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The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT, the oldest intelligence discipline, has proven to be a 
force multiplier for commanders during the Global War on Terror. 
As the Army downsizes its forces, refocuses priorities, and prepares for its Army 
20/20 vision, it will need to ensure that HUMINT remains at the forefront. In the coming 
years, the Army plans to downsize its force by 80,000 troops; it will also shift its focus 
toward the Asian Pacific region. As this transition happens, the Army should capitalize 
on ten years of operational experience. The Army currently possesses a large number of 
professional and experienced collectors; and has a unique opportunity to analyze their 
knowledge to answer the question: Does U.S. Army HUMINT doctrine achieve its 
objectives? 
To address this question, the author describes problems encountered by HUMINT 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. By identifying issues, the Army can adjust its doctrine and 
training to meet the changing needs of the nation. The author proposes that the Army 
should restructure the HUMINT MOS to better fit the current operations. This would 
improve the quality of the collector and eliminate shortcomings identified by HUMINT 
professionals. 
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I. DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS 
OBJECTIVES? WHAT HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
TAUGHT US? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT). Human intelligence, which is the oldest intelligence discipline,1 
through the course of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has proven a force multiplier 
for combat commanders. Information gathered directly from human interaction is 
immensely valuable and indispensable. Prior to the development of modern day technical 
intelligence collection platforms of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Geospatial 
Intelligence (GEOINT), HUMINT was the chief method of gathering intelligence. 
Throughout its history, U.S. Army Human Intelligence professionals have exploited 
spies, deserters, prisoners, and captured documents to provide commanders the most 
reliable intelligence picture. 
As the Army resets from Iraq and Afghanistan, downsizes it forces, refocuses its 
priorities, and prepares for the new Army 2020 vision, it will need to ensure that 
HUMINT remains at the forefront. Recently, the Army announced it plans to downsize 
its force by 80,000 troops, and it will shift its focus toward the Asian Pacific region. As 
the Army transitions, it should capitalize on ten years of operational experience. The 
Army fortunately possesses a sizeable number of professional and experienced HUMINT 
collectors, and has a unique opportunity to analyze challenges faced by HUMINT. By 
analyzing these challenges, TRADOC can modify its training and doctrine to prepare for 
future conflicts. This is the intent of this thesis. 
The 9/11 attacks exposed a national need for additional intelligence professionals, 
as well a demand for larger and a more skilled HUMINT capability. Washington Times 
journalist Frank J. Cilluffo wrote that “there is no substitute for experienced and 
                                                 
1 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence. From Secrets to Policy (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE publications, 
2012), 102. 
 2
knowledgeable human intelligence specialists,”2 and although the Army has made 
tremendous efforts to fill this need, institutional problems still exist. The Army’s 
objective has been to expand its HUMINT capabilities by increasing the size of its force, 
and by enhancing training and employment of collectors at all levels.3 The Army’s effort 
to improve its capability has included changing the HUMINT Field Manual, expanding 
training by establishing a new HUMINT training center and deploying thousands of 
troops to gain valuable real world experience. These efforts have made notable strides in 
professionalizing the HUMINT corps, but nevertheless, Army leadership continues to 
express frustration with its HUMINT capability. 
Although over the years there have been many recommendations on Army 
intelligence reform, this thesis is unique in that it recommends restructuring the 
HUMINT military occupational specialty (MOS) to meet changing objectives. Before 
discussing MOS restructuring, it is necessary to identify existing problems and other 
professional recommendations on improving HUMINT. 
B. PROBLEM 1—HUMINT ROLE IS CHANGING 
The primary problem stems from the expanding role of the conventional Army 
HUMINTer. Traditionally, the role of the HUMINT military occupational specialty 
(MOS) centered on interrogations but has since evolved beyond the interrogation booth. 
During past conventional wars, such as WWII and Vietnam, there was a need for a large 
number of young interrogators; this was due to the large number of Enemy Prisoners of 
War (EPWs).4 Young interrogators frequently shared characteristics with the EPWs they 
interrogated. This commonality between the detainee and interrogator aided the 
collection of intelligence. As the nature of U.S. conflicts changed from conventional 
warfare to operations other than war, such as in the Balkans, or counterinsurgency 
                                                 
2 Frank Cilluffo, “How Can the U.S. Improve Human Intelligence,” Washington Times, July 6, 2008, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/06/how-can-the-us-improve-human-intelligence/. 
3 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, “Growing Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities,” 2012 
Army Posture Statement, February 5, 2012, 
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2012/InformationPapers/ViewPaper.asp
x?id=179. 
4 Federation of American Scientists, “History of Military Intelligence,” November 8, 2012, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/miotc/mihist.htm. 
 3
(COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the Army Interrogator expanded. 
Army interrogators no longer solely interrogated. The missions necessitated the use of 
trained interrogators in military source operations (MSO), force protection screening, 
debriefings, and analysis. The Army needed fewer specifically trained interrogators and 
more individuals to perform a wider range of military source operations and other 
HUMINT related tasks. Regrettably, training did not teach these tasks to collectors. 
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the Army human intelligence 
MOS has continued to evolve and collectors are required to perform more tasks than ever 
before. While the role is changing, HUMINT training has failed to sufficiently keep up 
with the growing responsibilities. This represents the primary problem facing Army 
HUMINT. The U.S. Army’s HUMINT mission is not appropriately supported by its 
doctrine and training. In 2007, the Army recognized the growing duties and 
responsibilities of an Interrogator and changed of MOS’s name and nomenclature. The 
new 35M (HUMINT collector) replaced the old 97E (Interrogator) MOS.5 
Along with the changing of the MOS’s nomenclature, changes also came to 
doctrine and training. In September of 2006, the Army released the new Army Field 
Manual (FM) 2-22.3 that “provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures 
governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical 
assets in support of the commander’s intelligence needs.”6 The new manual, mixed with 
command guidance, necessitated lengthening initial training to accommodate for 19 
newly identified critical tasks.7 
HUMINT doctrine describes the critical tasks as Debriefing, Liaison, Screening, 
Tactical Questioning, Document and Media Exploitation (DOCEX/DOMEX) Analysis, 
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Military Source Operations and Interrogations.8 The 
Army employs HUMINT in a variety of missions, depending on the military operation, to 
                                                 
5 John Andruszka and George Stemler, “Training the Corps, USAIC’s 35M10 HUMINT Collector 
Course—An Overview,” Military Intelligence (July–September 2007): 28. 
6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Ft. 
Huachuca, AZ: DoA, 2006), VI. 
7 Andruszka and Stemler, “Training the Corps.” 
8 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, vi. 
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include offensive, defensive, stability, and reconstruction operations. HUMINTers collect 
intelligence through screening, interrogation, debriefing, liaison, and human source 
operations. Sources of HUMINT can include first- or second-hand knowledge from ally, 
neutral, or enemy forces. “Categories of HUMINT sources include but are not limited to, 
detainees, enemy prisoners of war, refugees, displaced persons, local inhabitants, friendly 
forces, and members of foreign governmental and nongovernmental organizations.”9 
In spite of the Army’s efforts at changing doctrine and improving training, they 
have not done enough. Army HUMINT has grown at a rate with which training has not 
been able to keep up. The Army still trains interrogation as the primary skill even though 
collectors are performing fewer and fewer interrogations. Military Source Operations 
(MSO) and other tasks are considered secondary. “In terms of training, only six weeks of 
18 weeks of the 35M Course is devoted to MSO vis-à-vis interrogations.”10 Having been 
through the course, this thesis’s author remembers the MSO instruction as inadequate. 
Soldiers require comprehensive training to conduct proper MSO. 
Trainers only briefly mention other HUMINT tasks and devote almost no time to 
teaching and perfecting them. DOMEX, analysis, and OSINT, although important, are 
traditionally thought of as less critical than Interrogations or Source Operations. While 
training does not emphasize these skills, unit commanders still expect proficiency in 
them. One task in particular, analysis, is extremely crucial regardless of the HUMINT 
activity. The fact is that analysis of HUMINT reporting is extremely vital. FM 22-2.3 
states “analysis is an integral part of HUMINT collection … [and] occurs throughout the 
HUMINT collection process;”11 but unfortunately, it takes a back seat to collection. 
Since the collection aspect of HUMINT is extremely time-consuming, collectors often 
neglect or do not have time for the analysis portion. Analysis at the human collection 
team (HCT) level is often non-existent. Additionally, unlike SIGINT’s, the human 
intelligence field does not have designated analysts. All Source Analysts (35F), which 
                                                 
9 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, ch. 12, para. 12–1. 
10 Dylan T. Randazzo, “Fixing Tactical HUMINT: The Case for Low-Level HUMINT Collector” 
(master’s thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, July 2008), 24. 
11 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, ch. 1, para. 1–6. 
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rarely interact directly with collectors, do the majority of the analysis of HUMINT 
reporting. This creates a problem, where the analysis of reports and sources is far 
removed from the collectors. Moreover, collectors often are not able to discuss and 
explain the nuances of reports or sources with the analysts, leading to misinterpretation or 
dismissal of crucial information. 
Another contributing difficulty to analysis is that traditionally, unit intelligence 
“fusion” centers exclude HUMINT collectors. There are two root causes for this. The 
first, HUMINT soldiers lack the clearance to enter Top-Secret Sensitive Compartmented 
Information Facilities (SCIF), preventing collectors from participating in intelligence 
briefings and operational planning.12 As a result, HUMINT operator’s concerns and 
opinions are excluded from the decision-making process. Second, HUMINT Collection 
Teams (HCTs) accompany maneuver units to small patrol bases, away from the 
intelligence centers whereas; the analysts are located with the Brigade fusion centers. 
The current objectives and tasks identified in Army FM 2-22.3 are clear and valid; 
however, amid a changing operational environment the problem arises in identifying 
which tasks are the most crucial. The Army seems to prefer MSO collectors to 
interrogators, and while analysis is extremely vital, it gets insufficient attention. 
C. PROBLEM 2—ARMY HUMINT INCREASED QUANTITY AT THE 
EXPENSE OF QUALITY 
In addition to the expanding role of HUMINT, the Army also adopted a policy of 
“Growing HUMINT Capability.”13 For the past several years in the Army’s Posture 
Statement, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 has said that the Army plans to create a “robust, 
well-trained HUMINT force.”14 During the Global War on Terror, the U.S. Army 
drastically increased the number of HUMINT collectors in the field, tripling the size of 
                                                 
12 Until recently, HUMINT collectors were required to have only a Secret Security Clearance. The 
Army has since changed this policy. 
13 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, “Growing Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities, 2012 





its force. The active duty HUMINT force grew from 950 soldiers in 2004 to 
approximately 3,500 in 2011.15 Currently, Army Intelligence is the largest force provider 
for worldwide full-spectrum Department of Defense (DoD)-level HUMINT operations.16 
This increase in size, regrettably, came at a price. Quality of collectors has suffered at the 
expense of quantity. 
1. Lowering of ASVAB Score 
To fill the need for additional HUMINTers, the Army lowered the qualification 
requirements for entry into the MOS. The U.S. Army’s Recruiting Command responded 
by reducing the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery’s (ASVAB) Skill Technical 
(ST) score from 100 to 95.17 Recruiting Command, feeling the pressure to provide more 
HUMINTers, granted waivers to individuals who previously would not have qualified for 
the MOS. Allowing these soldiers into the MOS required Advanced Initial Training 
(AIT) standard to lower to the least common denominator. “One officer in charge of an 
aspect of the 35M training admitted that the Army had ‘lowered the standards for these 
HUMINT soldiers in order to get more of them out to the field and into the fight.’”18 
While this facilitated the Army getting soldiers into the field quickly, it decreased the 
quality of the soldier’s collection ability. 
2. Suspension of DLAB and Language Training 
Standards were further reduced when, in 2004, the Army suspended the foreign 
language proficiency requirement. Language suspension facilitated quick deployment of 
soldiers but further decreased the quality of the collector. Previously, recruits were 
mandated to pass the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) with a minimum score 
                                                 




16 Association of the United States Army, “Voice for the Army–Support for the Soldier, Revitalizing 
Army HUMINT, Army Intelligence Transformation,” June 2005, 
http://www.ausa.org/publications/torchbearercampaign/tnsr/Documents/TB_KeyIssues.pdf. 
17 The ASVAB is the entrance exam all soldiers are required to take, it measures developed abilities 
and predicts academic and occupational success in the military. 
18 Randazzo, “Fixing Tactical HUMINT,” 24. 
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of 95% to be eligible for the MOS. The suspension of the language requirement 
essentially meant that soldiers no longer had to take the DLAB, although the Army never 
officially removed the requirement. The DLAB test measures a person’s ability to learn a 
foreign language. Those who are able to learn a foreign language are usually far more 
effective HUMINTers. Strong collectors, who demonstrate an ability to learn a foreign 
language, are remarkably familiar with the language after spending a year in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, even if they did not formally study it. 
When the HUMINT MOS required soldiers to learn a foreign language, new 
recruits attended the Defense Language Institute (DLI), where they would learn one of 24 
languages.19 DLI Language programs vary in length from 26 to 64 weeks of training, 
depending on the language difficulty. Arabic, for example, is a 64-week course while 
Dari, Pashto, and Persian Farsi are 48-week courses. While at DLI, soldiers learn vital 
information about the language, culture, and customs of their country. DLI offers 
Cultural Exposure Exercises that provides students a sense of the operational 
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, during language training, students 
study in a combined Army/academic environment that allows students mature and gain 
precious knowledge of a target language and culture. DLI’s military training permits 
soldiers to develop a deeper understanding of basic Army policies and procedures. 
Soldiers also foster writing skills and acquire a greater understanding of military 
operations by interacting with instructors, senior military personnel, and experienced 
soldiers from other job fields. In some cases, soldiers are even able to earn associates 
degrees from DLI. Since 2001, DLI has awarded more than 4,000 associate degrees.20 
During this additional time spent in language training, soldiers build up confidence, 
maturity, and cultural understanding of target countries. These traits, as the data will 
suggest, are vital to be effective HUMINTers in combat environments. 
 
                                                 
19 Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, General Catalog 2011–2012 (2011): 19, 
http://www.dliflc.edu/archive/documents/DLICatalog2011_2012_NEW.pdf. 
20 Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Flagship 0-2 Conference (January 2010): 5–
12, http://www.utexas.edu/cola/centers/tlc/_files/proficiencyconference/presentations/DLI/1.pdf. 
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By lowering the entrance qualification, requirements and removing the language 
requirement the Army reduced the abilities of the collector. This has created a knowledge 
gap among collectors and, although not their fault, many collectors do not possess the 
skills required to perform proper their job. 
D. PROBLEM 3- REWRITING THE INTERROGATION MANUAL 
A third problem arises from the legality of past and present interrogation doctrine. 
Since the scandals associated with Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay interrogation 
facilities, there have been debates on the legal and ethical conduct during interrogations. 
These debates led the Army to establish new legislation governing interrogation. Based 
on this new legislation, the Army rewrote its interrogation manual the new FM 2-22.3 
“Human Intelligence Collector Operation.” Despite this change in doctrine, problems 
remain within the interrogation function of the MOS. 
Problems with interrogations include several factors. First, mistakes made within 
interrogations facilities have placed a black eye on the Army interrogation program, 
putting practices under severe scrutiny ever since. This scrutiny often led to commanders 
not wanting to conduct interrogations in fear of repeating past mistakes. Additionally, as 
the U.S. transfers responsibility over to host countries, the Security Agreements often 
restrict the length of detainment. In Afghanistan, for example, according to the 
Memorandum of Understanding between Afghanistan and the U.S. states that the U.S. 
should turn detainees over to Afghan security forces or release them within 72 hours.21 
In addition, initial entry soldiers receive a mere 44 days of interrogation training, 
but the Army expects them to be both professional and effective in the booth. This 
shortage of training, as the data will show, has proven to be insufficient during combat 
operations. The Army lacks an adequate amount of follow-on training or sustainment 
training, further compounding the problem. As the literature review will demonstrate, that  
 
 
                                                 
21Abdul Rahim Wardak and John Allen, “The Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America MoU,” Headquarters, United States Forces-
Afghanistan, March 9, 2012, http://www.public.navy.mil/ia/documents/Civ_Clothing_Afghan.pdf. 
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while the new manual is highly regarded as a significant improvement to interrogation 
operations, many have voiced concerns that it has shortcomings that hinder future 
interrogation operations.22 
The combination of these issues makes one wonder whether interrogation should 
remain as the MOS’s primary task. Should the Army change its policy on training young 
initial entry soldiers in interrogations; or should interrogation become the responsibility 
of mature and experienced collectors? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
To develop insight into problems facing HUMINT, the author relied upon data 
collected from a combination of, personal experience, and research. Initially, the author’s 
unique perspective, as a Human Intelligence Warrant officer, formed the research topic 
and hypotheses driving this study. Beyond personal experiences, this research project 
analyzes literature from multiple sources to offer a comprehensive examination on 
whether U.S. Army HUMINT’s current doctrine meets its objectives. The author 
reviewed scholarly books and articles, military academic theses, and papers on 
intelligence reform. By understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the National 
HUMINT effort, one can apply these opinions directly to improving U.S. Army 
HUMINT. 
The author will argue that the best method on solving HUMINT issues would be 
for the Army to restructure the MOS and align soldiers exclusively to one geographical 
region. Geographical regional alignment has succeeded with other Army communities, 
such as Foreign Area Officer and Special Forces. The author suggests that soldiers 
entering the MOS should be designated as HUMINT analysts in order to emphasize the 
primacy of the analysis mission. First term HUMINTers would have limited collection 
responsibilities and focus on report writing, OSINT, DOMEX, cultural knowledge and 
                                                 
22 Frank Anderson, Robert Baer, Vincent Cannitraro, Jack Cloonan, Mark Fallon, Stu Herrington, 
David Irvine, Steven Kleinman, Patrick Lang, Malcolm Nance, Joe Navarro, Haviland Smith, Ali Soufan, 
and Harry E. Soyster, “Letter from Interrogators and Intelligence Officials—To The Honorable Robert M. 




other aspects HUMINT. The Army would reserve collection for the second term soldiers, 
primarily E-5 and above. HUMINT collection would be divided into two tracks; soldiers 
would choose between interrogation and MSO. They would receive advanced training in 
their chosen field and be assigned an additional skill identifier (ASI). Upon completing 
advanced MOS training, they will attend DLI to acquire a language in their assigned 
region. With a designated ASI and language identification, code (LIC) it would be easy 
for Human Resources Command (HRC) to assign soldiers to appropriate units. Chapter V 
will discuss this recommendation. 
1. Personal Experience 
The author drew motivation for this research from personal experience as a 
HUMINT Platoon leader and Operational Management Team (OMT)23 Chief during 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq from 2008 to 2010. As 172nd Infantry Brigade’s 
OMT Chief, the author guided the operations of eight individual four–five-man HUMINT 
collection teams operating in five separate provinces. The Brigade’s footprint stretched 
across the Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit provinces. This large area was 
conducive to HUMINT source operations, and each HCT collected intelligence from 
numerous sources. 
The Brigade conducted limited interrogation operations during its one-year 
deployment. Of approximately forty-two HUMINT collectors only three, (including the 
author), received the required “Theater Interrogation Training.”24 At the Brigade level, 
less than a dozen actual interrogations took place. Most HUMINT collectors strictly 
performed Military Source Operations. About half of the collectors had previous real 
world HUMINT experience; of these, only one Staff Sergeant had ever worked as an 
interrogator in a combat environment. 
                                                 
23 The OMT performs a necessary function when two or more HCTs deploy by assisting the HUMINT 
element commander in tasking and providing technical support to assigned or attached HCTs. FM 2-22.3, 
ch. 2, para. 2–10. 
24 Theater Interrogation Training is required before being authorized to interrogate. Training consists 
of Geneva Conventions Training, Authorized Approaches Training, Separation Training, Force Protection 
Training, as well as conducting left and right seat ride interrogations. 
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Although the 172nd Brigade (BDE) acquired additional collectors for the Iraq 
deployment, the Manpower and Equipment Requirements & Authorizations (MTOE) 
only authorized the Brigade with seven HUMINT and Counterintelligence personnel. 
This authorized number of HUMINT assets was woefully insufficient. The Brigade’s 
MTOE authorizes the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) one CI team consisting of 
one CI Warrant officer, one CI Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and one CI lower 
enlisted. Likewise, the BDE’s MTOE authorizes only one HUMINT team; that includes 
one HUMINT Warrant, one Senior NCO, and two lower enlisted soldiers. This 
authorized number of HUMINT assets is dreadfully unrealistic, and without additional 
supporting assets, the Brigade could not fulfill its wartime mission. 
The Brigade’s lack of HUMINT assets continued as they prepared to deploy to 
Afghanistan in 2011. The MICO struggled to maintain an adequate number of 
HUMINTers to support their upcoming mission. For the first eight months upon returning 
from Iraq, the HUMINT platoon lacked a Senior NCO to act as a Platoon Sergeant. The 
Army assigned many of the experienced collectors to follow-on units or the soldiers 
exited military service. By the beginning of the Afghanistan deployment, only two 
sergeants of seventeen soldiers remained from the previous deployment. One additional 
Staff Sergeant had arrived to the unit with previous HUMINT experience. An 
experienced and capable Warrant Officer (WO1) became the platoon leader/OMT chief; 
however, but he arrived to the unit only a few weeks before the deployment and did not 
have time to become familiar with the unit’s collectors. 
The majority of the HUMINT collectors were young and inexperienced. None of 
the soldiers ever attended any foreign language training. The bulk came straight out of 
AIT (advanced initial training). The unit made every effort to train these soldiers, but 
mandatory non-HUMINT unit training trumped any distinct MOS preparation. Before 
deployment, the unit only managed to send four soldiers to the Source Operations 
Course, which is the primary course for MSO. The collective knowledge of the HUMINT 
platoon was well short of what was needed. 
Even with an available 17 soldiers, the MICO struggled to fill a 3-man OMT and 
4-four-man HCTs. Five of the newly arrived soldiers were non-deployable. Three 
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soldiers had physical profiles that prevented them from deploying. The soldiers acquired 
these physical limitations during basic training, AIT or even before entering military 
service. These tactical HUMINT collectors would likely never be able to deploy or 
perform their job in the real world scenarios. Units throughout the Army had similar 
complications. 
Two areas in which the author felt the HUMINT platoon needed particular 
training on are automation & research tools, and reporting cycle & intelligence 
requirements. These skills were not sufficiently taught during AIT and created problems 
as the unit prepared to deploy to Afghanistan 
a. Automation and Research Tools 
Soldiers had limited knowledge of the automation, communication, and 
research tools they would use in the field. In past deployments, many soldiers were not 
familiar with the classified systems they were expected to use. Inexperienced HUMINT 
soldiers rarely conduct research at the unclassified and classified level, often become 
frustrated with complex systems, and simply stopped using them. 
There are two good examples of this practice. The first is the misuse or 
non-use of the HUMINT Tool Kit. The tool kit, known as CI/HUMINT Information 
Management System (CHIMS) and CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS), is the 
primary equipment issued to HUMINT teams. It includes a computer, scanner, digital 
camera, printer, GPS, secure telephone, and other hardware to meet mission 
requirements.25 Unfortunately, because of unfamiliarity with the operation of many of the 
peripherals, teams often only used the laptop computer, and left the other devices in 
storage. 
To complicate this matter was the Army’s policy on banning thumb 
drives. To ensure that Soldiers were not using external storage devices, unit S6 shops 
often blocked USB ports on all computers. This practice essentially rendered the 
                                                 
25 Federation of American Scientists, “Counterintelligence /Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) 
CI/HUMINT Information Management Systems (CHIMS) CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) 
CI/HUMINT All Source Integration System (CHASIS),” February 23, 2000, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/ci_humint.htm. 
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peripherals useless. Although these systems technically should not have had their ports 
blocked, many times when HUMINT teams requested to be connected to the Secure 
Internet Protocol Router (SIPR), S6 shops would, by routine, make the ports inoperable. 
Remedying the issue was a lengthy process, for which the teams often did not have time. 
A second example was the practice of not using programs designed 
specifically for HUMINT reporting. It was commonplace for soldiers to default to using 
MS Word and Outlook to write and send reports because they were more familiar with 
them. A specific example was a system used by CENTCOM. It is a reporting tool named 
the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). Of which MG Flynn said, 
“CIDNE provides a platform for organizing knowledge in order to answer the 
fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are 
trying to protect and persuade.”26 This program offers multiple features, such as routing 
intelligence information reports (IIRs), searching for additional intelligence reports, 
plotting and mapping tool, as well as a system to send and receive intelligence 
requirements. Though it is a valuable tool, soldiers who are not familiar with it are unable 
to fully utilize its potential. Bandwidth shortage and complexity of the system further 
encouraged teams to default to using MS Word and secure email to communicate, 
practically rendering CIDNE useless at the HCT level. 
Training should produce soldiers that are familiar with HUMINT tools 
before using them in a combat environment. Additionally, shoulders should be taught to 
use other research tools such DCGS, SOMMS, M3, Intellipedia, and other open source 
resources. 
b. Reporting Cycle and Intelligence Requirements 
Another issue is soldiers not completely understanding the reporting cycle. 
Many soldiers fail to understand the reporting cycle beyond the HCT/OMT level. Novice 
collectors should recognize that their reporting fits into a larger intelligence picture.  
 
                                                 
26 Brandie Woodard, “Data Exchange Becomes “Go-To” Software for Theater Information,” Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, 2012, http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123296334. 
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Information collected from one source could answer intelligence requirements from other 
units or agencies. Unfortunately, collectors often fail to look beyond reporting for the 
company or brigade that they support. 
Along with this, new soldiers are not familiar with intelligence 
requirements on which they should collect. The reason for this is simply that they are not 
taught how to do so. Ten level training concentrates so much on appropriate questioning 
techniques, it fails to explain why the soldiers are asking questions in the first place. It 
has been said that there is no such thing as intelligence for intelligence’s sake. FM 2-22.3 
states, “The HUMINT collector needs not only to know, but also to understand the 
requirements that he will be attempting to answer. These requirements can include 
Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence 
Requirements (PIRs) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), Intelligence 
Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), specific requests from national level consumers 
such as HUMINT collection requirements (HCRs), source directed requirements (SDRs), 
or even vocal orders given by the local commander. These all will determine the 
objective of the questioning plan.”27 HUMINTers should be taught how important 
requirements are and should understand where requirements derive. “All intelligence 
requirements for collection are and must be based on and traceable to the NIPF [National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework].”28 The NIPF is the “sole mechanism for establishing 
national intelligence priorities,” and is updated and presidentially approved 
semiannually.29 Although each HUMINT report references NIPFs and PIRs, soldiers 
rarely understand their importance. It usually takes one operational assignment to grasp 
the significance of intelligence requirements. 
                                                 
27 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, ch. 7, para. 7–3. 
28 T. O’Connor, “Intelligence Collection,” MegaLinks in Criminal Justice, July 5, 2011, 
http://www.drtomoconnor.com/4125/4125lect01a.htm. 
29 Federation of American Scientists, “Intelligence Community Directive Number 204, Roles and 
Responsibilities for the National Intelligence Priorities Framework,” September 13, 2007, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-204.pdf. 
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2. Scholarly and Military Opinions 
This research encompassed scholarly opinions from national intelligence experts, 
such as Amy Zegart who has written extensively on the intelligence failures of 9/11 and 
intelligence reform and Dr. Mark Lowenthal, who wrote Intelligence: From Secrets to 
Policy. The author focused on scholars that addressed intelligence reform like Jennifer 
Sims and Burton Gerber book, Transforming U.S. Intelligence-Managing HUMINT. 
Furthermore, this research utilized academic papers and theses completed by Intelligence 
officers from the National Defense Intelligence College, Naval Postgraduate School, and 
United States Army Command & General Staff College. The Evaluation of Current 
Policies section covers these papers that concentrate on personal opinions of utilization of 
Tactical HUMINT teams. 
3. Professional HUMINTer Opinions 
To provide current and relevant data the author evaluated testimonials and survey 
material from HUMINT professionals. This data originated from post deployment after 
action reviews (AARs), and on-line intelligence forums. The opinions reflect individual 
sentiments and experiences of U.S. Army HUMINTers, and largely vary. These firsthand 
accounts offer unique perspectives from those with deployment experience. Informative 
trends emerged while reviewing this material, many of which supports this thesis’ 
hypotheses. 
Although, these opinions are useful, there are limits to there validity. These 
thoughts are deeply rooted in personal experiences, and contain biases that might not 
represent HUMINT as a whole. Likewise, comments are from opinion forums, in which 
individuals are not held accountable for their statements nor do the opinions have any 
effect on Army policy or doctrine. 
F. SOURCES 
To gather data that highlights the problems with Army HUMINT, the author 
relied upon Army websites, such as Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and the 
Army Professional Forum – Military Intelligence Space (MI Space). The data collected 
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from these sources was reviewed to determine what the consensus is on failures of 
HUMINT. These websites provide a wealth of information written by active duty 
Enlisted Soldiers, Warrant Officers, Officers, and other HUMINT professionals with 
combat deployments. 
The Center for Army Lessons Learned collects opinions of lessons learned from 
combat experiences. By contacting CALL the author received more than 90 HUMINT-
related documents from a senior military analyst. These documents included unit after 
action reviews, unit developed HUMINT standard operating procedures (SOP) manuals, 
intelligence articles, and other HUMINT related material on current obstacles to 
HUMINT policy, doctrine, and training. 
Some of the most useful documents were the after action reviews written by units 
returning from deployment. Since, every deployment is unique, based on location and 
that no two units employ their HUMINT collectors in the same manner, these AARs 
represent the most comprehensive data available. The AARs cover both interrogation and 
military source operations and identify specific issues that HUMINT collectors 
encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. The objective of reviewing AARs was to determine 
if there were common systemic problem areas within HUMINT. 
Equally as valuable were opinions gathered from on-line professional forums, 
specifically from the Military Intelligence Space (MI-Space) forum. MI-Space is one of 
more than 60 professional forums available from the Army Operational Knowledge 
Management (AOKM) System. It is an online professional forum where members share 
knowledge and resources. Professional forums foster collaboration among Soldiers, 
subject matter experts, and units. Online forums help the Army share “expertise and 
experience, develop intuitive leaders, and develop organizations and teams.”30 They 
“provide a secure place where candid conversations can occur.”31 As of November 2012, 
Army Professional forum had 264,719 members, and MI-Space had more than 3,700 
members. 
                                                 




The Army calls its supported and structured communities of practice 
“professional forums.” AOKM provides a nested network of more than 60 
facilitated professional forums and hundreds of knowledge networks that 
provide a foundation for knowledge creation and exchange. These 
professional forums differ slightly from communities of practice found in 
other professions and industry. Army professional forums focus on leader 
development. They intersect with other knowledge networks, communities 
of purpose, and knowledge centers through their members and facilitators. 
They maintain a secure place where candid conversations can occur. 
Through these online professional forums, Army Soldiers and civilians 
connect to share explicit and tacit knowledge to solve problems, share best 
practices and develop their professional skills. Leaders and staff members 
have access to members with similar duty positions and challenges. 
Functional specialists and those interested in a particular specialized 
domain gather virtually in focused forums. Many members of AOKM 
forums maintain dual membership in two or more forums and serve to 
vitally transfer observation, insights, lessons learned and best practices 
across the boundaries of organizational hierarchy.32 
MI-Space forum provides the most up-to-date discussions about the Army’s 
Intelligence corps. MI-Space separates forums into each of the unique intelligence 
disciplines, which enables members to focus discussion among those with similar 
interests. MI-Space members include Officers, Warrant Officers, Enlisted, Retirees, and 
various other intelligence professionals. For this research, the author utilized the 
HUMINT specific forum. 
To answer this thesis’ principle research questions: Does U.S. Army HUMINT 
Doctrine achieve its Objectives? What have Iraq and Afghanistan taught us? The author 
combined data from his own personal experience, scholarly opinions, military papers, 
lessons learned, and opinions from professional forums. This data represents opinions 
ranging from the National level down to the Tactical level. This collection methodology 
intended to gather as much relevant information possible. Chapter III will cover all 
relevant findings. 
                                                 
32 Army Operational Knowledge Management, “Professional Forums AOKM Forum.” 
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G. CHALLENGES  
The U.S. Army intelligence corps faces challenges in the years ahead; with the 
reduction of troops and budget, how can the Army continue to professionalize its 
remaining troops? The Army’s HUMINT capabilities remain essential for successful 
intelligence operations. HUMINT played a critical role in the success of the Global War 
on Terror, and has proven to be extremely valuable in all operational environments. 
The 35M HUMINT Collector MOS grew rapidly since the onset of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars. During GWOT, the Army deployed thousands of HUMINT collectors. 
The Army currently has a robust and highly experienced HUMINT force. In a changing 
operating environment, the Army must ensure that it retains skilled and experienced 
HUMINT operators, while at the same time professionalize the entire MOS. 
Although, today’s HUMINT collectors are the most experienced and capable that 
the Army has ever possessed, the rapid growth caused a decline in the quality of 
collection and reporting. Today, weak collectors occupy many positions throughout the 
ranks; many of these collectors have limited interpersonal skills, writing abilities and 
basic traits that HUMINT collectors should possess. 
In addition to the presence of weak collectors, the Army faces another challenge 
with the availability of quality training. Advanced or sustainment training is often hard to 
come by. The Army is constrained by funding, course availability, and training slot 
obtainability, along with countless other factors. Training among the HUMINT corps 
varies drastically. TRADOC offers several MSO specific courses, but interrogation 
courses are limited. Likewise, the type and amount of training an individual collector has 
significantly varies. Strong collectors are often rewarded with advanced training; 
whereas, weak collectors rarely receive any. These drawbacks, and the problems 
mentioned in Chapter I, have led to the following hypotheses. 
H. HYPOTHESES 
1. Across the Army, experienced HUMINT collectors have conducted only a 
small subset of assigned tasks. The Army would better meet its intent by redefining 
HUMINT primary tasks. 
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 A wide range assigned HUMINT tasks has created a force whose 
specialties vary dramatically from one another. This has caused limited 
proficiency in areas that soldiers have not worked. Those with experience 
with interrogations may be proficient in screening and interrogations but 
may have zero experience with source operations or liaison work. 
 The roles and responsibilities of the Army HUMINT have grown beyond 
what a single collector can reasonably master. 
2. Human Intelligence Collectors (35M MOS) lack regional language and cultural 
expertize required to conduct HUMINT properly. 
 Frequent assignment changes and deployments to various regions of the 
world have prevented soldiers from acquiring the regional knowledge and 
language expertize in any one country. 
 The suspension of the language requirement has decreased the quality of 
HUMINT collector. HUMINT would benefit from reinstating the 
language requirement, but only if the Army assigns Soldiers to position in 
which they utilize the language. 
3. Training suffered during the Global War on Terror. AIT allowed soldiers to 
complete initial training even though they lacked the skills to perform the job properly. 
 Some collectors lack the age and maturity to engage the populace of the 
host country. 
 Some collectors lack basic writing and analytical skills to write reports, in 
a manner that answers the commander’s intelligence requirements 
properly. 
4. By restructuring the MOS, collectors would be better suited to satisfy assigned 
HUMINT tasks. 
 Initial entry soldiers should not be collectors, but rather HUMINT analyst. 
 Interrogations and Military Source Operation should be separated into two 
tracks. 
I. OVERVIEW 
The remainder of the chapters will expand on the problems facing Army 
HUMINT, while also recommending the best way to capitalize on the experience and 
talents of current collectors. 
Chapter II discusses and evaluates current Army policies and training. It provides 
a short synopsis of current 10 level and advance HUMINT training programs. It then 
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reviews writings from scholarly intelligence experts and proposes that experience Army 
collects could supplement the national HUMINT enterprise. Next, the author discusses 
how and why the Army modified its interrogation doctrine, and rewrote the field manual 
governing HUMINT collection. The finial portion discusses Military sentiments that 
express a need for greater capability and improvement of current HUMINT. 
Chapter III takes an in-depth look at the findings of the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL) website, unit AARs, and MI-Space professional online forums. The data 
collected here provides insight into HUMINT related issues and addresses the primary 
research question and hypotheses of this study. It presents questions on whether or not 
the current training system meets the needs of the Army, particularly what is the primary 
HUMINT task and is the Army training soldiers to be proficient in it. The chapter also 
addressed concerns about the importance of foreign language proficiency. The final two 
topics touched on are, making HUMINT a non-entry level MOS, or splitting the MOS 
into analysis, interrogation, and source operation tracks. 
In Chapter IV, the author provides his conclusion and recommendations. This 
thesis suggests that the Army HUMINT has never been in a better position to capitalize 
on real world experience to professionalize the corps. The author makes 
recommendations on how to adjust current policies, and training to match what collectors 
face in the field. These recommendations provide a possible framework on how U.S. 
Army human intelligence can remain relevant and bring Army HUMINT on par with 
other Defense HUMINT agencies 
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II. CURRENT POLICIES 
A. CURRENT POLICIES 
The U.S. Army remains committed to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
campaigns around the world and requires trained professional HUMINT collectors to 
achieve its goals. Claims advocate HUMINT has lost much of its stature due to the 
development of highly technical intelligence disciplines as signals intelligence, imagery 
intelligence, and measures and signals intelligence. Over the past ten years, there has 
been renewed recognition of the importance of HUMINT. International intelligence 
professional Kerry Patton suggests, “America’s HUMINT is like the bald eagle--it may 
be endangered, but it is making a comeback.”33 
With the successes of HUMINT during the GWOT, the intelligence community 
has identified a need for a robust and aggressive HUMINT. The U.S. Army has led the 
way to improve its HUMINT capability to provide proper training and professionalize the 
corps. 
1. Doctrine 
DOD HUMINT falls under the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and is executed 
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), COCOMs, DIA, and Military 
Departments. The Army field manual (FM-22-2.3) provides the “doctrinal guidance, 
techniques, and procedures governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) 
collection.”34 Only specially trained collectors carry out Army HUMINT. These include 
enlisted personnel in the MOS 35M (HUMINT Collector), enlisted personnel in the MOS 
35L (Counterintelligence Agent), Warrant Officers in the MOS 351M (Human 
Intelligence Collection Technician), Warrant Officers with the 351L MOS 
(Counterintelligence Technician), and Commissioned officers in the MOS 35E 
                                                 
33 Kerry Patton, “The Pentagon’s New Clandestine Service,” American Thinker, April 27, 2012, 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/04/the_pentagons_new_defense_clandestine_service.html#ixzz1wq
SmwkoY. 
34 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3. 
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(Counterintelligence Officer) and MOS 35F (Human Intelligence Officer). These trained 
collectors are the only authorized Army personnel that can legally conduct HUMINT 
operations. 
Many commanders often consider HUMINT and Counterintelligence as one in the 
same. However, it should be noted, that counterintelligence specialties are not allowed to 
conduct interrogations, and conversely, Human Intelligence specialties do not conduct 
counterintelligence investigations. Throughout GWOT CI Agents (35L) largely worked 
as source handlers. MSO often took precedence over the CI mission downrange. This 
overlap in operations complicates the role of HUMINT. For the purposes of this paper, 
policies, doctrine, and training for the counterintelligence field will not be covered. 
2. Training 
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca is responsible for 
providing Army personnel HUMINT training. Ft. Huachuca provides numerous 
HUMINT training opportunities. Similar to the increased numbers within the MOS, the 
Army has also expanded the HUMINT courses available. Available training includes the 
initial MOS producing course as well as advance HUMINT training. 
In 2007, the Army G-2 and Ft. Huachuca worked closely with the DIA to 
establish the HUMINT Training – Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE). HT-JCOE is 
DoD’s only training center for advanced HUMINT and, as of 2011, provides 11 
advanced HUMINT training courses.35 In addition to providing training to Army 
personnel, HT-JCOE is working to “establish joint HUMINT training standards” and 
expand joint training across the “Defense HUMINT Enterprise.”36 HT-JCOE has three 
separate branches, the Military Source Operations Branch, Interrogations Branch and the 
Debriefing Branch. A general concept of Army HUMINT training structure is described 
below. 
                                                 
35 Federation of American Scientists, “A Short History of HT-JCOE,” Military Intelligence PB 34-10-
4, 36, no. 4 (October–December 2010): 7, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2010_04.pdf. 
36 Association of the United States Army, “Key Issues Relevant to Army Intelligence 
Transformation,” Torchbearer National Security Report (July 2007): 6, http://www.ausa.org. 
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a. Advanced Individual Training (AIT) 
The Human Intelligence Collectors course is the primary MOS producing 
school. During this 18 week 3 day training course, HUMINTers are trained and evaluated 
on 51 critical tasks. Training is divided into four modules that culminate with a field 
training exercise. Module A teaches HUMINT foundations. It is a 10-day training that 
covers, Law of Land Warfare, information security, protecting classified material, 
intelligence cycle and other military skills such as map reading. Module B is the longest 
training cycle, it consist of 44 days of interrogation training. It covers developing an 
interrogation plan, authorized approach techniques, questions and other related tasks. 
During Module C, which lasts 29 days, soldiers learn Military Source Operations. 
Soldiers learn about establishing rapport, the recruiting cycle, management of intelligence 
collection funds (ICF), and other MSO responsibilities. The Final Module D is a 10-day 
field training exercise where students perform all tasks in a simulated real world 
environment.37 
 
Figure 1.  Percent of Course by Training by Module 
 
                                                 
37 Andruszka and Stemler, “Training the Corps,” 30–32. 
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The 309th Military Intelligence Battalion (MIBN) is responsible for the HUMINT 
collectors’ course. The 309th MIBN says, “Soldiers graduating from the 35M 10 Course 
are fully prepared to rapidly assimilate into their permanent units as HUMINT 
Collector.”38 
Throughout the course, students learn to fully incorporate Military Justice 
and Intelligence Law into HUMINT collection services and operations. 
They practice interrogation techniques and procedures to include planning 
and preparation; questioning techniques; screening; assessment; 
approaches; research, and the application of analytic skills to curriculum 
problem sets. Students write numerous HUMINT related reports; identify 
information gaps; perform predictive analysis, and prepare link diagrams, 
time event charts, and activity and association matrices. Students learn to 
coordinate mission requirements with interrogators, interpreters, and 
translators to meet mission or unit requirements and are familiarized with 
Distributed Common Ground Station–Army (DCGS-A) system as part of 
their HUMINT automation training.39 
b. Advanced Training 
Advanced HUMINT training can be divided into 3 categories. Training 
consists of Military Source operations, which are the most robust, interrogation training, 
and other training that includes the Strategic Debriefing Course and civilian courses. 
(1) Military Source Operations. “MSO refers to the collection 
of foreign military and military-related intelligence by humans from humans.”40 Military 
Source Operations utilizes networks of informants to provide timely and accurate 
intelligence to superiors. Within the Army, only trained personnel conduct MSO under 
the direction of their commanders. “MSO sources include one-time, continuous, and 
formal contacts, from contact operations; and sources from interrogations, debriefings, 
and liaison activities.”41 
The Army divides MSO into three separate categories based on 
skill level. Category III MSO is taught during initial training. Level III MSO is the lowest 
                                                 
38 Andruszka and Stemler, “Training the Corps.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3. 
41 Ibid. 
 25
level, is usually overt, and does not allow HUMINTers to run formal contacts. Essentially 
formal contacts are recruited and can be tasked, trained, and paid. HUMINT sources are 
maintained or terminated based off their level of Placement and Access to intelligence 
information. Each source is carefully controlled to ensure oversight and deconfliction. All 
HUMINT and CI personnel are authorized to conduct level III MSO. To perform Level I 
-II MSO soldiers must attend additional certifying course. Soldiers that receive this 
training are awarded additional skill identifiers (ASI). 
HT-JCOE’s Military Source Operations Branch offers five 
courses: Source Operations Course, Defense Advanced Trade Craft Course, Joint 
HUMINT Officer’s Course, Joint Source Validation Course, and Joint Foreign Materiel 
Acquisition Course. Of these courses, the two main ones are the Source Operations 
Course and the Defense Advanced Trade Craft Course. 
The primary course that certifies collectors to conduct Level II 
MSO is the Source Operations Course (SOC). SOC is a Joint Certified seven-week 
course that prepares collectors to conduct secure MSO in hostile foreign environments. 
SOC awards graduates the ASI S7. This course has extremely restrictive qualification 
requirements, and there is no guaranty of successful completion.42 SOC graduates are 
authorized to run formal contacts. During GWOT the Army made a push to have at least 
one member of a four man HCT to be a SOC graduate, although, this was rarely the case. 
The Primary course for certification for category I source 
operations is the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC) formerly known as the 
Advanced Source Operations Course (ASOC). This intense course is eighty-nine days 
long and ensures graduates can survive and conduct MSO in various environments. The 
course covers “MSO legal parameters; the HUMINT operational cycle; surveillance and 
surveillance detection; report writing; the use of intelligence funds, and other topics.”43 
Candidates for DATC must have completed SOC or equivalent course, and be granted 
approval by a selection board. Army graduates of Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course 
                                                 
42 Federation of American Scientists, “A Short History of HT-JCOE,” 8. 
43 Ibid. 
 26
receive advanced skill identifier VA. This course has a tremendously high operational 
tempo and students must at all times conduct themselves as they are performing MSO in 
a foreign country. The average attrition rate is around 21%. Commanders are advised 
only to send motivated personnel with the aptitude and desire to perform at their best in 
demanding environments.44 DATC/ASOC graduates are rare and a valuable 
commodities, the Army has made an effort for each Brigade to have at least one. 
(2) Interrogation. HT-JCOE also provides five courses in 
interrogation. The Joint Analyst and Interrogator Collaboration Course teaches analysts 
and HUMINTers to work together to effectively obtain intelligence from detainees. The 
Joint Interrogation Management Course teaches the management of interrogation 
operations for HUMINT Officers. This course does not certify students to conduct 
interrogations. The Joint HUMINT Analysis and Targeting Course also teaches 
interrogators and analysts to work together but focuses on “three core competencies: 
Lead Development, Source Validation, and Personality Based Targeting.”45 The Joint 
Interrogation Certifications Course certifies sister service personnel, DoD civilians and 
Army counterintelligence personnel to conduct interrogations. Joint Senior Interrogator 
Course is advanced training for senior interrogators and is gear toward senior NCOs and 
Warrant officers that have extensive operational experience. Unlike MSO, these courses 
do not provide additional skill identifiers. 
(3) Other Training. In addition to the courses already 
mentioned, there are numerous other HUMINT courses available. These include the HT-
JCOE Defense Strategic Debriefing Course (DSDC) and civilian taught courses. 
“DSDC’s mission is to train the art of strategic debriefing–the collection and reporting of 
national- level information acquired from usually willing and cooperative U.S. and 
foreign sources.”46 DSDC is a 5-week joint certified course that awards an ASI. Civilian  
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taught courses include but are not limited to the LSI Scan course, and the Reid 
Interrogation Course. These courses are geared more toward law enforcement but are 
applicable to Army HUMINT. 
Although the Army offers several training opportunities, not every 
HUMINT collector is afforded the opportunity to attend them. Limited funds prevent a 
large number of soldiers from attending training. In addition, units often do not want to 
lose personnel for extended amounts of time other non-MOS training and daily business 
take precedence over HUMINT training. Many HUMINT course can last months. Getting 
training for soldiers is difficult in its own right but is further complicated by minimum 
requirements that not all HUMINTers possess. These include clearance levels, minimum 
rank and experience requirements. 
B. EVALUATION OF CURRENT POLICIES 
Researching U.S. Army Human Intelligence has its challenges. Several aspects of 
HUMINT impede research as a whole. One issue is that much of the research conducted 
in the realm of HUMINT, focuses on the CIA and national level clandestine operations. 
Extremely little, outside the Army, is written about military source handling at the 
tactical level. Additionally, since Army HUMINT operates at the Secret level, much of 
the information is classified, or at a minimum at the “for official use only” (FOUO) level. 
This chapter identifies three themes; first, it identifies scholarly opinions from 
intelligence experts. These opinions come from books published about intelligence 
failures and reform, and advocate a need for a robust National HUMINT Capability. 
Based on this need the author recommends that other intelligence agencies utilize Army 
collectors. The Army’s experienced and trained collectors should have a greater role the 
DIA’s HUMINT collection effort. 
Next, the chapter discusses the legal aspects of interrogation and the changes that 
happened since the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal. It proposes that although the Army 




the case. Since interrogation has become a sensitive topic, within both the international 
community and domestically, Army interrogators need specialized advanced training to 
ensure it avoids repeating past mistakes. 
The final theme covers opinions about HUMINT at the tactical level. The chapter 
examines Army literature and opinions from commanders in the field. Drawing from 
other’s real world experience allows for a greater understanding of overarching problems 
identified within human intelligence. 
1. Theme 1: Intelligence Scholars and Experts 
Homeland Defense and Security Scholars and Experts within the Intelligence 
community agree intelligence reform is needed within the national HUMINT apparatus. 
Over the past several years, there have been several studies recognizing a need for larger 
and improved HUMINT capability. This includes a Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) internal study that advocated that the DoD concentrated too much “on the 
gathering of intelligence via technological means rather than human intelligence…which 
emerged as a glaring capability gap as the war on terrorism ramped up.”47 This DNI 
study was not the first to identify a deficiency in the national HUMINT capability. 
Numerous Blue Ribbon Commissions and experts in National Security have identified a 
similar demand for human intelligence. 
In the book Spying Blind, leading national expert on the Intelligence Community 
scholar Amy Zegart argues that HUMINT within the CIA and FBI, before and after 9/11, 
was not accomplishing its intended mission. She points out that even a decade before 
9/11, there were several commissions, governmental studies, and task forces that 
examined the Intelligence Community all-urging for intelligence reforms. She states there 
were “twelve bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think-tank task-forces 
that examined the U.S. Intelligence Community” all of which urged for intelligence 
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reforms.48 Of these reports, the majority found a “need to revitalize human intelligence.” 
“Nine of the twelve reports called for more aggressive human intelligence efforts.”49 
Former CIA officer Burton Gerber argues for reform with a joke that rings 
remarkably true within the HUMINT community. He writes, “A few years ago, a cartoon 
in the New Yorker depicted several executives around a conference table looking at a 
chart with a sharply downward trend line. The man pointed at the chart saying, ‘the dip in 
sales seems to coincide with the decision to eliminate the sales staff.’” This image also 
portrays what happened within the U.S. HUMINT community. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 and the defeat of Russian forces in Afghanistan in 1988, the U.S. 
government removed many clandestine agent handlers from the countries in which they 
were experts. This meant that the U.S. removed many case officers in Afghanistan and 
lost its eyes and ears in the country from which Al Qaida would later originate.50 Ex-CIA 
national clandestine service officer John MacGaffin also recognizes, “the need for real 
transformation in clandestine HUMINT.” MacGaffin argues that HUMINT is an 
“indispensable element of national intelligence collection,” which is in desperate need of 
rejuvenation.51 
MacGaffin, although wary about DoD conducting its own clandestine operations, 
makes a case for using Army collectors for broader nationally focused missions. He 
suggests that with proper guidance, clear lanes, and coordination the national HUMINT 
apparatus can utilize DoD assets to free up the limited number of CIA officers. He urges 
that the various intelligence agencies should stop competing with one another and lend 
mutual support to improve the overall national clandestine HUMINT effort. MacGaffin  
declares, “the intelligence community has never before been able to put aside the 
parochial interests of its component parts and truly organize itself for the ‘national 
good.’”52 
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Tactical Army HUMINT can learn from these scholarly opinions ensuring it 
avoids similar problems. Traditionally, as the military downsizes after major wars it loses 
experienced soldiers. These soldiers leave the military and move to civilian careers in 
agencies like the CIA, DIA, or law enforcement, leaving a gap of trained professional 
within the Army. Army Major Dylan Randazzo suggests that Army HUMINT collectors 
can “make $170K per year as civilian contractors conducting interrogations.”53 The 
Army must retain trained and experienced soldiers. There are two reasons for this: First, 
these experienced soldiers are best suited to train future generations; they can provide the 
practical expertize that Army training manuals cannot. Second, experienced and quality 
collectors can enhance the military side of agencies like the DIA, where Army collectors 
already have a role. 
Recently, the DIA announced the creation of the Defense Clandestine Service 
(DSC), which consists of both civilian and military operators. Army HUMINT, which 
makes up the largest DoD HUMINT force, should prepare to fill the need for more 
HUMINT collectors in the field. Operating at this level requires the highest standards. 
Training must resemble and be comparable to Army’s counterparts in the DIA and CIA. 
With the corps current group of trained and experienced collectors, individuals can be 
assigned to DIA to maintain their expertise developed during GWOT. 
On 24 April 2012, the Pentagon placed the Defense Clandestine Service under 
DIA’s direction. Understanding the need for greater HUMINT capability, Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta signed off on the new agency. Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, Michael G. Vickers, and CIA’s National Clandestine Service carefully 
designed the new service to improve cross agency communication and broaden national 
intelligence capabilities. Congress, whose approval was not required for the creation of 
DCS, was subsequently briefed on the new service’s intent before its establishment.54 The 
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2011 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) internal study, which outlined gaps in DIA 
HUMINT collection, was the foundation for DCS’s creation.55 
This newly created DCS intends to strengthen DoD’s HUMINT effort. It plans to 
transfer 15% of the current DIA’s HUMINT officers into positions that complement the 
intelligence effort. About 300 officers will shift focus from tactical missions, such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, to long-term strategic emphasis. DCS consists of DIA and military 
officers and its numbers will grow in the next few years “from several hundred to several 
more hundred.”56 DCS intends to professionalize its agents and offer “new, more clearly 
delineated career paths [that] will give DIA case officers better opportunities to continue 
their espionage assignments abroad.”57 The Army must follow suit and professionalizing 
it HUMINTers. 
In the past, experienced DIA and Military case officers transitioned to positions 
within the Pentagon or CIA because their overseas clandestine operations were not 
rewarded.58 “The new service intends to curb personnel losses, making clandestine work 
part of the Pentagon’s professional career track and rewarding those who prove 
successful at operating covertly overseas with further tours and promotions, similar to 
their CIA colleagues.”59 Increasing the number of Army HUMINTers working in this 
capacity would strengthen not only Army HUMINT but also national HUMINT. 
Likewise, it will reduce the number of Army collectors leaving the military for civilian 
positions. 
As Washington policymakers shift the emphasis from Iraq and Afghanistan 
toward the Asian-Pacific region, DCS ensures DoD’s officers are in locations that satisfy 
national intelligence requirements. Although the CIA’s National Clandestine Service 
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(NCS) has the lead in foreign HUMINT, the creation of DCS complements its capability. 
DCS will address security issues in Africa, China, North Korea, and Iran, among others. 
DCS agents will work closely with the NCS and other intelligence agencies to “integrate 
defense intelligence capabilities with the broader intelligence community by leveraging 
unique military capabilities.”60 DIA and military agents already work closely with the 
CIA in field offices around the globe; the new service will simply refocus attention to 
answering both DoD and National Intelligence’s global requirements.61 Jennifer Sims 
and Burton Gerber advocate a need for greater HUMINT capability. They say: “There are 
state-based challenges that deserve our continuing and persistent attention, such as the 
rise of China, the nuclear plans of North Korea and Iran, the stability of Pakistan, the 
health of Russian and Ukrainian democracy and the implications of political change in 
states in the Middle East.”62 
Intelligence reform has been a hot topic since 9/11; the failure to predict the 
World Trade Center attacks forced a reevaluation of the IC. Much of this debate insists 
on more clandestine HUMINT. The IC requires quality HUMINT agents that are able to 
penetrate and work clandestinely in foreign nations. During the Cold War, clandestine 
operators recruited spies via diplomatic circles.63 By prioritizing infiltration of foreign 
nations instead of terrorist groups, DIA and the military would develop source networks, 
able to answer national intelligence requirements. These types of operations will 
resemble HUMINT activities during the Cold War. Agents should work under official 
cover; permitting the CIA’s National Clandestine Service to concentrate on covert 
operations. 
MacGaffin explains that HUMINT encompasses foreign intelligence, 
counterintelligence, counterespionage, and covert action.64 Each of these activities is 
complex and requires numerous man-hours. Coverage and capability intensify with every 
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new agent in the field. DCS reduces the burden on the limited number of CIA agents. 
DCS distributes the work, allowing individual agents to concentrate on a distinct area. 
This reduced burden allows time for agents to develop the cultural and language skills 
that are often lacking. The intent of HUMINT reform is to establish close ties with the 
CIA, to deconflict, coordinate missions, and provide widespread global HUMINT 
coverage. 
With demands for clandestine HUMINT reform, the DoD must take the initiative 
to revitalize HUMINT. Since the U.S. military is more likely to operate in 
unconventional environments, it is essential that we develop HUMINT collectors that are 
able to collect globally. This will not be easy; considering the shortcomings identified in 
this thesis. Nevertheless, we should recognize that the Army currently possesses a 
plethora of talented collectors, who have the training and experience to enhance the 
national HUMINT effort. 
Sims and Gerber say, “The United States is blessed with a great capacity to 
innovate and adapt its institutions to new requirements even when crises are not 
occurring.”65 The IC adapted quickly to requirement changes after 9/11. No other 
discipline matches HUMINT’s ability to adapt. Unlike other intelligence disciplines 
(INTs), technological innovation does not constrain HUMINT. HUMINT is only limited 
by the quality of its collectors. Thankfully, during GWOT DoD’s HUMINT collectors 
received both the training and practical experience needed to be productive collectors. 
Historically, HUMINT is the intelligence discipline that has defended this nation; and 
HUMINT will likely be the first INT to adapt to future conflicts. 
Human intelligence endures as a crucial intelligence discipline. Continuously 
growing security threats require robust and skilled collectors around the world. As the 
nation transitions its focus on the Asian Pacific, the Army needs to lead the effort and 
provide long-term global HUMINT coverage. 
Integrating, supporting, and fusing Army collectors into the Defense Clandestine 
Service guarantees a stronger national IC. Army HUMINT agents have never been in a 
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better position to join their DIA and CIA counterparts in clandestine operations. Ten 
years of operational experience have produced highly skilled HUMINT operatives 
qualified to conduct clandestine missions. The U.S. needs to capitalize on this experience 
and support its continued growth. Tomorrow’s security requires solid HUMINT. 
2. Theme Two: Legality of Interrogation Doctrine 
After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared the Global War on 
Terror, vowing: “it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated.”66 This pronouncement led to a war unlike any the U.S. has fought 
in the past. Fighting individuals, organizations, and networks would be found to be much 
different from fighting nations. This new type of war presents several problems regarding 
interrogation laws. Nothing in U.S. law was written on the handling and protections of 
non-state actors. The President, Combat Commanders along with many others wondered: 
How do we deal with individuals that do not abide by the rules of war? Terrorists had 
never signed or agreed to abide by the Geneva Conventions nor were they protected by a 
sovereign nation. Because of this confusion, a great debate on prisoner rights 
commenced. 
a. Background 
In 2004, the unfortunate events of Abu Ghraib tarnished the U.S. Army 
interrogation practices, not only in the eyes of the international community, but 
domestically as well. Images of mistreated prisoners come to mind at the very mention of 
the word “interrogations.” While President Bush quickly condemned the Army soldiers’ 
pictured degrading Iraqi prisoners and vowed to punish those involved, the U.S. 
government responded by reevaluating the laws governing interrogations and detention 
operations at all levels. Newly created legislation ultimately prompted the rewriting of 
the Army’s Interrogation Field Manual. 
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This section reviews the interrogation policies before and after Abu 
Ghraib. It discusses the likely causes of why Army soldiers mistreated detainees, the 
unclear interrogation guidance given by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel and independent working groups, as well as the subsequent legislation 
implemented since Abu Ghraib. Specifically, it will focus on the changes to DoD policy 
concerning interrogations, and the Army Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence 
Collector Operations. Ultimately, it will show that the U.S. has made an enormous effort 
to refine interrogation procedures, refining training so that only specially trained can 
enhance the new policies, and experience interrogators conduct the mission. The Army 
should rethink its policy on how to carry out interrogation operations and who should be 
responsible for them. It is no longer appropriate for young Army HUMINTer to be 
trained in and responsible for interrogations. 
b. Interrogation Legal Advice 
Even before Abu Ghraib, the Bush administration addressed the legal 
aspects concerning interrogations of Al-Qaida members. Early in the Afghanistan War, 
President Bush requested that his legal counsel investigate and advise him on what 
interrogators could and could not do.67 President Bush surely desired to avoid incidents 
like to Abu Ghraib but needed to protect the American people from future terrorist 
attacks.68 This led President Bush and individuals within his administration established 
multiple inquiries into the legality of interrogation operations. 
One of the first legal opinions that the president received came from the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Council (OLC), specifically, memoranda written 
by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and signed by Assistant Attorney 
General Jay Bybee. Unfortunately, the OLC provided President Bush skeptical legal 
advice. On 1 August 2002, President Bush’s Legal Counsel Alberto Gonzales received a 
memorandum from the OLC. This was the OLC’s primary memorandum of three, which 
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came to be known as the torture memos.69 The memo concluded, “Because the acts 
inflicting torture are extreme, there is significant range of acts that though they might 
constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of 
torture.”70 The memo further stated: “[E] ven if an interrogation method might violate 
Section 2340 a,71 necessity or self-defense could provide justifications that would 
eliminate any criminal liability.”72 This advice was harmful in two aspects; first, it set the 
bar of torture exceptionally high requiring “death or organ failure,” and second, it 
suggests that even if interrogators were to torture prisoners, they would not be liable for 
their actions. This memo essentially gave the administration a blank check to conduct 
interrogations as they saw fit. This concept was regrettably conveyed down to tactical 
Army Interrogators. 
This guidance is not the only legal advice obtained before the 2004 Abu 
Ghraib scandal. Early in 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved 
“expanded interrogation techniques” that combat commanders requested for use in 
Afghanistan. He approved techniques ranging from forced grooming to the clothing 
removal to without consulting the administration.73 A short time later, due to controversy 
on the legality of such techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld suspended the use of the same 
“expanded interrogation techniques” that he had approved earlier in the year. 
Rumsfeld then asked a group of lawyers to conduct a legal review of the 
expanded techniques. He received an assessment from his working group in April 2003. 
The working group reviewed the legality of “expanded” interrogation procedures during 
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the war on terror.74 The working group concluded that, after considering everything, the 
thirty-five interrogation techniques should be authorized for use in the Global War on 
Terror and were legal.75 The expanded techniques included hooding, dietary 
manipulation, environmental manipulation; sleep adjustment, isolation, prolonged 
interrogations, forced grooming, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, physical training, 
face and stomach slap, and removal of clothing among others. 
The then-current Army Field Manual 34-52 permitted seventeen of these 
thirty-five techniques already. CENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM commanders requested 
from the Secretary of Defense the additional use of eighteen techniques that were not in 
the field manual.76 Ten of the eighteen expanded interrogation techniques were “more 
aggressive counter-resistance techniques.”77 Many of these techniques originated from 
Special Forces training that prepare soldiers to be captured in dangerous environments. 
Because of this connection, people felt that if U.S. Special Forces troops could endure 
these practices, they were not dangerous for enemy combatants. Techniques used during 
special operations training included the controversial waterboarding procedure, although, 
not directly mentioned in the working group conclusion. Based on these conclusions, 
Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the use of the expanded techniques, essentially rendering 
the 1992 Army Field Manual obsolete. 
Jack Goldsmith stated, “I, and others in the OLC had a relatively easy time 
concluding that these [Justice Department approved] twenty-four precisely defined and 
procedurally restricted techniques did not violate the torture statute or any other 
applicable law.”78 Additionally, despite deciding to withdraw earlier OLC opinions he 
advised that the Defense Department continue to employ the twenty-four expanded 
techniques.79 
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Army interrogators were ill prepared to be given so much lead way with 
interrogation operations. Especially, since they had zero training on the approved 
expanded techniques. With so much riding on proper interrogation techniques, one would 
assume additional training and specialized certification would be required before 
conducting interrogations. Soldiers at these detention centers were left to follow CIA and 
SOF led. The Army still offers very little advanced interrogation training and during AIT, 
soldiers only receive 44 days of interrogation training.80  
c. Drawing a Line between the CIA and DoD 
In addition, “in spring of 2003, the [Director of Central Intelligence] DCI 
asked for a reaffirmation of the policies and practices in the interrogation program.”81 
The National Security Council’s (NCS) Principals Committee met and concluded the 
“program was lawful and reflected administration policy.” The committee based their 
assessment on the OLC’s 2002 opinions. The NSC briefed the findings to the secretary of 
state and the secretary of defense in September of 2003. During this time, it was difficult 
to distinguish between policies that governed the CIA versus the policies that applied to 
DoD, not least because the CIA, civilian contractors, and DoD often worked out of the 
same detention facilities under conflicting and confusing guidance. 
George Washington University Law School Professor and International 
Law expert, Laura Dickinson states: 
[A]dministration authorities circulated statements and memoranda 
suggesting that the law of war might not apply to certain categories of 
detainees, issued multiple, confusing directives to troops on the ground 
regarding permissible interrogation practices, allowed civilian intelligence 
personnel, special forces, uniformed troops, and private contractors to co-
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mingle without clear lines of authority or division of responsibility, and 
greatly expanded the role of private contractors.82 
In April of 2004, newscaster Dan Rather shocked the administration and 
the world when he reported on and released the Abu Ghraib images. Jack Goldsmith, who 
was serving in the OLC at the time, immediately recognized that the legal opinions of his 
predecessor, John Yoo, were flawed. Goldsmith withdrew the OLC’s legal opinions on 
torture law.83 
Once the Abu Ghraib images surfaced, it was blatantly evident that 
interrogation policies required revision. Goldsmith’s successor, Dan Levin, wrote the 
replacement documents.84 However, Levin’s advice still included the use of 
waterboarding and other questionable interrogation methods.85 
As the story broke on CBS, President Bush ordered an immediate 
investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and during the next year, he ordered nine 
additional and separate investigations.86 The investigations all concluded that detainee 
abuse had occurred and revision of interrogation practices were required. 
d. Investigations of Abusive Interrogators 
Army Major General (MG) Antonio Taguba conducted the initial 
investigation. MG Taguba concluded that Army and CIA interrogators and military 
police (MP) guards inflicted abuse on several detainees and hid unidentified captives 
from the Red Cross.87 “In Taguba’s view, the abusers violated two pertinent bodies of 
law: the Army’s own regulation [FM 34-52] and the Third Geneva Convention.”88 
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Additional investigations by MG George Fay and the former Defense 
Secretary James R. Schlesinger suggest that U.S. Army interrogators and MPs assumed 
that harsher techniques were allowed and ignored the Army regulation because elite 
forces such as the CIA and Special Forces used them.89 MG Fay’s report also recognizes 
that the majority of atrocities committed were not by interrogators but military police. In 
actuality, MPs committed the majority of crimes in the photos disseminated worldwide. 
Sadly, the brunt of the outrage was directed solely at Army interrogators. 
In the official Investigation of Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, MG Fay, 
lays out the number of allegations of abuse, the nature of abuse, and associated personnel. 
In his findings, 40 percent of cases involved interrogators with fifty cases involving 
military police.90 The individuals involved in the cases of torture all knew that they had 
violated the Geneva Convention. MG Fay states: “This investigation found no evidence 
of confusion regarding actual physical abuse, such as hitting, kicking, slapping, punching, 
and foot stomping. Everyone we spoke to knew it was prohibited conduct except for one 
soldier.”91 This comment suggests that although the soldiers knew their actions violated 
Geneva Conventions, the detainee’s status of lawful versus non-lawful combatants 
confused soldiers about whether or not detainees fell under these rules. 
The confusion generated by the approval of different interrogation tactics 
for detainees depending on their classification led to a decline in the 
overall standards of interrogation and confinement. Many detention 
facilities contained a mixed group of interrogators—civilian, military, and 
contractor—with differing guidelines. At the strategic level, debates about 
what constituted torture and the extent of restrictions on it under domestic 
criminal statutes and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment led to further confusion. 
(LTC David G. Bolgiano and COL Morgan Banks.)92 
These investigations made clear that the Administration and Congress needed 
uniform legal restrictions on interrogations. Senator John McCain, who was a prisoner of war 
during the Vietnam War, suggested limiting interrogation techniques to the then-current 
Army Field Manual, regardless of detainee’s location or status.93. The Army Field manual 
authorized seventeen techniques none of which involved detainee mistreatment. The manual 
explicitly states that stress positions, sleep deprivation, and food deprivation are forms of 
torture. The severest technique authorized was Fear-up Harsh, in which an interrogator 
“behaves in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice…[and] may even 
feel the need to throw objects across the room.”94 
Senator McCain introduced a bill in 2005, commonly referred to as the 
“McCain Amendment,” which Congress approved and later became the Detainee Treatment 
Act (DTA).95 The DTA requires the DoD personnel to use U.S. Army Field Manual 
guidelines while interrogating detainees and prohibits “cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment.” Although, the DTA ensured that DoD personnel abide by the Army FM and 
ended the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on “unlawful combatants,” the DTA did 
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not constrain non-DoD agencies, law enforcement, and non-military intelligence.96 The DTA 
also did “not prevent DoD from subsequently amending the Field Manual.”97 
e. DoD Releases New Interrogation Manual 
On September 6, 2006, the Army released Field Manual 2-22.3 Human 
Intelligence Collection Operations, an updated version that aligns with the requirements 
of DTA. The new manual explicitly prohibits eight previously used interrogation 
techniques, including those that employ hoods, forced nudity, waterboarding, working 
dogs, mock executions, dietary manipulation and extreme environmental conditions. 
There are nineteen authorized interrogation approaches according to the 
new Field Manual 2-22.3. Interrogators can use these approaches individually or in 
combination. These techniques are not new to the manual and included all of the old 
approaches plus a few new ones. One notable change was the removal of Fear-up Harsh 
and Fear-up Mild. Instead of explaining varying degrees of Fear-up, it lumps all levels 
into a single Fear-up method (see note for description).98 
The new 2006 interrogation manual includes additional techniques not 
authorized in the former version. The first O-6 in the chain of command must approve 
two new interrogation methods such as False Flag and Mutt and Jeff (see note for 
description).99 Furthermore, an additional “restricted” approach strategy called 
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Separation (see note for description) 100 cannot be applied to Enemy Prisoners of War 
and must have an additional approval of the first General/Flag Officer in the chain of 
command and the COCOM commander. 
On the second day of Obama’s administration, the president signed 
Executive Order 13491, which revokes all earlier executive orders with regard to 
interrogations and supports the authorized techniques of FM 2-22.3. The order 
established FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, as the new U.S. 
government standard for conducting intelligence interrogations, applicable to all 
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Specifically, the executive order 
prohibits “any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to 
interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in FM 2-22.3.”101 
The Army Field manual on interrogations dates back to 1956. The original 
manual was based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions III, which established provisions on 
the treatment of prisoners of war. “The first version of the U.S. Army Field Manual on 
Interrogations intended to clearly and forcefully guide U.S. interrogators away from  
abusing prisoners.”102 The Army has updated the Interrogation Manual throughout the 
years, notably in 1967, 1976, 1987, and 1992 and has maintained “guidelines prohibiting 
physical abuse of prisoners.”103 
Although the new manual is highly regarded as a huge improvement to 
interrogation operations, many feel that the old manuals provided clearer and more 
restrictive guidance on interrogations. In a November 16, 2010, letter sent to Defense 
Secretary Robert M. Gates, fourteen highly experienced and respected intelligence and 
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interrogator professionals wrote: “While we support efforts to adopt a single, well-
defined standard for U.S. personnel engaged in the detention and interrogation of all 
people in U.S. custody, we are very concerned about a handful of changes that were 
written into the manual in 2006.”104 
This group of distinguished professionals raises concerns about Appendix 
M of the FM 2-22.3 and suggests its removal. They claim, “The use of these techniques 
were clearly banned in previous versions of the manual and they ought to continue to be 
clearly off limits.”105 Appendix M is new to manual and covers the restricted 
interrogation technique of separation. Separation is “for use on a by-exception basis only 
with unlawful enemy combatants.”106 The Army Field manual does not authorize 
Separation for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). Separation requires approval from the 
first General/Flag Officer in the chain of command.107 The FM states separation may be 
used on “specific unlawful enemy combatants…to help overcome resistance and gain 
actionable intelligence…to safeguard U.S. and coalition forces…to protect U.S. 
interests.”108 
First, the group argues that the term “separation” is confusing. 
Traditionally, interrogators use separation to protect detainees from “negative influences 
of–-or unnecessary exposure to–other detainees.”109 Second, the group advocates that the 
appendix may have inadvertently “authorized the use of several sensory and sleep 
deprivation tactics that could be employed in an abusive fashion.”110 Appendix M allows 
interrogators to use “field expedient separation [to] prolong the shock of capture…and 
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foster a feeling of futility.”111 This measure allows interrogators to use goggles or 
blindfold and earmuffs for up to twelve hours (extendable) as a method of separation.112 
These stipulations can often be confusing and interpreted differently. After 
putting so much time and effort into revising the interrogation policy, the nation should 
not leave it in the hands of young soldiers. Professional interrogators with extensive 
training are needed to insure interrogations are carried out in accordance with the new 
doctrine. The U.S. Army interrogation program should be of the highest standard, and be 
a role mode for other nations could follow. 
f. Implication 
Now that, Navy SEALs have neutralized Osama Bin Laden and the U.S. 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are ending, it is time to ensure that interrogation legislation 
established since Abu Ghraib still meets its initial intent. Military officers David G. 
Bolgiano and J. Morgan Banks state: “regardless of their legal or political rationales, both 
the [Detainee Treatment Act of 2005] DTA and the new [Obama] executive order 
authorize only those interrogation approaches and techniques set forth in FM 2-22.3. 
There are two major problems with this approach: little science supports the approved 
techniques, and the requirements imposed by the FM are so restrictive that they are 
ineffective and nonsensical.”113 
The question on ethical interrogations is far from over. The new manual is 
highly regarded as a huge improvement to interrogation operations but it has taken 
detainee abuse, investigations, working groups, court-martials, legislation, and a rewritten 
manual to get the U.S. closer to conducting interrogations in a respectable manner. To 
enhance this improvement, the Army should revise its training, making interrogation 
training more stringent and selective. 
Army Interrogators, minus a few “bad apples,” have conducted 
interrogations respectably. Nevertheless, Army HUMINT must re-evaluate if 
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interrogation should be the primary skill of the 35M MOS. Despite that, previous wars 
required large numbers of young interrogators the changing nature of American conflicts 
suggests there is a larger need for highly trained interrogators able to operate within the 
legal restrictions. With lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must ensure 
that it trains its interrogators in the rules and regulations that govern interrogations. This 
may require changing the training and doctrine governing tactical HUMINT. Equally, 
with interrogation operations remaining under a microscope of scrutiny the Army should 
ensure that its interrogators receive more than 44 days of training. It takes a mature and 
intelligent individual to understand the complex legal and ethical rules that govern 
modern day interrogations. 
3. Third Theme: Military Professional Opinions on HUMINT 
a. Need for Greater HUMINT Capability 
Military opinions from the field represent the third theme. When 
discussing opinions from Military Professional Papers, it best to start with the Army’s 
official published opinion. The 2012 Army Posture statement asserts that while the 
budget declines the Army is still obligated to provide a lean force capable of combating 
future conflicts. It states: “Today the U.S. Army is the best-trained, best-equipped and 
best-led combat-tested force in the world. Today’s soldiers have achieved a level of 
professionalism, combat experience, and civil and military expertise that is an invaluable 
national asset. Our warriors have accomplished every assigned task they have been 
given.”114 
In regard to HUMINT specifically, the 2012 Posture Statement referenced 
a document written by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2. The document was titled “Growing 
Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities, and advocates that despite budget 
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constraints the Army plans to create a “robust, well-trained HUMINT force.”115 This 
document articulates the “Expansion of army HUMINT capacity is a key component of 
Military Intelligence (MI) transformation with HUMINT force structure more than 
doubling from FY 04 through FY13.”116 It goes on to state that the Army plans to 
revitalize and enhance training and employment of HUMINT forces. This includes 
increasing the number collectors certified from advanced courses offered by HT-JCOE 
and the FOUNDRY program.117 The Army appreciates that HUMINT is essential for 
future military success, and is committed to train and professionalize the corps by 
learning “from operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.”118 This raises the 
question of; what have we learned? With continuous military operations for over the last 
10 years, there are many opinions on the proper method on utilizing HUMINT. This 
section will touch on opinions from military commanders. 
In January 2010, MG Michael T. Flynn published a critique of intelligence 
operations in Afghanistan, criticizing that intelligence focused too much on tactical 
threats and failed to understand the larger demographic and political environment.119 
Throughout the article, he seems to be making an argument for more HUMINT collectors 
at the ground level; however, he advocates for civilian analysts, not military, to conduct 
these collection operations. 
MG Flynn suggests that the intelligence community develop analysts that 
are able to work at the grassroots level; who would collect comprehensive information on 
geographical lines, focusing on collection of economic and political information instead of 
                                                 
115 Department of the Army, “2012 Army Posture Statement, Growing Army Human Intelligence 




117 Ibid. The Foundry Program provides training to Military Intelligence personnel. For more 
information, visit the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 home page at 
http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/foundry.aspx. 
118 Department of the Army, “2012 Army Posture Statement.” 
119 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making 
Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Voices from the Field, January 2010, 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf. 
 48
simply targeting the enemy. He advocates that intelligence analysts should embrace “open 
source population centric” information to understand and win over the Afghan people. 
This sounds surprisingly similar to MSO; although MG Flynn makes a 
distinction that these analysts should not be HUMINT collectors. He says, “There are, of 
course, limits on how far analyst can or should go in pursuit of information. Concern for 
physical safety is one. Rules that govern the difference between collection and analysis 
represent another.”120 Despite MG Flynn point that these analysts should not be 
HUMINT collectors, it would seem that Army HUMINT is in the best position in 
carrying out this duty. The Army could easily fill the intelligence gap identified by MG 
Flynn’s article, because Army HUMINTers are already at the grassroots level working 
with the same teams MG Flynn suggests. (i.e., Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Female 
Engagement Teams, Civil Affair Teams) 
Army collectors are capable of collecting on more than just targeting the 
enemy. Priority Information Requirements (PIR), which regulates collection, simply need 
to reflect the topics identified by MG Flynn. If properly tasked the Army’s collectors can 
gather political and economic information. Additionally, to ensure that the data collected 
at the grassroots level is properly analyzed and disseminated the Army could develop a 
HUMINT analyst. These analysts could, as MG Flynn suggests, combine classified 
material with open source to write, “master reports” of an area of operation.121 
Along the same lines as MG Flynn, Army Col Ralph O. Baker makes an 
argument for HUMINT to concentrate less on targeting and more on the populace. While 
serving in Baghdad, Col Baker changed the way the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of 
1st Armored Division conducted operations by transforming the BCT’s traditional 
intelligence collection system into what he coined “HUMINT-centric”. 
This meant that his subordinate commanders changed the way they 
interacted with the local populous. They were encouraged to develop sources, conduct 
interrogations, exploit evidence, and most importantly work with the populace best 
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interest at heart so that the brigade could accomplish its mission. Col Baker states, “My 
purpose in writing this article is to share with the reader insights and lessons learned from 
the reform of our intelligence operations; specifically, what we learned by conducting 
human intelligence (HUMINT)-centric operations in a heavy BCT in Iraq.”122 Col Baker 
makes an argument that COIN operations need to grounded in HUMINT and explains 
that: “Conventional intelligence collection systems just don’t work in this type of 
environment; our imagery operations, electronic reconnaissance, and standard combat 
patrols and surveillance operations were simply ineffective. After faithfully applying 
these conventional ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) methods and 
assets to our combat operations, we netted almost no actionable intelligence.” 123 
Early in the deployment, the BCT conducted door to cordon-and-search 
operations in which they found “dozens of weapons and a handful of suspects.”124 
However, Col Baker explains that: “No matter how professionally you executed such 
searches, the net result was inevitable ugly.”125 Therefore, after training his unit 
commanders, the Brigade began its HUMINT-centric intelligence collection. By using a 
HUMINT centric campaign, which developed a source network and worked with the 
local populace the brigade had success. To accomplish these types of operations Col 
Baker advocates that the Army would need to authorize more 35M billets within its 
brigades. 
The need for a larger HUMINT collection capability is widely agreed 
upon. A larger force with proper training and guidance could focus on the needs of the 
target population. Focusing less on targeting and more on social and political issues is a 
method to succeed in COIN. This concept can be applied beyond the U.S.’s current 
operations in Afghanistan; a HUMINT centric focus could be successful in future 
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operations as well. Greater capability should not mean just increasing the size of the 
force; it should identify and fix current issues within Army HUMINT and apply them to 
future training and operations. 
b. A Need to Improve Current HUMINT 
In 2008, Army Major Dylan Randazzo wrote a thesis on “Fixing Tactical 
HUMINT: the case for the Low-level Collector” for the National Defense College. Major 
Randazzo agrees with the Col Baker’s HUMINT-centric concept. But, he argues that the 
current HUMINT policies are too restrictive, and suggests that the Army revise it policy 
and allow more soldiers to collect HUMINT than the assigned MOSs. Identifying a need 
for a robust HUMINT collector capability, he recommends developing a Low-Level 
HUMINT collector that possesses the right characteristics to be successful in COIN 
operations. He suggests collectors should have specific selection requirements but do not 
necessary have to be HUMINT MOS specific collectors. Randazzo suggests five 
characteristics should be taken into account when selecting a HUMINT collector.126 
1. NCO or Officer; those who are generally older, occupy positions 
of authority, and experienced with tactical operations or law 
enforcement. 
2. Possession of excellent interpersonal skills; strong ability to 
establish rapport. 
3. Ability to write accurate, clear, and timely reports. 
4. Excellent evaluation reports and counseling statements. 
5. Interim security clearance.127 
There is a lot of merit in the need for HUMINTer to possess certain 
characteristics. Since HUMINT is a highly skilled task, there should be some type of 
assessment for collector. The ASVAB test is not designed to assess these traits. Major 
Randazzo goes on to recommend the following selection method: 
1. Nomination from company commander or battalion leadership. 
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2. Vote from [the battalion] S2, [Operational Management Team] OMT / 
[HUMINT Collection Team] HCT, and /or company representatives after 
conducting interviews or a board that subjectively gauges whether the 
individual demonstrates basic predetermined criteria. 
3. Passing score on test of reading, writing, and memory recall.128 
In a Monograph titled, “Some Principles of Human Intelligence and their 
application.” Major Robert A. Sayre identifies similar problems with HUMINT and 
offers some insightful recommendations on possible solutions. He states; “there currently 
exists no real assessment process for the enlisted HUMINT career fields, there is also no 
assessment process for HUMINT officers. There is such a process for HUMINT warrant 
officers, who nearly always come from the enlisted HUMINT career fields, and these 
warrant officers are usually apt, experienced, and well trained. Company-grade officers, 
however, undergo no screening before they are admitted to HUMINT training.” The 
absence of an assessment process allows ineffective collectors to occupy many positions 
through the HUMINT corps.  
To remedy this, Sayre advocates “HUMINT collectors of both Army 
HUMINT MOSs [35M &35L] should not be allowed to enter the MOS on their first 
enlistment. Allowing recruits to enter the MOS at the recruiting station prevents any sort 
of assessment of their potential and suitability as a HUMINT collector. HUMINT 
collectors should be selected from among first and second term enlistees of any MOS 
who have already been successful in another career field, and who are older, more 
mature, and have a more fully developed and settled character.” Sayre says, after 
selecting soldiers, they should attend language training and follow on immersion training 
in the target country. 
Sayre recognizes “that the collector should have a high degree of area 
knowledge, an understanding of the culture and politics of the region in which he is 
working.” Major Sayre makes two interesting and compelling points. First, he says that 
collectors must be properly “matched” with their targets. He advocates, “collectors 
should be of similar personal and professional backgrounds as their potential targets.” If 
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the HUMINT collector and source share similar characteristics, it is easier to establish 
rapport, assess the source, build a relationship, and run the asset. Next, Major Sayre 
recommends that the analyst reviewing the HUMINT reports also establish a personal 
relationship with the source. Analyst do not have time to delve into learning an individual 
source, analyst frequently gather reports from multiple INTs to develop their products. 
This might be more possible if an analyst was located with a HCT an worked solely with 
one their reports and sources. In most units today, analysts are at the Brigade SCIF, and 
do not interact with the HUMINTer that is miles away at a patrol base 129. 
In 2006, Army Major Tony L. Thacker wrote a compelling Master’s 
Thesis titled; “Interrogation: Is the U.S. Army Equipped and Trained to meet the Present 
Challenges in Today’s Contemporary Operational Environment?” In this thesis, he 
conducts historical research and combines it with interrogation operations during GWOT 
to conclude, “The Army can and should improve training and resourcing for the Army 
interrogator.” Major Thacker recommends that an assessment and selection board 
evaluate potential interrogators before entering the MOS. This board should have four 
primary criteria for selection of interrogators including age, military experience, eligible 
for a top-secret clearance, and possess an aptitude for learning a foreign language. Major 
Thacker also presents an engaging “snapshot of what an ideal interrogator my look like” 
in the Figure 2.130  
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Figure 2.  Major Thacker’s Example of the Characteristics of Ideal Interrogator 
Major Thacker’s conclusions are still relevant today. His assertion that 
Human Intelligence collectors must possess language and cultural knowledge to perform 
in combat environments is right on the money. Collector knowledge must be matched 
with age maturity and, and as he put it, “command presence” to be effective. Major 
Thacker wrote his thesis before the changing of the interrogation field manual and 
although, there have been significant changes to interrogation training and 
implementation since the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Army still faces similar problems as in 
years past.131 
In an article, “Optimizing Intelligence Collection and Analysis: The Key 
to Battalion –Level Intelligence Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” LTC Richard 
G. Greene, Jr. discusses successes and shortcomings of COIN intelligence operations. For 
the purposes of this research, only the aspects dealing with HUMINT will be mentioned. 
First, while discussing organic and non-organic HUMINT collection 
teams, LTC Greene mentions that his Brigade had success with pushing the HCTs down 
to rifle companies. Having collectors operated in locations were enemy personal and 
                                                 
131 Thacker, “Interrogation.” 
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sources were should have been more effective, however, the limited capabilities of 
individual collectors often hampered operations. The article argued that HCT’s are not 
proficient enough to operate in a COIN environment; collectors “are not linguist…junior 
enlisted soldiers…with little or no practical experience with real-world source 
operations.”132 
Next, while discussing interrogation operations LTC Greene states: “Early 
in the tour, the TF [Task Force] determined that HUMINT specialists and interrogators 
were unable to conduct interrogations that yielded useful results. While trained and 
motivated to perform duties, the interrogators lacked an adequate awareness of the 
intelligence that drove operations. Without this information, an interrogation can quickly 
devolve into a prolonged denial of insurgent associations by the detainee.”133 The article 
indicated that interrogators were for more successful during field questioning, but only 
when provided with an approved questioning plan. This article is telling in the abilities of 
the average young HUMINT collector. Unfortunately, like other opinions, HUMINTers 
lack the training, language, and cultural skills needed. 
All these military commanders agree that HUMINT is extremely 
important in all military operations. They see a need for a robust HUMINT capability, but 
often find that the Army’s current collectors are not suited to perform the mission. The 
commanders here seem to agree that there needs to be an assessment process for selecting 
HUMINT personnel. Purposed characteristic include older soldiers with the maturity, 
security clearance, communication, and writing skills to perform the job. Having 
collectors with these characteristics, combined with language and cultural knowledge are 
essential to conduct HUMINT driven operations. 
                                                 
132 Richard G. Greene Jr. and Mark N. Awad, “Optimizing Intelligence Collection and Analysis: The 
Key to Battalion-level Intelligence Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” News from the Front, 
Center for Army Lessons Learned (July 2007). 
133 Ibid. 
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III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. DATA AND RESULTS 
This chapter comprises data and opinions resulting from the author’s research. 
The intent of the chapter is to identify common sentiments about the weaknesses of 
current Army HUMINT practices. The author separates findings into three categories. 
First, to be analyzed are units AARs. Then opinions from Army HUMINT Warrant 
Officer are presented. Lastly, discussion topics from the MI-Space forum are reviewed to 
get an idea of whether the thesis’s hypotheses are supported. These sources convey the 
most contemporary opinions about HUMINT and offer viewpoints directly from experts 
in the field. 
These opinions are largely based on human intelligence collector’s individual 
experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF). Because of the wide range of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels, these HUMINTers understandably have diverging opinions. Likewise, the 
individual collector’s skills, mission success, region of employment, and individual 
tasking influence these opinions. It is not the author’s intention to focus solely on the 
shortcomings of HUMINT collection in this section but unfortunately, little is written on 
the successful missions conducted by ARMY HUMINTers. This is likely because the 
information is classified, or as the old adage goes, there are either operational successes 
or intelligence failures. The Army currently possesses a wealth of knowledge from 
experienced HUMINTers from which we can learn. This chapter reflects the opinions of 
knowledgeable HUMINT professionals. 
1. After Action Reviews 
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website collects opinions of 
lessons learned from combat experiences. Military commanders, to advise future 
deploying units, wrote after action reviews of the pros and cons from first hand 
deployment experience. Based on all CALL provided HUMINT related AARs 15 
commonly identified problems emerge. These common problems were derived from 19 
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separate AARs and include opinions from the Marine Corps and the Urban Warfare 
Analysis Center. Eleven AARs identified that the HUMINTers assigned to their units 
either had no language capability or that the languages that the HUMINTers did possess, 
was the wrong language for the area of operations. Ten units expressed that training was 
a major issue. This indicates that the 10 level training was not sufficient, and there is 
inadequate follow-on training at the unit level or from HT-JCOE. Nine units proposed 
that collectors lacked the cultural knowledge to perform the job properly. Another nine 
units suggested that HUMINTers lacked the interpersonal skill or experience to interact 
with sources. Eight AAR’s reported issues with analysts. Either the analyst did not 
directly work with the actual collectors or HUMINTer did not perform analysis on their 
own. (See Table 1) 
 57











































































X   X X  X     X X   X X X  9 
Lack of 
Writing Skills 




 X  X X  X      X   X X X X 9 
Shortage of 
Analyst or need 
for more 
Analysis 
X X   X    X     X X  X X  8 
Garrison 
Training is not 
HUMINT 
focused 
 X      X    X        3 
Problems with 




 X   X     X    X  X    5 










   X      X  X X X X   X  7 
General 
Training Issues 




     X      X X X      4 
Vehicle Issues      X X X   X X  X X   X  8 
Clear Tasks for 
HUMINTers 
      X X X  X      X X  6 
Shortage of 
HUMINTers 
        X X X   X X X    6 
Command 
unfamiliar on 
how to employ 
HUMINT 
             X    X  2 





These 19 separate units after action reviews identified four issues that directly 
relate to training problems. The first problem identified was the lack of language ability 
or training in the wrong language. During OIF 08-10, the 172nd BCT’s HUMINT 
platoon only had one qualified Arabic speaker out of 17 collectors. Similarly, before 
172nd deployment to Afghanistan in 2011, the HUMINT platoon had zero Dari or 
Pashtun linguists.134 HUMINT collectors often rely solely on the assistance of civilian 
interpreters. This brings up the second issue. Seven of the 18 AARs suggest that issues 
with civilian interpreters hindered HUMINT collection. Without going into detail, 
problems included improper dialect, clearance issues, availability, and utilization of 
civilian interpreters. 
The final two issues go hand in hand, the lack of cultural knowledge and 
interpersonal skills. Eight AAR’s argued HUMINT collectors lacked the cultural 
knowledge to interact with the local populous. Although, cultural training is mandatory 
before deployment it is rarely specific to the region in which soldiers operate. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to capitalize on interpersonal skills when individuals cannot 
relate to the local populace. Factors including age, religion, social status, and even gender 
can affect a collector’s ability to understand the cultural nuances to interact with 
foreigners. 
The common themes that arose while reviewing the after action reviews suggest 
that HUMINT soldiers lack, or were not properly trained in, the skills that are required 
for the MOS. The following comments were derived directly from unit after action 
reviews or independent observers’ reviews upon completion of combat deployments. 
Based on interviews with soldiers and leaders of the 201st Military Intelligence 
Battalion, an observation team from the Center of Army Lessons Learned wrote a 
summary of issues and comments of HUMINT after a deployment to Iraq. Soldiers in the 
201st were responsible for conducting interrogations at the Joint Interrogation and 
  
                                                 
134 The author was assigned as the HUMINT platoon leader for the 504th MICO, 172nd BCT, and 
relied upon personal knowledge. 
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 Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Camp Cropper Iraq in 2007. The following is an excerpt 
from the summary; it divides the issues into pre-deployment and during deployment and 
makes recommendations on improving collectors.135 
 
Pre-Deployment: 
 35Ms need thorough situational awareness of the theater of operations and specific area of operations 
(AO) knowledge. 
 35Ms need training in technical writing and a Basic English refresher course to develop more concise 
and accurate reporting. 
 Quality control needs to be conducted on reports, and soldiers need to be required to correct mistakes 
and clarify any confusing areas. 
During Deployment: 
 “Many 35Ms were not able to consistently pick up on leads during interrogations. This was caused by 
either lack of knowledge on the requirements or lack of critical thinking skills. Many 35Ms were 
unable to quickly transition their interrogations based on detainee responses and were not successful 
with shifting approaches based on detainee cues or detecting when an approach was no longer 
necessary.” 
 “Elicitation is a weak point for numerous 35Ms. Basic conversational skills are wanting and the ability 
to steer conversations and draw information out with tact is lacking.”136 
 
                                                 
135 Amanda Meyer, “201st MIBN HUMINT Ops Lessons Learned,” Memorandum for Record. USAIC 
Lessons Learned (February 23, 2009). 
136 Ibid. 
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The 10th Mountain Division S2 intelligence section wrote a comprehensive report on 
lessons learned during OEF 05-07. The following comments are pulled directly from 
their report.137 The first topic of discussion was HUMINT teams experience and report 
writing skills. 
 
Topic: Inexperienced Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) [HCT138] and Report Writing Skills 
Discussion: Report writing continues to be an ongoing issue. It is understood that inexperienced collectors 
need time to hone their reporting skills. However, collectors continued to make repetitive errors despite 
guidance from quality control analysts. Under optimal circumstances, the THT leader was an experienced 
Warrant Officer or senior NCO. The experienced leader provided mentorship and immediate quality 
control prior to reports passing through the OMT or S2X/CJ2X. In the case of the current THT 
composition, the average THT leader is an E-4 or E-5 with no prior deployments or real world collection 
experience.  
Lesson Learned: OMTs need to identify chronic weaknesses in reporting and initiate mentor/coaching 
sessions with collectors. If coaching over the phone or via email was ineffective, then the OMT needed to 
conduct sessions in person. Teams that needed more assistance than could be provided by the OMT were 
identified to CJ2X as candidates for Operation Old School.  
Implications: 35M AIT must place heavy emphasis on report writing capabilities, that are similar to the 
report writing forced upon students going through the DOD Strategic Debriefer Course. The OMT Course 
at FT Huachuca should also place a heavy emphasis on writing and editing of draft intelligence information 
reports (DIIRs) along with effective writing styles and discipline. 
 
                                                 
137 10th Mountain Division, “OEF 05-07 CJ2 Lessons Learned,” CALL (March 2007): 35, 39. 
138 THT is a Tactical HUMINT Team, the Army Changed the term to HCT HUMINT Collection 
Team. 
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The 10th Mountain Division’s second topic of discussion was developing a HCT 
leader course at the Division or USAIC level to assist junior ranking soldiers. 
 
Topic: THT Leaders Course. 
Discussion: Inexperienced/junior ranking THT leaders are in need of Army leadership and administrative 
skills. Due to significant shortages of mid-career HUMINT collectors, many THTs are being led by 
inexperienced first term junior enlisted soldiers. While we recognize these leaders need mentoring on 
HUMINT skill sets, it sometimes goes unnoticed that these soldiers lack critical leadership and 
administrative skill sets. Maintenance, time management, property accountability, counseling, and logistics 
are just some of the skill sets in need of development. A team leaders’ inability to manage or navigate the 
aforementioned tasks has a direct negative impact on team operations. We can teach them to collect; but if 
their vehicles break down, they lose equipment, and they cannot acquire logistics; they’re significantly 
hindered in their ability to accomplish the mission. 
Lesson Learned: 10th Mountain Division or USAIC should develop a THT Leader’s course of instruction 
to train both identified and potential leaders prior to deployment. Course of instruction should include THT 
leadership functions such as mission planning, source operations management, report writing, as well as 
critical Army leadership and administrative skill sets. 
Implications: Just as THTs are certified, a THT Team Leader should be certified. As we are placing an 
additional challenge upon extremely junior NCOs with little to no experience, it is vital that a course be 
established that trains and certifies potential candidates.139 
 
These two comments support hypothesis 3, that collectors lack age, maturity, and 
basic writing ability. The recommendation on establishing a HCT leader course has not 
occurred at the USAIC level, nor has there been any push to develop such a course.A 
2007, 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade AAR provides more insight into issues 
facing HUMINT. Primarily, 10 level training is substandard and does not produce quality 
collectors. This reinforces the hypothesis that training suffered during GWOT, and that 
quantity took precedence over quality. Also, stated here is the fitness level of soldiers 
arriving from AIT is substandard. As the author noted in his own platoon, soldiers had 
physical profiles that prevent them from deploying with the units. This leaves the unit 




                                                 
139 10th Mountain Division, “OEF 05-07 CJ2 Lessons Learned,” 35, 39. 
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Issue: Advanced Individual Training (AIT) output. 
Discussion: [U.S. Army Forces Command] FORSCOM performed miracles to provide the number of 
soldiers required to stand up a new company. There were, however, many issues with the Soldiers we 
received that could have been addressed prior to arrival. Many arrived overweight, with less than optimal 
levels of physical fitness, with profiles dating back over one year or to basic training, and more 
importantly, non-deployable. While the majority is adept at the technical skills of the 97 series MOS 
[35M], a significant minority of these HUMINT Soldiers lack the interpersonal skills also necessary for 
success. 
Recommendation: Tighten the strict screening process to pass thru the 97E [35M] Course. If a person 
cannot effectively speak to someone or write a legible coherent report, they should not push them through 
the course. Re-examine the requirements or physical profile limitations for a 97E [35M] and 97B [35L]. Do 
not release Soldiers from the schoolhouse who are having medical issues that warrant a [medical evaluation 
board] (MEB).140 
 
A News from the Front article written by members of Task Force 2-1 of the 172nd 
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, highlights HUMINT concerns they encountered during a 
yearlong deployment to Eastern Mosul, Iraq. The article says: “Enlisted personnel and 
junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) assigned to THTs are too young or 
inexperienced to manipulate the urban environment to their favor.”141 The article 
continues to explain that HUMINT soldiers are not linguist and lack practical “real 
world” experience with source operations. Interrogation operations similarly suffered  
because, although motivated, military interrogators were unprepared for the task. Causes 
for this included a shortage of language ability, nonexistence cultural knowledge and age 
and experience.142 
The article author’s recommend that National level intelligence agencies are more 
suited for source operations, because of their maturity level and resource capability. 
Additionally, they advocate that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were more effective during 
interrogations. “The ISF interrogator has an infinitely greater grasp of Iraqi cultural and 
social conventions…which provides far a more productive interrogation.”143 
                                                 
140 Department of the Army, 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Transformation AAR Phase I by 
Robert P. Ashley, (AFZA-BfSB-CDR), Ft. Bragg, NC, August 21, 2007, 28. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Greene and Awad, “Optimizing Intelligence Collection and Analysis,” 1–15. 
143 Ibid. 
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Reviewing these AARs is incredibly revealing if one considers that each of the 
above units served yearlong deployments, then it can be presumed that there is 19 years 
of data in the reviewed AARs. This information encompasses responses from both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The period ranged from 2003 until 2009, and included data from both 
interrogations and MSO missions. As suspected, these AAR comments confirmed many 
of the hypotheses of this thesis. Primarily, soldiers lack the skills to perform HUMINT 
collection in the most effective manner. It should be noted that some AARs also 
recognized practices that should be maintained. The most common included, MOS 
training prior to deployment, locating HCTs close out at patrol bases, and assigning more 
than one designated Category II linguist to each HCT. 
2. HUMINT Warrant Officer Opinions 
In an on-line opinion poll, U.S. Army HUMINT Warrant Officers were asked a 
series of questions in regard to their personal experience with HUMINT. Thirty-nine 
HUMINT Warrant Officers, who are subject matter experts, voluntarily participated. The 
respondent’s ranks ranged from WO1 to CW4. Five participants were the rank of WO1, 
23 were CW2, and five were CW3 and six CW4s. Of the respondents, 100% had 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with an average of 3.5 deployments. During all 
deployments respondents worked within the area of HUMINT. There is well over 300 
years of combined HUMINT experience represented here. (See Table 2) 




The first question posed to the group was: “In your opinion, is the Army currently 
meeting its objectives in regard to HUMINT?” Of the 39 responses 29 (74.4%) replied 
that the Army is not meeting its objective, whereas only 10 (25.6%) believed the Army 
meets its objectives. However, of the 19 individuals that elected to provide written 
comments, none offered an opinion of why they thought Army HUMINT was meeting its 
objectives. 144 Individual comments reflect many of the problems with HUMINT, but the 
most common theme implies the lack of proper training for HUMINT collectors. Also, 
mentioned is here is that 10 level MSO is of poor quality and advanced coursed are 
needed prior to deployment. One individual’s comment supports the author’s argument 
that MSO and interrogations should be divided. “Lack of experience on the collection 
teams requires more oversight at higher levels. Put Warrants back on teams. Split 
HUMINT into interrogation and source operations.”145 
                                                 




Table 3.   Is the Army Meeting its Objectives in Regard to HUMINT? 
In your opinion, is the Army currently meeting its objectives in regards to HUMINT. 
Answer Options Response 
Percent 
Response Count 
Yes 25.6% 10 






Current Army Objectives are not in-line with what is practical and productive in today’s rapidly-
changing social landscape. 
[HUMINT] continues to face the same challenges as defined in FM 2-22.3; primarily based in 
misunderstanding of mission by command, army operations, HUMINT support to army operations. 
Leadership has put too many restrictions and requirements on conducting MSO. 
Lack of experience on the collection teams requires more oversight at higher levels. Put Warrants 
back on teams. Split HUMINT into interrogation and source operations. 
Unit level HUMINT training is being swept aside for taskings. HUMINTERS only receive proper 
training when away from parent unit. 
BCT is not the place for MSO; quality of junior soldiers is typically not good. 
Although current efforts to focus on source validation have been initiated, I believe our low levels 
of training on basic analytical skills greatly detracts from our ability as a force to properly conduct 
source validation and basic analysis. 
All mikes must attend at least SOC [mikes = 35M] 
Institutional training needs to be expanded. Commanders must release Soldiers to attend training. 
Need closer integration with CI and CID [Criminal Investigation Department] 
When new HUMINTers arrive at the parent units after AIT, we have to strip down everything they 
have learned and begin from scratch. 
No, one big area of deficiency is operational management. We currently train the 35F HUMINT 
Officer and the 351M Warrant Officer for operational management, but the NCO and junior 
enlisted levels do not receive a lot of training covering this area. Therefore, we have to train at the 
local unit levels to meet this training deficiency. The G2X course partially filled this gap, but was 
recently removed and directly integrated into the MI Captains Career Course and is no longer 
available to the larger military force or for the NCOs in this field. 
More training needs to be given to wide range of 35M and 351M. 
HUMINT Soldiers coming out of the 10L course are being taught differently than what happens 
out in the field 
The emphasis on quantity over quality of HUMINT soldier and training has diminished, allowing 
for a greater number of fully trained collectors. 
Too much emphasis is placed on tasks that are not part of the core competency. Focus should be on 
Interrogation/Source Operations. 
The foundation of HUMINT skills is legacy and does not aid the HUMINT effort. 
Further training on Source Operations is needed prior to AIT Soldiers joining the force. 
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The same on-line poll asked: “In general, does the current training program 
produce quality HUMINT collectors?” Similarly, 73.7% of respondents answered that the 
current training program does not produce quality collectors. Only 10 (26.3%) out of 38 
respondents considered the current training program sufficient. Common responses 
include; 10 level training is not sufficient, the MOS needs stricter entrance qualifications, 
and there has been a reduction in the quality of collector, due to quick accessions into the 
MOS. Recommendations cited here include requiring a selection process for potential 
HUMINTer and develop quality collectors by sending them to SOC and ASOC. 
Table 4.   Does Training Produce Quality Collectors? 
In general, does the current training program produce quality HUMINT collectors? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent 
Response Count 
Yes 26.3% 10 
No 73.7% 28 





We have been churning out garbage over the last 10 years trying to meet quotas, particularly in 
the Warrant Officer Corps. I’ve seen SIGINT NCO’s with ZERO HUMINT experience rammed 
through the 351M pipeline simply to meet quotas. 
Garbage in equals garbage out. 
The MOS producing 35M course does not but additional training does. (SOC, ASOC) 
The 10 level gives the Soldier the understanding of HUMINT operations, however, concurrent 
unit level training is almost non-existent. 
I do not believe the 10 level course produces quality HUMINT collectors. SOC and ASOC are 
both course that I believe produces quality HUMINT collectors. 
Source ops piece in 10 level is horrible. SOC and ASOC [are] not entirely conducive to BCT 
HUMINT ops. 
Screening of potential HUMINT collector candidates needs to be conducted in a manner that 
evaluates the maturity, personality, intelligence, motivation and capabilities of a soldier suitable to 
conduct HUMINT collection operations. The technical HUMINT skills can be taught but does not 
guarantee a proficient HUMINT collector if the soldier is not suitable to conduct such operations. 
Most of these operations rely on soldiers that are self-starters, highly motivated, creative and will 
take charge of a situation in the absence of guidance. A screening process that has been battle-
tested and produces better HUMINT collectors is conducted by the USMC when evaluating 
CI/HUMINT Marines to become HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET) members. 
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I believe that once SOC and ASOC are completed you end up with a quality HUMINT collector, 
but the base 10-level course is not strenuous enough to produce quality collectors out of the 
course. Having had reduced requirements and standards within the course have led to a significant 
amount of incapable soldiers within the HUMINT field. 
No fail rate at Huachuca; collectors not properly mentored due to [operational tempo] 
OPTEMPO; fill the force mentality has killed selecting professionalized and qualified force of 
collectors 
Quick accessions, lack of institutional training opportunities/experience, and lack of focus on 
HUMINT training are degrading the collective pool of experience in the HUMINT community. 
Personality dependent. 
More time on debriefing and analysis of information received (work jointly with 35F) 
Currently the Army only has a cursory selection process for 35M applicants who meet current 
MOS requirements, however, this process does not assess for maturity, life experience and basic 
social skills which are key elements in this field. We need personnel that are able to effectively 
communicate person-to-person in this field. The 35M entry-level course teaches the basic 
fundamentals for the conduct of HUMINT operations, but it cannot teach a lifetime of experience 
and social skills that are critical for a HUMINT Soldier. 
Time limits/constraints on the 10L course prevents quality training to be conducted. We train to 
time, not really to standard. 
Due to OIF and OEF, the Army needed to produce more 35M10. This caused the standards to be 
lowered and the suspension of the language requirement has hindered the MOS as well. 
Again, too much focus on trying to be everything. We need to focus on questioning and report 
writing, because that’s all that first-termers can reasonably be expected to do. Should consider 
changing the requirements to not allow entry level Soldiers to join the MOS. 
The training program produces Soldiers with the minimum level of skills needed to effectively do 
the Job. We depend on proactive leaders in the Army to grab up new HUMINTers and develop 
them past that minimum level of effectiveness. Where we fall short is when we have lazy leaders, 
or there are no experienced personnel to guide and mentor the junior collectors. Also, you cannot 
train maturity, and that is primarily where Army HUMINT falls short. 
Relaxed standards of acceptance are producing relaxed HUMINT collectors not ready to operate 
as a team let alone a singleton. 
More often than not Junior Soldiers are unable to perform this job. This should not be an entry 
level MOS. 
 
Next, in an attempt to determine which HUMINT tasks are considered the most 
imperative verses which tasks are actually conducted more frequently. Two questions were 
posed.  The first Question, “Page 1-4 of FM 2-22.3 states: HUMINT tasks include but are not 
limited to; -Conducting source operations. -Liaising with host nation officials and allied 
counterparts. -Eliciting information from select sources, -Debriefing U.S. and allied forces 
and civilian personnel including refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third country  
nationals, and local inhabitants. -Interrogating EPWs and other detainees. -Initially exploiting 
documents, media, and material. In your opinion, rank these HUMINT tasks in order of 
importance.”146 
                                                 
146 Federation of American Scientists, “Warrant Officer Opinion Poll”; Headquarters, FM 2-22.3. 
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Table 5.   Opinions on Which HUMINT Task Are Most Important 
Page 1-4 of FM 2-22.3 states: HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to— -Conducting source 
operations. -Liaising with host nation officials and allied counterparts. -Eliciting information from 
select sources. -Debriefing U.S. and allied forces and civilian personnel including refugees, displaced 
persons (DPs), third country nationals, and local inhabitants. -Interrogating EPWs and other detainees. 
-Initially exploiting documents, media, and materiel. In your opinion, rank these HUMINT tasks in 
order of importance. (1 being the most important) 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Tasks are equally important. 
Source Operations 23 2 3 1 0 2 0 1 6 
DOMEX/DOCEX 0 1 2 0 0 2 9 18 6 
Liaison 1 1 3 10 7 4 4 3 6 
Eliciting 1 8 1 3 6 5 7 1 6 
Debriefing 0 4 10 6 8 4 0 0 6 
Screening 4 1 4 4 5 5 4 4 7 
Analysis 1 1 6 5 3 8 7 1 6 
Interrogation 2 15 3 3 3 2 1 3 6 
                    Answered question 39
 
The responses show that 23 out of 38 (60.5%) considered source operations the 
most important task for HUMINTers. Only two (.5%) considered interrogation as the 
most important task. Fifteen individuals (39.4%) considered interrogation the second 
most important skill. DOMEX/DOCEX ranked as the least important skill with 18 
individuals placing it last. These results insinuate that the majority of warrant officers 
believe that MSO is a more important than interrogations. The results here advocate that 
tasks such as analysis, DOMEX/DOCEX, and Biometrics are deemed the least important 
by HUMINT professionals. 
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The second question asked: “According to your experience; rank these HUMINT 
tasks in order of frequency conducted.” Since, these Warrant Officers have a wide variety 
of experiences this question truly assesses whether or not interrogation is the primary 
skill needed by the Army. 
Table 6.   Which HUMINT Tasks Are Most Frequently Conducted? 
According to your experience: rank these HUMINT tasks in order of frequency conducted. (1 being most 
frequently conducted) 
Answer Options   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Interrogations   8 6 6 4 4 3 3 1 3 0 1 
Analysis   0 6 8 3 6 4 5 3 1 3 0 
Screening   0 4 7 12 7 5 2 2 0 0 0 
Liaison   3 5 5 6 6 9 2 2 1 0 0 
DOMEX/DOCEX   0 0 2 1 4 2 8 8 10 2 2 
Source Operations   25 4 4 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 
Elicitation   2 6 2 3 5 8 8 4 0 1 0 
Debriefing   0 7 4 8 4 4 6 5 1 0 0 
Biometrics   0 0 1 1 2 1 5 12 14 1 2 
Conducted all tasks 
equally 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 25 3 
Other 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 31 
Answered question 39 
 
Not surprisingly, MSO was the most commonly performed task for Army 
HUMINTers. 64% of HUMINT warrant officers surveyed conducted source operations 
as their primary job. Only 20.5% primarily conducted interrogations during deployments. 
Only one individual responded that he conducted all tasks equally. This data implies that 
MSO is conducted three times more often than interrogations. This supports hypothesis 1, 
that human intelligence collectors only perform a small subset of assign tasks. 
The next question asked if these HUMINTers were properly trained in the 
HUMINT tasks they are expected to perform. The tasks represented here are derived 




Table 7.   Are HUMINT Tasks Properly Trained? 
In your personal opinion, were you properly trained to conduct the following HUMINT tasks? 
Answer Options Yes No Response Count 
Source Operations 34 5 39 
Interrogations 36 3 39 
Analysis 12 27 39 
Screening 33 6 39 
Liaison 27 12 39 
DOMEX/DOCEX 15 24 39 
Elicitation 36 3 39 
Debriefing 35 4 39 
Biometrics 16 23 39 
Answered question 39
 
Most individuals considered themselves properly trained in interrogations, source 
operations, elicitation, screening, liaison operations, and debriefing. The least trained 
tasks were analysis, DOMEX/DOCEX, and biometrics. This is likely because no course 
specifically teaches these tasks. Interestingly, even though all HUMINTers are required 
to attend 10 Level MOS training that predominantly focuses on interrogation three 
respondents considered themselves as not properly trained to conduct interrogations. 
These Warrant Officer’s opinions; advocate that source operations have become 
the primary skill HUMINTers perform, whereas, DOMEX/DOCEX, biometrics, and 
analysis are least executed missions. This data supports the hypothesis that the role of the 
U.S. Army HUMINTer is changing. MSO has grown to be the primary task of collectors. 
Collectors not only consider it the most important task; they also perform MSO the more 
frequently. 
Many of the written comments suggest training at the 10-level does not meet the 
needs of Army HUMINT. Warrant officers, who manage the collectors, note that the 
MOS’s entrance standards have been reduced, and quantity has overshadowed quality. 
These comments support the hypothesis that HUMINTer lack the age and maturity to be 
effective in the field. Advanced courses such as SOC and DATC/ASOC improve a 
collectors overall skill level. 
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This data confirms the author’s notion that the analysis portion of the MOS is 
often overlooked. 69.2% of individuals considered themselves as not being properly 
trained in analysis. Additionally, analysis was not regarded as an important task, only one 
individual rank it as the most important. 
In addition to the HUMINT tasks specifically mentioned in FM-22-2.3, these 39 
Warrant Officers were asked if the current language program is meeting the needs of the 
Army. The discussion posed six language specific questions. 
The first question asked; “Are you proficient in a foreign language?” 65.8% 
(26/39) responded affirmatively with eleven languages identified.147 Only one individual 
responded that they were not currently proficient in a language, but had been previously. 
Four individuals said that they were proficient in more than one language, one of which 
knew three languages and another was proficient in five languages. One participant 
skipped the question. 
Table 8.   Are You Proficient in a Foreign Language? 
 
The second question asked if the individuals ever attended Military language 
training. Twenty-three of 39 responded YES; this represents 59% of the respondents. 
Five individuals are proficient in a foreign language but had never attended Military 
language training. It is worth noting here that the majority of these Warrant Officers 
joined the MOS before the suspension of the language requirement in 2004. The numbers 
of junior soldiers would reflect a much smaller percentage of language-trained soldiers. 
                                                 
147 Noted Languages: Spanish=7; Arabic=6; Russian=4; Korean=4; French=3; Tagalog=2; Persian 
Farsi & Serbo-Croatian & Portuguese & Italian & Chinese=1. 
Are you proficient in a foreign language? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Yes 66.7% 26 
No 33.3% 13 




Table 9.   Have You Attended Official Foreign Language Training? 
 
Question 3 asked: “How important is foreign language proficiency for HUMINT 
collectors?” Although, the answers varied, the largest response was that foreign language 
proficiency was “highly” important with 41% vote. 69.2% considered language 
proficiency” highly” or “extremely” important. Only one individual responded that 
language proficiency was “not at all” important. One respondent skipped the question. 
Seventeen individuals shared their personal opinions. 
Personal responses suggest that soldiers need to be assigned to units where they 
can use language skills, the MOS language requirement should be reinstated and 
language capability leads to cultural understanding. One notable comment says, “Foreign 
language proficiency familiarizes a collector with a foreign culture, mindset, and thought 
process in addition to speaking the language. Even if the collector does not actively 
collect in their control language, they still have this exposure to a foreign mindset, which 
makes HUMINT operations easier to accomplish by ensuring that the collector can make 
the distinction between an US/Western view and the target culture.”148 
                                                 
148 Federation of American Scientists, “Warrant Officer Opinion Poll”; Headquarters, FM 2-22.3. 
Have you attended official military foreign language training? 




Yes 59.0% 23 
No 41.0% 16 




Table 10.   How Important Is Foreign Language Proficiency? 
How important is foreign language proficiency for HUMINT collectors? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent 
Response Count 
Not at all 2.6% 1 
Some what 28.2% 11 
Highly 41.0% 16 







The ability to navigate the target population is critical. This is impossible without being proficient in the 
target language. The use of interpreters is not always practical. 
If for nothing else, it requires a mental aptitude, dedication, perseverance that is required for the field but 
not assessed in any other way than through language capabilities. 
It could make a difference when you collect information. 
Based on advanced training, I was successful but could’ve been more successful if I spoke the language. 
HUMINT needs to transition back to being a language dependent MOS instead of Language Capable. 
Sure could use some Dari, Arabic (dialect specific) and Pashto training. 
Language capability is an important aspect of cultural intelligence. 
Without foreign language proficiency, HUMINT collectors are less likely to be able to utilize an 
interpreter if need outside of their trained or native language. Language training not only decreases 
HUMINT’s reliance on interpreters, but also creates a better understanding of their skills and use if one is 
needed. 
If focused on theatre of operations - no need for Spanish linguists in Afghanistan in collector positions; 
ref: [International Security Assistance Force] ISAF, Kabul. 
Language ability enables better interpersonal skills. Bring back the language requirement. 
Regionally based HUMINT to maximize language skills. 
It comes down to what are the manpower needs of the Army and mission requirements? In the past when 
HUMINT personnel were language dependent and trained in a language, they were still mismanaged and 
put into positions that didn’t even utilize the target language. So if a language is important we need to 
ensure that personnel are put into positions to utilize the training and employ the language to support 
operations. Otherwise, we are wasting our time, money, and efforts. 
Foreign language proficiency familiarizes a collector with a foreign culture, mindset, and thought process 
in addition to speaking the language. Even if the collector does not actively collect in their control 
language, they still have this exposure to a foreign mindset, which makes HUMINT operations easier to 
accomplish by ensuring that the collector can make the distinction between an US/Western view and the 
target culture. 
Learning a foreign language gives the collector insight into other cultures that simple cultural awareness 
training cannot. 
If the Army is willing to align HUMINTers with the regions that their languages are used, then it is 
absolutely worthwhile to send HUMINTers to language school. 
Life experience if nothing else. Topics of interest to draw from in a casual conversation with a lead. 
The level of expertise needed in a language is often unattainable. 
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Question four asked, “If you are proficient in a foreign language: Have you 
conducted HUMINT operations in this foreign language?” The most common response 
was yes with 35.9% of the vote. However, 30.8% said the question did not apply to them. 
One respondent skipped the question and five provided written opinions. 
Table 11.   Have You Conducted HUMINT Operations in a Foreign Language? 
If you are proficient in a foreign language: Have you conducted HUMINT operations in this foreign 
language? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Yes 35.9% 14 
No 33.3% 13 
NA 30.8% 12 
Comments: 5 
Answered question 39 




I would like to do it but never selected to do it. 
When I was proficient in Arabic, I conducted source operations in Iraq using this language. 
4 X COMBAT TOURS, IRAQ. 
Interrogation in the target language, without the use of an interpreter. 
Unless you are a Korean linguist or Arabic linguist, the Army does not utilize language skills. 
 
Question 5 asked: “If you have been trained in a foreign language, how often have 
you used your language in HUMINT operations?” Unsurprisingly, 50% of respondents 
said that they “never” conducted HUMINT in a language that they had been taught. Only, 
one respondent said that they conducted 100% of their HUMINT operations in their 
trained language. Four individuals offered personal comments, but unsurprisingly, 






Table 12.   How Often Foreign Language Skills Been Utilized During Operations? 
If you have been trained in a foreign language, how often have you used your language in HUMINT 
operations? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Never 50.0% 18 
10% of the time 19.4% 7 
20% of the time 5.6% 2 
30% of the time 8.3% 3 
40% of the time 5.6% 2 
50% of the time 0.0% 0 
60% of the time 0.0% 0 
70% of the time 0.0% 0 
80% of the time 8.3% 3 
90% of the time 0.0% 0 
100% of the time 2.8% 1 
Comments: 4 
Answered question 36 
Skipped question 4 
 
 Individual Comments 
IC concentrates their effort in CENTCOM only. 
 
One deployment to Iraq, I used the language 100% of the time. Three deployments to Afghanistan, I 
used the language 5% of the time. 
 
Only in country have I utilized the use of my language in support of operations, however, outside of the 
country there is very limited use of the language in support of operations. 
 
My language is not useful in operations in [Afghanistan] AF or [Iraq] IZ. 
 
The final language question is the most revealing in regard to the current Army 
language program. It asked; “Does the foreign language program meet the needs of the 
Army?” Of the 35 responses, 68.6% said that the current language program does not meet 
the needs of the Army.149 Five individuals declined to answer the question and 19 
provided written responses. 
Insufficient language maintenance training and command oversight are popular 
complaints. Additionally, respondents mention “assignments need to coincide with a 
Soldier’s language proficiency” and “it appears as though the army has no idea as to how 
to prioritize target languages…Soldiers with language training are not guaranteed 
                                                 
149 Federation of American Scientists, “Warrant Officer Opinion Poll.” 
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assignments in which they would utilize their target language. A Spanish-speaking soldier 
may end up with an assignment to a unit that deploys to an Arabic speaking location…” 
Table 13.   Does the Foreign Language Program meet the Army’s Needs? 
Does the foreign language program meet the needs of the Army? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Yes 31.4% 11 
No 68.6% 24 
Comments: 19 
Answered question 35 
Skipped question 5 
 
Individual Comments 
Language maintenance is not currently funded appropriately, including immersion programs in the target 
countries. 
Not enough emphasis in language but more in maintenance in the motor pool. 
I believe that HUMINT and Counterintelligence professionals should have the ability to go to language 
training. They could make it a requirement for E-6 and above and all Warrant Officers. 
Completely broken, there is no command emphasis or allocated time or resources for 35M’s to maintain 
proficiency. 
While the foreign language program meets the needs of the Army, assignments need to coincide with a 
Soldier’s language proficiency. 
It appears as though the army has no idea as to how to prioritize target languages. Additionally, Soldiers 
with language training are not guaranteed assignments in which they would utilize their target language. 
A Spanish-speaking soldier may end up with an assignment to a unit that deploys to an Arabic speaking 
location. Also, units do not make language training a priority. It only becomes a concern once a soldier 
has failed a language proficiency test. 
I believe the training is available; however, it is very difficult to maintain due to the operational tempo in 
the past 11 years. Foreign language takes a substantial amount of time to maintain proficiency. 
[The Defense Language Proficiency Test] DLPT 5 is a disaster; bonuses are clearly for the 09Ls, not the 
rest of us. Think of the money we’d save paying and screening civilians if we’d take the time to 
adequately train our soldiers in middle eastern and Asian languages. Yes, I get it...these languages take a 
long time. But haven’t we been at war for over 10 years? We could be reaping the rewards of having 
trained our own soldiers. 
HUMINTers do not currently get training in a foreign language. Given current technology available to 
units and commanders, there is little reason to rely solely on DLI for language acquisition. All HUMINT 
professionals should have language capability that can be fostered through use of distance learning, 
partnerships with local colleges and universities, immersion and other blended learning techniques. 
Needs to be longer; the mere “mark on the wall” of 2/2/2 is ridiculous - no collector can learn a language 
in the college setting of DLI, immersion is key. There is no time in the current army setting of language 
maintenance; hundreds of thousands of dollars and man-hours lost to teaching somebody a language just 
to let it fade away. Army G1 / anybody else has no track of who learned what language. 
Five deployments to Iraq or SW Asia and I have never used my language. Units I have been assigned to 
do not have a command language program and language training frequently falls off the training 
schedule due to other training requirements. 
Poor program management (admin/training) within FORSCOM units. 
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Although I am not a DLI graduate - the quality of the students is superb; however, all too often language 
training/reinforcement is relegated to the back seat for other “garrison” activities. 
The Army has to determine if they want to bring back language dependency to the HUMINT field, if not 
then it will still be deficient in language needs for HUMINT. Currently we rely heavily upon interpreters 
to support operations. The other issue is different units have differing levels of emphasis on language 
maintenance and programs available. 
Actual language training time and refresher training is extremely rare for HUMINT collectors. SIGINT 
collectors receive the greater emphasis on language training. 
We need to get back to the way it was when we were required to maintain language proficiency. 
Language proficient Soldiers are able to function as interpreters as well. 
Language proficiency is simply not a priority in the tactical Army. 
The training is excellent. The application of the training is substandard. 
Realistically HUMINT Soldiers are unable to obtain a native speaker status, which is needed if you were 
to ever think about doing either Interrogation or Source Operations in a language other than English. 
 
As the data shows, the majority of responders considered the Army as not meeting 
it language objectives. Since being proficient in a foreign language is considered essential 
for HUMINT operations, the Army should review is current language program. 
According to this data, several factors seem to have caused a lack in language capability. 
First, the suspension of the language requirement reduced the HUMINT’s capability. 
Next, soldiers are not aligned with units where they are able to conduct operations in their 
target language. Finally, sustainment training is not properly managed throughout the 
Army. 
3. On-Line Professional Forums 
For this section, the on-line MI-Space professional forum was utilized. Within 
MI-Space, there is a subcategory, where members can discuss HUMINT specific topics. 
This forum is open to enlisted soldiers, warrant officers, officers, civilian contractors, 
retirees, and others in the IC. From this forum, the author pulled questions and comments 
that relate to thesis’s hypotheses. 
In June of 2012, the question was asked: “Have “Interrogators” and “Source 
Handler” ever been separate MOSs? Should they be?” Individual comments on this 
thread can be read in entirety in Appendix A. Noteworthy comments suggest there is a bit 
of disagreement on whether or not MSO and interrogating have been separate. From the 
opinions in this poll, it appears as though the Army recognized a need for more MSO 
collectors around the Balkans conflict. The consensus is that counterintelligence agents 
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have historically conducted MSO, but the increase of demand led to interrogators 
participating as well. 
The discussion here also debates the levels of MSO. It is suggested that an ASI is 
require before conducting MSO. However, category III MSO is a basic HUMINT task 
and is included in the critical task list (CTL) for all 35M/351M. The respondents suggest 
that the problem rests in the fact that there “is currently no jointly agreed upon task list 
for MSO Cat 3 therefore there can be no certification for MSO Cat 3.”150 Advance 
courses which offer ASIs are needed to conduct categories I, II MSO. The author has 






Source handling used to be a primary function for CI. The large transition came after 
Interrogators los[t] the language requirement and became HUMINT, circa 2005. This was a 
result of requirement from OEF/OIF. As a result we have a large population of Interrogators, 
low population of CI, and continually pull CI out of our formations making us that much more 
vulnerable to the ever increasing trends of insider threat… 
CW2 
351M 
…the transition actually came after operations in Bosnia. 97Es were doing MSO before 9/11 
ever happened. This transition had nothing to do with having/not having a language. 97Es had a 
skill set and a language and therefore it made sense for them to conduct MSO. The biggest 




Good answer... The biggest reason for the creation of the “big Army” HUMINT Soldier was to 
create a tactical HUMINT capability that was offensive in nature. Since the Balkans Crisis, the 
CI MOS has been a more defensive discipline when working tactically and could not fulfill both 




Concur, the transition did begin after/during Bosnia/Balkans as I witnessed first-hand in 1998, 
but did not sky rocket in transition until later when the school house just pumped out quantity 
not quality of HUMINT over CI circa 2005. [Omitted]  
Overall, the Army has missed the mark, especially as this discussion clearly demonstrates the 
bias and division of CI vs. HUMINT. Although several of the comments later on paint a better 
light, the Marine Corps has it right with having experienced folks capable of doing both jobs. 
Furthermore, it’s not enough to say someone is trained in MSO can effectively perform the task. 




It isn’t possible to have a detailed discussion of this topic on an unclassified forum. The short 
answer to whether Interrogator and source handler have been separate MOSs is yes. In fact, 
“source handler” is presently an ASI for the MOS 35M. Elements of the source handling trade 
were first taught at the 10-level in 1999, if memory serves. 
As to whether they ought to be separate MOSs, that depends on what Army leaders expect 
                                                 
150 HUMINT &CI, Human Intelligence, MI-Space, “Have Interrogators and Source Handler Ever 
Been Separate MOSs? Should They Be?” Army Professional Forums, June 2012, 




35Ms to do. My personal opinion; leaders want interrogators, and THINK they want source 
handlers, but don’t really understand what being a source handler means or what the operations 
entail to be done correctly. So, I think they should be separate, and that source handling should 
remain out of the hands of conventional units. Again, just my opinion. 
CW4 
351M 
It is slightly misleading to say that source handling is merely an ASI for 35M. So, for 
clarification, the Army considers SOC to be an advanced course in source handling thus there is 
an ASI for enlisted Soldiers who attend the training. Source handling as a function of HUMINT 
is currently integrated into the MOS and forms part of the critical task list for all skill levels. 




Not my intention to be misleading. I did focus on 35M vs. 351M, but you are of course correct 
that there is no ASI for the 351Ms, as a MSO CAT II certifying course is required for technical 
certification as a 351M. 
For clarification, when I refer to source handling I assume we mean CAT II. I think that’s what 
most other folks mean as well. In any case, I will reference the message pertaining to the ASIs 
to make sure that I have my facts straight. 
[See footnote 146]152 
Since the title of the ASI S1 is “Source Handler” I infer that one is not considered a source 
handler without the ASI, and that source handling is therefore directly associated with MSO 
CAT II. The Army appears to not consider MSO CAT III source handling for the purposes of 
this discussion. I know we include aspects of source handling as critical tasks, but we don’t 
certify the collectors as source handlers without attendance at the courses above [courses listed 
in footnotes], at which point they are granted an ASI. 
The requirement to have a MSO CAT II certification prior to attendance at WOCS and WOBC 
has only recently been implemented and enforced. We still have a number of 351Ms who do not 
have such a certification, and a few (four that I am aware of) have attended a MSO CAT II 
certifying course and failed. What will happen to these Soldiers? Forced re-class? One last 
chance to pass? 
CW4 
351M 
You bring up an interesting issue in regard to MSO Cat 2 and MOS Cat 3. There is currently no 
jointly agreed upon task list for MSO Cat 3 therefore there can be no certification for MSO Cat 
3. That does not mean that those 35Ms who are trained to conduct MSO Cat 3 cannot be source 
handlers. It merely means that the community has yet to agree upon and publish a list of tasks 
that comprise such a skill set. 
CW3  
351M 
Actually, I have a question based on the way you phrased this... If there is no agreed upon CAT 




There is no Joint standard but there is an Army MOS that requires training in MSO Cat 3. 
Therefore, lacking any other benchmarks against which to assess training success, the closest 
we can come to a codified standard for the Army is whatever standard the [Critical Task / Site 
Selection Board] CTSSB decides comprises the basic requirements for the 35M 10 level 
Soldier. Is this the very best answer? Absolutely not, but the subject matter experts in the field 
convene every two or three years to determine what a 35M should be, know and do at each skill 
level so it’s not a bad answer either. 
CW3 
351M 
I was at the last CTSSB with you, and discussing the reasons why certain tasks were, were not, 
or couldn’t be included in the 10-level [critical task list] CTL is too big a can of worms to get 
                                                 
152 1. ASI S1: soldiers must successfully complete one of DA G2 approved category II MSO 
certifying courses to be awarded ASI S1: A. Source operations course (SOC) B. Military 
counterintelligence collections course (MCC) C. Counterintelligence force protection source operations 
(CFSO) D. Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) CI/HUMINT course. 2. ASI V4: soldiers must 
successfully complete one of the category 1 MSO certifying courses: A. Advanced source operations 
course (ASOC) conducted B. Advanced military source operations course (AMSOC) Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA). 
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into here. I observe, in addition to the lack of a task list for CAT III, a lack of uniform 
agreement as to what CAT III really is, operationally speaking. I think it would be super if we 
could have that discussion at the joint level. 
I also observe confusion/conflation between operational categories and source categories 
(levels). Again, ‘twould be great to have something that definitively laid it all out. (Actually, I 
think it is spelled out pretty well in existing policy and doctrine, but since there is still disparity 




… Interrogators were once a separate MOS, but the HUMINT collector/source handler is a 
recent MOS to the “big Army.” Army CI was the tactical source handler for the Army until the 
Balkans. The mission was too big for CI to man and maintain CI operations. The solution was 
to bring interrogators into the fold, which eventually led to two HUMINT based MOSs with two 
different focuses; 35L being defensive in nature and 35M being more offensive. 
The reasons that brought the MOSs to this point have all been good in theory, but I agree with 
[CW3 / 351M]. Execution has proved it to be less than efficient. Source handling and 
interrogations would be better employed and more productive if they were separate, and in 





I believe that much of the reason that CI personnel were pressed into being the “tactical source 
handler” for Big Army was that they had the skills, but what the Army really needed was MSO/ 
[low level source operations] LLSO HUMINT assets. Of course they had none, so they used CI 
assets somewhat out of their field… 
 
Additional discussions on the MI-Space forum are posed while students attended 
the 35M-Advanced Leadership Course (ALC) at Ft. Huachuca. Instructors ask general 
questions in regard to the MOS and HUMINT students are required respond. Some of the 
comments and names have been omitted. The demographic for responses to these 
questions are from SGT, SSG, and SFC, with the majority being SSG. 
The first ALC question posed in June 2011 asked. “What would be the 
advantages/disadvantages of making the 35M MOS a 20 level and above only MOS?”153 
Fifty-one students responded to the question. The majority of responses said that the 
MOS would benefit if initial entry soldiers were not allowed to directly join the MOS. 
The advantages of making the MOS 20 level only include establishing a screening 
process and the likelihood that soldiers would be more mature. Although, not all 
responses are included here, the following comments offer a good summary. (Additional 
comments can be found in Appendix B.) 
  
                                                 
153 HUMINT &CI, Human Intelligence MI-Space, “What Would Be the Advantages/Disadvantages of 
Making the 35M MOS a 20 Level and Above Only MOS?” Army Professional Forums, June 2011, 
https://forums.army.mil/Secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1472624&lang=en-US. Only USG-




In 2010, the question was posed: “Do you believe separating the 35M MOS into 
two separate tracks, one for MSO and one for Interrogations, would improve the overall 
quality of all 35M’s?” This question addresses this thesis’s main argument. There were 
55 comments that have been included in their entirety in Appendix C.154 Of the 
comments, 23 individuals argue that separating interrogation from Source operations is 
                                                 
154 HUMINT &CI, Human Intelligence, MI-Space, “Do You Believe Separating the 35M MOS Into 
Two Separate Tracks, One for MSO and One for Interrogations, Would Improve the Overall Quality of All 
35M’s?” Army Professional Forums, June 2012, 
https://forums.army.mil/SECURE/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1081907&lang=en-US, Appendix C. Only 
USG-authorized use only. 
The 35M MOS is a very specialized MOS and requires Soldiers with specialized attributes. Some of those 
attributes are: alertness; patience; tact; credibility; objectivity; self-control; adaptability; perseverance; 
appearance; demeanor; and initiative. These attributes cannot be verified without evaluations and 
experience. Sub 20 level Soldiers have not been in long enough to be evaluated and determined to have the 
attributes mentioned above. Sub 20 level Soldiers have not proven that they can operate as a 35M so they 
should not be pulled into the MOS 
An advantage to this concept would be Soldiers entering into the skill set would “normally” be more 
mature, responsible and adaptive to the requirements needed to become a successful HUMINT collector. 
Most entry level Soldiers coming into the Army are recent high school graduates and do not hold the 
appropriate life experience or maturity to deal with people during HUMINT operations… 
A 20 level soldier (or above) should already have that Army experience behind them. Most 10 level 
soldiers lack the basic understanding of the military necessary to function individually within the HUMINT 
Community… 
While restricting the 35M MOS to a 20 level or higher MOS would be a step in the right direction, what we 
ultimately need is thorough screening process. The 10 course has an excellent capability to accomplish this 
screening process; however it has been misused during recent years due to the greater demand for quantity 
over quality. What we need to do as a whole is uphold a high and solid standard without compromise. 
 
For the 35M MOS to progress and not become just another over-filled MOS, we do need an appropriate 
screening system, which assesses the potential HUMINTer’s intelligence, common sense, social skills, and 
maturity. As stated, our MOS should focus on quality. I would rather have a team of two or three solid 
performers than six bodies that lack the requisite skills to perform as a 35M… I agree we need to maintain 
a high standard for this job, and I encourage an appropriate screening for individuals wanting to enter this 
MOS. 
 
The HUMINT field is definitely a specialized MOS, which requires, in addition to those attributes 
mentioned…, a large amount of both maturity and life experience. Those who have been in the field long 
enough have likely met those battlefield commanders and Platoon Leaders who have been burned in the 
past by poor HUMINT Collection Team Leaders, etc.… due to their lack of maturity, inability to properly 
communicate, and a lack of overall professionalism. Unfortunately, these expectations when it comes to 
HUMINT have become the norm rather than the rare exception, damaging our overall credibility in 
battlefield operations and forcing us to work that much harder in order to prove our mission capabilities… 
 
The 35M MOS requires a certain level of expertise, maturity, and responsibility in order to accomplish 
whatever mission is assigned to you.  
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beneficial. Seventeen argued that it word hurt the MOS more than improve it. The 
remaining comments were either on the fence or neutral on the issue. 
The principle arguments on why the MOS should not be split focused on a couple 
of themes. First, was that advanced interrogation courses are not available. Therefore, 
individual who tracked into interrogation would have limited training opportunities. The 
Army would need to create advanced interrogation courses before splitting the job field. 
The Second argument is the shortage of personnel. By splitting the MOS, the pool of 
qualified collectors is reduced. Lastly, the Army would lose well-rounded soldiers who 
are able to perform both activities. 
This thesis argues that the MOS be split. In Chapter IV, the author will give 
possible solutions on how to separate the MOS into tracks, while mitigating the concerns 
of those opposed to this idea. The comments below are divided into Pro and Con of 
separating the MOS. 
Individual Comments 
Pro - Separating the MOS  
I believe the MOS should have two separate tracks. One track focusing on MSO and one interrogation. I 
believe for the MSO side of the track there should be certain requirements.  
Rank and age should be just some of the requirements for conducting MSO operations. It should not be an 
entry-level position. I believe by emplacing this requirement alone, the overall quality of the MOS will 
increase.  
I have no issues with an interrogator being an entry level position. I also believe that at after a certain 
amount of experience and meeting the requirements for the MSO track, you should be afforded the 
opportunity to make a decision to stay as an interrogator or move on to being a collector. This will allow 
for individuals to grow in the MOS (improving the quality) and have control of your own career path.
Separating the two (by MSO and interrogations) would permit/ focus the training for those specific skill 
sets i.e. source handling and detainee/ interrogation operations. Also, the SH/ interrogator role would be 
clearly defined (for the collector’s respective unit) so that a CDR would better understand his/ her 35M 
asset capabilities. 
Correct me if I am wrong here, but my understanding of previous discussions in our circle of colleagues has 
not been to physically split the 35M MOS. The way it has been discussed before is to establish two tracks 
within the 35M and 351M MOS’s for interrogations and MSO. Whether we agree or disagree with the 
concept it has unofficially been happening over the last 8-10 years. Many of my colleagues already pursue 
positions specifically focused on their preferred area within the MOS. The intent is to decide whether or not 
to formally establish career paths within the MOS in order to better support both areas within HUMINT. 
The area of training emphasis brought…is a valid one that has and is being discussed. What having formal 
career tracks should allow for is the establishment of more advanced training with regard to interrogations 
for those HUMINT collectors who prefer to follow an interrogation track and hopefully mirror the training 
pillars offered for MSO. 
While there are not different categories of interrogation operations such as MSO I-III there should be 
advancing levels of interrogation training. Just as … mentioned, the Senior Interrogator course is more of a 
management course. From discussions I have had with my peers there is a desire to establish and 
incorporate advanced interrogation training into the interrogator track should one be established. 
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Overall, having HUMINT collectors tracked as MSO or interrogator will help the career managers better 
determine future assignments and ensure that these soldiers, NCO’s, and Warrants hit the appropriate 
educational and assignment “wickets” for advancement and proper utilization. 
 
That is a great idea. Allowing a track split at the 30 level would allow the Army to focus its higher trained 
(and hopefully retained) assets on specific mission sets. God knows we have plenty of 30 level personnel, 
why not use this “dwell” time to ensure that these personnel are able to take the courses needed to become 
true experts in their track, whether MSO or Interrogations? I’d love to see the CTSSB approve split tracks 
based in choice/experience that allows … our collectors [to become experts].
The simple fact of the matter is that specialization is productive; it is the reason the entire Warrant Officer 
Corps exists. 
I would actually take it a step further, though. Once an MSO-specific MOS was created, structure it similar 
to 35L, requiring an application and screening process.
There are a lot of arguments predicated on the concept that splitting the MOS into interrogation ops and 
MSO degrades HUMINT because it denies a Soldier the ability to reach their full potential. I pose this 
question: where besides the -10 level course are the two disciplines integrated? No where! True, some 
principles and methodologies apply across the spectrum, but these are two distinct skill sets. Likely many 
of us have seen the 35M with only interrogation experience enter his/her first source meet and attempt to 
interrogate the source. Inversely, many of us have likely seen the 35M with only MSO experience enter 
his/her first interrogation and be run into the ground by the detainee “trying to establish rapport.” 
I concede that a well-rounded collector CAN and SHOULD be able to do both. But artificially imposing 
this diversification in the quest for a well-rounded Soldier is what actually degrades capability. If the 
Soldier is capable and demonstrates talent or exceptional performance in one skill set, but is forced to 
divide his/her attention and effort in maintaining proficiency in both compels that Soldier to do so at 
expense of the one in which they truly excel. 
Splitting the MOS contains many implied tasks, not least of which is differentiating missions. While this is 
not a simple task, it begs the question, is it worth the effort? Again, many arguments here have been 
presented founded on the concept of quality over quantity. Allowing a Soldier to dedicate their training life-
cycle to one of the two skill-sets (vice both), and giving them experience in one (vice both) results in a net 
gain in quality 
I believe courses should be developed to compliment the interrogation side of the house before separation 
can occur. We have courses that focus on MSO certifying collectors to conduct MSO operations in the 
current theaters but none that really focus on interrogations. I know the 10 level course focuses on 
interrogations and commanders seem to think that this is enough. There is a little known advanced 
interrogation school but this course focuses on collectors who have already conducted interrogation 
operations whereas SOC is a practical necessity to conduct effective operations in the current conflicts. I 
believe that before a “Split” of the 35M MOS is undertaken we should at least develop a certifying program 
for interrogations, much like the MSO side of the house.
Just spent the past 30 minutes catching up on this issue. Here are a couple issues to consider. First, until the 
late 90’s, the interrogator course was an 8-week long Order of Battle interrogation course with no MSO 
component. CI did all the source ops. Second, as you all know, a -10 AIT graduate is unqualified by the 
DOD and ARMY MSO policies to operate anything but CAT 3 MSO without the special O-5 waiver. 
Basically, he’s unqualified to do MSO by the basic course. I believe ours is the only MOS where the basic 
course does NOT qualify you do your job. SOC/ASOC/FTC’s required to do any MSO of value in the 
DOD’s eyes. The O-5 waiver is a stop gap measure intended to keep the MSO collectors engaged until they 
can get the required and expected advanced MSO training. I fully expect that waiver option to go away 
once DA assesses there are enough SOC/ASOC grads to sustain the mission. Keeping the training 
combined provides greater flexibility to the unit to swap collectors around between HCTs and interrogation 
jobs, depending on the situation day by day. I completely agree that there needs to be an interrogation 
career track with additional formal training in interrogation besides Reid, LSI/SCAN, and the British 
course, which I’ve only heard of and don’t know any actual graduates of. There is an initiative at [Defense 
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center] DCHC/DIA to develop a follow-on interrogation 
course. I would recommend that someone at USAIC/HT-JCOE set up a tiger team to draft a proposed POI 
for a journeyman/advanced interrogation series of courses. They’ll have to be short, no more than 4 to 5 
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weeks, though, if they intend to attract collectors from the divisions. Alternately, they could be tied to 
[NCO and WO evaluation systems], but that would involve buy-in from DA G1. All those PME schools are 
detached from promotion now, so there’s really no incentive to go to WLC/PLDC/BNCOC as they’ve all 
devolved into administrative block checks versus real leadership training--but that’s a different topic 
altogether. In the meanwhile, I’d recommend that the units look for individual augmentee assignment 
options in response to [requests for forces] RFFs to get their interrogators pushed out to units that are doing 
effective interrogations, that is, places other than the [detention facility in Parwan] DFIP/ [Joint 
Interrogation and Debriefing Center] JIDC-type places
 
Con - Separating the MOS 
I do not think it would be helpful to split 35M into two separate MOS’s. Source and detainee operations go 
hand in hand. There really is not enough significant differences between the two to warrant separation. The 
procedures for assessing, questioning, analyzing information, and report writing are all basically the same... 
whether or not the individual is physically controlled by U.S. forces. If our interrogations were more law 
enforcement-oriented, and our reason for interrogating detainees was to pressure them to confess, then it 
might be useful to separate the two. But the end goal of MI interrogation/ MSO is the same... to exploit 
information of intelligence value, and to use a series or approaches in order to make that happen. 
In every job, I believe it is necessary to have at least two separate job tracks in order to avoid stagnation. 
After working interrogations for six months straight, I know I was personally exhausted... physically and 
mentally. I needed a break to stay fresh and avoid getting into a rut. For me, that break was MSO. After 
doing that for six months, in turn, I was eager to get back to interrogations, and I found myself a better 
interrogator, not just because I was rested, but also because developing my MSO skillset actually improved 
my ability to “break” sources. 
I don’t think splitting the MOS would do any good, for two reasons. One is that it would be easy for the 
MOS to become lopsided -- not enough MSO or not enough interrogators. Given our current manning, this 
might not be an immediate problem, but I could see it being a problem down the road. 
The second reason is that there’s very little training out there specifically for interrogators. At least, I can’t 
think of much. The Reid course, I suppose. Kinesics and LSI-SCAN are useful HUMINT classes. But what 
do we have that is really advanced training for interrogators? Another way of saying this is, if someone 
wanted to be highly trained and proficient, why would they choose to be an Army interrogator? What 
would your training path look like? The 10 course and then... what? Senior interrogator -- which is a 
management course, not an advanced interrogation course. DSDC/Strat D? Not an interrogation course -- 
closer to MSO, I would think. The British course? I don’t know anyone who has actually gone to it, but that 
could be a start. 
If we’re going to separate the MOS, we need to have a comparable training path for the people who go to 
each path. Right now we don’t. 
I feel that splitting the MOS would hinder more than help. In this profession there is no way of knowing 
who we will be called on to support or what our supported unit may run into while on mission. If the MOS 
were split how could we possibly ensure those individuals assigned for interrogations would end up in a 
DHA, or JIDC and even if those were hard slots, there isn’t enough for an even split of the MOS. In order 
to maintain an even spread of the MOS some people slated for interrogation would still have to conduct 
MSO eventually and vice versa. The major problem being that MSO and interrogation are perishable skills. 
I believe the entire MOS needs to continue to work in and train on all facets of the job to mitigate this 
degradation of skill sets. 
 
I do not believe that separating 35M into two different tracks would be beneficial to HUMINT Operations. 
This can cause multi problems and not alleviate the problem which already exists. One of the problems that 
could be caused by this course of action would be a lack of personnel available for future missions. The 
problem which exists now is the level of maturity and competence of the HUMINT Collector that we are 
finding in the Army.  
With this approach to HUMINT Operations, you would have separate tracks for soldiers to follow allowing 
the individual soldier to focus on one aspect of collection allowing them to better hone their skills. The 
underlying problem that HUMINT as a whole would face after this would be manning. As it stands now 
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there is a tremendous manning issue in the Army for the 35M field. This is part of the reason so many new 
collectors have been pushed out of the schoolhouse. After talking with 10 level instructors’ students 
standards for operating in the field have dropped due to the Army needing numbers. We will run into the 
same problem, maybe not now; but, later down the road it is inevitable. With two tracks we will have over 
manning in one and not enough in the other. 
The major problem that is in the 35M field which makes me assume the reason for the question being posed 
in the first place is some soldiers are good at interrogations and some soldiers are good at MOS. Why can’t 
a soldier just be a good collector? I believe that soldiers can be good collectors but with interrogations and 
with MOS the soldier has to have a personality and characteristic traits that are not taught but gained 
through life experience. How can we as Non Commissioned Officers expect an 18 year old soldier straight 
out of high school to have the opportunity to gain these traits? There needs to be 35M recruiting teams. We 
need to “identify” collectors. That is what MSOH’s [military source handler] do in the first place, identify 
people. Separating the field is only forming an excuse to be substandard.  
Now to play devil’s advocate; I do think that we should make a carrier path once you reach senior Non 
Commissioned Officer by separating into fields of expertise. This would be a beneficial alternative to 
creating an entirely separate track for the 10 level soldiers. This will allow collectors that have focused on 
certain aspects of HUMINT throughout their carriers to be better managers in the realm that they have 
operated in. 
 
No! All separating the MOS would do is create problems. Within HUMINT there are already 
specializations, interrogations and MSO. Specifically assigning individuals to those task by MOS and not 
by ability would destroy both operations. There are several HUMINTers that are exceptional at conducting 
MSO, but are completely lacking at interrogations and vice versa. Though this is an issue for HUMINT, it 
is manageable because HUMINTers can be moved from position to position depending on their strengths, 
however it is practically impossible to determine where a HUMINTers talents lie before they are engaged 
in operations. By separating the MOS, you would limit HUMINTers to their MOS instead of their talents 




This chapter illustrates that Army HUMINT is currently not meeting the nation’s 
needs. Although, the HUMINT Corps has gained invaluable experience during the Global 
War on Terror, professionals from many different backgrounds and experiences still 
encounter similar and reoccurring issues. HUMINT professionals advocate that there is a 
general lack of skill, due to training deficiencies in numerous areas crucial to HUMINT 
collection. Collectors often lack language ability, cultural knowledge, analytical and 
writing ability, and maturity to be successful. 
Throughout the intelligence community, there is an understanding that the Nation 
need a greater HUMINT capacity. This means growth not only in the number of 
collectors but also evolution in the types of operations they are able to carryout. The 
Army has recognized that the role of HUMINT is changing and has begun to modify its 
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doctrine and training to attempt to meet this need. While the Army has some experienced 
and talented collectors, not all of its HUMINTers are up to par. 
In Chapter IV, based on the information obtained, the author concludes that the 
Army’s HUMINT structure and training are in need of reform. The author proposes that 
if the Army restructures the HUMINT MOS and modifies the training, it could mitigate 
many of the challenges identified in this research. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
1. Does U.S. Army HUMINT Doctrine Achieve its Objectives? What 
Have Iraq and Afghanistan Taught Us? 
Based on the data from the previous chapters the answer to this thesis’s primary 
research question is, “No, the Army is not meeting its HUMINT Objectives.” However, 
we have learned from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. As pointed out earlier the 
Army, as well as the entire IC, agree that the nation needs a large HUMINT capability. 
The Army reacted to this need by increasing the number of soldiers trained in HUMINT 
operations. Unfortunately, this this was not without consequences. First, the Army 
increased numbers without taking into consideration that the tasks HUMINT collectors 
would be conducting has changed. Collectors trained primarily in interrogation 
operations but more frequently performed military source operations downrange. Second, 
quantity took precedence over quality and many unskilled collectors were allowed to 
enter the MOS. Lastly, confusing and controversial interrogation guidance has 
necessitated that the nation revamp its policies, this monumental effort has attempted to 
repair damage of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Nevertheless, the Army should ensure that 
only highly skilled and professionally trained soldiers interrogate. 
The Army has made a measureable effort to improve HUMINT over the last 12 
years. It rewrote the Army Field Manual guiding HUMINT activities, it established HT-
JCOE training center and has increased the size of its force. Because of this, the Army 
currently has many well-trained and experienced HUMINT collectors. As the Army 
transitions out of Afghanistan and downsizes its forces it should continue to 
professionalize the HUMINT Corps.  
Recognizing deficiencies of Iraq and Afghanistan the Army continues to make 
adjustments to its current HUMINT policy. Recent improvements include an increase in 
the required security clearance level, an increase of the minimum ST score, and a 
required score of 95 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). Unfortunately, 
despite these efforts, there remain shortfalls in the MOS. Issues with experience, 
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maturity, competency, and cultural and language knowledge persist. The likelihood that 
these already implemented measures will be sufficient for future operations is doubtful. 
Obsolete 10 level training and counterproductive doctrine impede on the changes 
that are required to address these shortfalls. The rapid pace of which HUMINT has 
grown, both in size and responsibility has necessitated a revision in training, standards, 
and policy. The author suggests that implementing the following recommendations; the 
Army would likely improve the HUMINT MOS and further professionalize the corps. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are a combination of initiatives the Army has 
already begun implementing, as well as, proposals for restructuring the Army HUMINT 
MOS and allowing HUMINT collectors to supplement the national HUMINT enterprise. 
The author contends that the Army can build and maintain quality HUMINT collectors 
by: 
 Increase the MOS’s entrance requirements, by mimicking other 
intelligence field’s qualification requirements 
 Regionally aligning soldiers, based on individual language and cultural 
knowledge. 
 Restructuring the MOS, by creating an entry level HUMINT analyst 
position; and making separate interrogation and source operations tracks at 
the NCO level. 
 Integrate Experienced Collectors into National Agencies.  
1. Increasing Entrance Requirements to the MOS 
To increase the quality of soldiers entering the MOS, the Army must raise the 
MOS enlistment standards to ensure the selection of the best-qualified recruits. These 
changes should mirror requirements for other intelligence disciplines such as 35P, 
Cryptologic Linguist, 35F Intelligence Analyst and the 35L counterintelligence MOS. 
The Army should raise the ASVAB qualifying scores for HUMINT collectors from the 
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current 95 ST score to 105, to match that of an intelligence analyst.155 In addition, the 
MOS should require a Top-Secret clearance and GT score of 110 or higher, like 
requirement of the 35P. Moreover, the 35M specialty should also require an accession 
assessment comparable to the 35L. Scores and assessment should not be waiverable. 
Fortunately, the Army has already begun the increase enlistment standards for the 
HUMINT MOS. As of October of 2012, the Army has required all HUMINTers entering 
the MOS to be eligible for a Top-Secret clearance.156 Before this date, collectors only 
needed a secret clearance. This change, however, does not require a soldier to pass a 
counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) as the 35P MOS does. The CSP requirement 
should be extended to HUMINT collectors as well. A higher security level clearance 
would ensure greater cooperation between all Army intelligence disciplines; sister 
services; and allows Army HUMINT collectors to support other national agencies like 
DCS. 
In June 2012, a U.S. Recruiting Command message announced that all new the 
35M MOS applicants must score a 95 on the DLAB. This requirement will ensure all new 
HUMINTers will possess an aptitude to learn a foreign language. As for the soldiers that 
enlisted without a DLAB, they should be required to take the DLAB before attending 
language training. If these soldiers fail to get the minimum score, they should become 
HUMINT analyst and not collectors. 
As suggested earlier in this thesis, the Army should develop an accession 
assessment. HUMINT soldiers should possess a minimum set of characteristics to be 
eligible join the MOS. Currently, Army counterintelligence soldiers undergo a restrictive 
interview before consideration for the MOS. Army HUMINT ought to adopt a 
comparable assessment procedure. According to DA Pamphlet 600-8, procedure 3-33,  
 
                                                 
155 The required ST score has changed over the years. On March 1, 2013, five different scores were 
advertised; about.com lists the required score as 95, goarmy.com lists the score as 101, army-portal.com 
has the ST score at 91, and atrrs.army.mil show the required score as 95 prior to January 2, 2002 and 92 
after. 




active duty CI applicants need to pass an assessment interview. Experienced CI personal 
assess applicants suitability for the MOS.157 The interview includes questions regarding 
the following: 
(1) Motivation and reasons for applying for MOS 97B, poise, mental 
alertness, sincerity, ability to think quickly, ability of oral expression, 
personality, and maturity. 
(2) The qualities and attitudes listed below are desirable and particularly 
sought by MI:(a) Neatness (clean-shaven, shoes polished, brass polished, 
clothing clean and pressed, hair combed, and neat and clean fingernails). 
(b) Posture…(c) Stature and physique… (d) Physiognomy (no outstanding 
characteristics to … cause…stand[ing] out in a crowd). (e) Demeanor 
(straightforward, looks directly at the interviewer when speaking, calm, 
poised, at ease, self-confident, courteous, respectful, pleasing, …animated, 
interested, voice quality... no unpleasant qualities or unusual 
characteristics which may cause easy identification or undue notice to the 
extent that it would be detrimental to the soldier’s MI duties). 
(3) Educational requirements. (a) Attended accredited schools or received 
proper tutoring or self-instruction comparable to formal education 
requirements. (b) Received passing grades in most subjects, especially in 
English, history, and political science courses. (c) Worked toward definite 
goal. (d) Intends to use his education to further career. (e) Expresses 
intention of completing or improving his education. (f) Has retained a fair 
amount of what he learned in school. (g) Has the ability to write correctly, 
using good grammar, and spelling. (h) Speaks English correctly. 
(4) Development. (a) Current events (well informed on current events, 
interested in national affairs, possesses ability to reason and form 
conclusions relative to world affairs). (b) Personal (has common sense, is 
quick to grasp a situation and quick to change his thoughts to new trends 
or changes in situation under discussions). 
(5) Moral. (Has definite ideas of right and wrong in personal and public 
life; has religious or moral ideals; has sense of personal responsibility; has 
religious and racial tolerance). 158 
Using an assessment tool, the Army would avoid recruiting substandard 
HUMINTers. Problems with inadequate interpersonal skills, weak writing abilities, and 
                                                 
157 Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-8, Management and Administrative 
Procedures (Washington, DC: DoA, 1986), 116–117. 
158 Ibid. 
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immaturity would be less frequent than in the past. In combination with stricter ASVAB 
scores, required DLAB score, and a higher clearance level requirement, the Army could 
further professionalize the HUMINT Corps. 
The Army must hold its intelligence soldiers to the highest standard. As MG 
Flynn stated: “leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted 
and hungriest [HUMINTers] to serve…”159 
2. Regionally Alignment of Soldiers 
On April 19, 2012, General Raymond Odierno and the Secretary of the Army, 
John McHugh, signed the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), which provides 
guidance on adapting an Army program to meet the needs of DoD.160 In this document, 
and publically, the Army announced its plans to regionally align brigades with the six 
Geographic Combatant Commands.161 Regionally aligning brigades will allow soldiers to 
develop the language and cultural expertise that were lacking during GWOT. This is a 
long overdue step, particularly in the intelligence field. As this may be less imperative for 
some MOSs, such as administrative support jobs, it is extremely vital for HUMINT 
personnel. By regionally aligning HUMINTers, the Army will create SMEs in the 
language and culture of their target countries that are more effective when performing the 
mission. 
In the past, soldiers relocated far too often. A soldier working in Korea today can 
be assigned to CENTCOM tomorrow. The language and cultural knowledge gained 
during one assignment does not remain valid in the soldier’s new environment. The 
soldier has to start at ground zero to learn about his new area of operations (AO). This 
often creates an apathetic attitude toward learning the new AO among soldiers. 
                                                 
159 Flynn and Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” 
5. 
160 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance—2012, Section I of 
The Army Plan, April 19, 2012, 1, 4–5. 
161 Rob McIlvaine, “Odierno: Regional Alignments to Begin Next Year,” United States Army, May 
16, 2012, http://www.army.mil/article/79919/. 
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It is understandable that the relocation every 3-year methodology could create 
well-rounded soldiers with a multitude of different experience. Some even say that if a 
soldier is in a single position too long the quality of their work may decrease. Soldiers 
become complacent and have minimum job satisfaction. While these are valid arguments, 
the benefits of having soldiers specialize in a single region significantly out way the 
disadvantages. 
For example, Army has already had success with regionally aligning soldiers, just 
consider special operations forces and the Foreign Area Officer programs. Both of these 
programs strive to ensure that soldiers have specialized knowledge of the history, 
religions, cultures, geography, politics, military, and economy of a foreign region. To 
accomplish this, these soldiers receive language training, often live, and operate in the 
region of interest. The conventional Army needs to adopt similar practices. Although 
aligning the brigades may take several years, Army HUMINT should immediately assess 
soldier’s language abilities and cultural familiarity and correspondingly assign its soldiers 
to regional commands. 
Regionally aligning HUMINT soldiers would be a step toward solving the 
language and cultural knowledge problem within the MOS. Many soldiers are currently 
assigned to units in which they are unable to use or get training in. Ideally, after 
regionally assignment, HUMINT platoons would consist of soldiers all trained in the 
same language. With this being the case, sustainment of the language is far more likely. 
Not only would soldiers be able to communicate in a target language, but also it would be 
easier to facilitate and track language training. 
Sustainment of language proficiency is currently largely up to the individual 
soldier, occasionally soldiers can be sent to refresher training at DLI or the Partnership 
Language Training Center (PLTC). Funding and class slot availability often hinder 
prevent soldiers from attending. Mobile Training Teams are also available, but since 
HUMINT platoons often consist of soldiers who know several languages, there is not a 
large enough concentration of one language to justify the cost. Often units that have large 
concentrations of linguists have resident language instructors or sustainment training 
available for soldiers. This is much more prevalent at strategic assignments that support 
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agencies like the National Security Agency. However, with regional assignment units 
would be able to offer language training to a large number of soldiers at the same time 
regardless of MOS. 
Regional alignment would allow units to track a soldier’s language proficiency 
throughout a soldier’s career. This would make oversight of command language 
programs more efficient. From the soldier’s perspective, it would seem that commanders 
cared and are vested in language sustainment. As pointed out in Chapter III, soldier often 
feel that language maintenance is not a priority for the Army. 
3. Restructuring the HUMINT MOS 
As opinions from this research suggest, HUMINTers often lack the skills required 
to be successful in the MOS. Soldiers arriving fresh from training are ill prepared for the 
missions in foreign countries. Although, these soldiers often develop into quality 
collectors over several years, they should not be expected to straight out of AIT. 
One way to take advantage of the lessons learned from GWOT is by embracing 
the author’s recommendation of restructuring the HUMINT MOS. Combining Army 
initiatives and a new MOS configuration would improve the problems identified in this 
thesis. 
Since the role of HUMINT has changed, and interrogation training and policy is 
increasingly controversial, the Army should revise its current approach. Interrogation 
should no longer be the primary skill taught at the 35M course. Instead, Interrogation, as 
well as MSO training, should be reserved for Army Sergeants that have proven to possess 
the required maturity, knowledge, and professionalism. 
As an analyst, soldiers should perform HUMINT non-collector tasks, such as 
analysis, report writing quality & control, DOMEX, biometrics, source deconfliction and 
validation, OSINT research, and other tasks described in FM 2-22.3. In a non-collector 
role, they can become intimately familiar with the HUMINT structure, intelligence 
requirements, automation, and operations planning. HUMINT analysts would work 
alongside experienced collectors at every echelon, learning valuable information of the 
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systems, tools, methods, and resources available. A HUMINT “analyst-first” 
methodology will allow soldiers to grow into becoming collectors while developing skills 
and reducing shortcomings experienced during GWOT. 
As one Army Sergeant stated “Maybe we should have more focus on 
MSO for the HUMINT collector. I think there’s still a widespread 
perception that 35M is an interrogator -- maybe we should get away from 
that. 35M should be a collector first, and interrogation being one small 
skillset in a broader array of capabilities. I think our primary focus should 
be MSO anyway. Maybe we should make 35M primarily MSO and make 
advanced interrogation training an ASI. Provided we can GET advanced 
interrogation training, which as we’ve discussed may not be available.”162 
Both of these skills should require advanced specialized training and additional 
skill identifiers; comparable to the current system with MSO categories I and II. Training 
should be reserved for only experienced collectors who have demonstrated an aptitude to 
be successful. 
The first step in restructuring the MOS, would be changing the initial entry MOS 
to a HUMINT analyst. Initial entry soldiers should be trained as HUMINT analysts with 
limited or no collection responsibilities. 10 level training should concentrate on duties 
such as research and analysis, understanding intelligence requirements, reporting cycle; 
quality report writing, automation, and other HUMINT related tasks. The concepts of 
collection tasks, such as debriefing, liaising, screening, interrogation, and MSO, should 
only be introduced during AIT. Soldiers should not focus on questioning and collecting 
techniques. In a non-collector role, HUMINTers would develop an understanding on how 
HUMINT works and how it fits into the larger intelligence collection effort. New soldiers 
should be eased into the MOS by essentially working as apprentice collectors, while 
gaining knowledge, maturity, and experience. 
An experienced Army Sergeant supports the argument for analyst with his 
statement, “I agree wholeheartedly that entry-level troops are not usually a 
good fit for MSO- but neither do I feel that they’re right for interrogations 
either. Both require a high level of maturity, and some of the attitudes I 
have seen some of the young kids bring to interrogation operations are 
                                                 
162 HUMINT &CI, Human Intelligence, MI-Space, “Do You Believe Separating the 35M MOS Into 
Two Separate Tracks,” Appendix C. 
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ridiculous and require a lot of fixing before they’re useful interrogators. 
That is time that we have, but that could be put to much better use if we 
didn’t have to deal with it as much/at all. 
Maybe if we did what the Marines do, and have troops be analysts or 
something first? That would hopefully give them a better understanding of 
how intelligence works as a whole, and that could only help them in the 
long run. The things my analysts taught me when I was the new guy are 
invaluable to me now, and it would have been nice to know them from the 
start.”163 
HUMINT analysts should be able to track themselves into a collection role of 
their choosing. After an initial enlistment, HUMINT analysts could decide to remain as a 
HUMINT analyst or be trained in interrogation or source operations. Both of these tracks 
should require language and cultural training in a target region. Soldiers would work for 
the majority of their careers. MSO collectors would attend the Source Operations Course 
and interrogators would attend an equivalent course. Both tracks could then be assigned 
according to their ASI and LIC codes. Senior soldiers in the MSO track should be 
afforded the opportunity to be assigned to the DCS after receiving appropriate training. 
Below is a possible graphical representation of the new structure. Advanced courses such 
as the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course and Strategic Debriefing Course are not 
included but should be a requirement before a DIA assignment. 
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Figure 3.  A Graphical Representation of the Purposed New Structure. 
a. Advanced Individual Training Modifications (10 Level) 
The second step in restructuring the MOS is to modify initial entry 
training. Module B (Interrogation Operations) and Module C (Human Source Contact 
Operations) of the current system should be shortened to 2 weeks of general 
familiarization of interrogation and MSO operations. The final field training exercise 
should focus on analytical tasks, automation, reporting, source validation and 
deconfliction, and answering intelligence requirements. 
This thesis implies that HUMINTers often lack the skills required to 
properly perform HUMINT. Soldiers arriving fresh from training are ill prepared for real-
world missions. Junior HUMINTers, lacking age and maturity, often do not understand 
their role in broader intelligence collection effort and should not be collectors. Although 
these soldiers often develop into quality collectors, they should not be expected to do this 
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unaided. The Army should recognize that HUMINTers often work in locations that have 
little direct supervision; with this, they get little guidance. While veteran collectors are 
able to succeed at the mission, junior soldiers are not. 
b. Interrogation Training (20 Level) 
The third step in restructuring the MOS is to develop an advanced 
interrogation course. This should start by turning over all Army interrogation certification 
to HT-JCOE. As noted earlier, HT-JCOE already has the Joint Interrogation Certification 
Course that certifies sister service personnel, DoD civilians, and Army 
counterintelligence personnel to conduct interrogations. HT-JCOE could expand the 
course to include HUMINT analysts who choose the interrogation track. Resembling 
other HT-JCOE courses, this interrogation course should be highly selective in choosing 
its candidates and the course should be highly demanding allowing only the most 
qualified interrogators to pass. 
Chapter III pointed out that there are very few advanced interrogations 
courses. It is imperative that the Army expands interrogation training. Another option to 
increase training opportunities is to take the interrogation portion of current AIT training 
course, expand it, and make this the primary interrogation certification for Army 
interrogators. HT-JCOE should control this course as ell, and it should be the equivalent 
to SOC for interrogators. In this case, the Joint Interrogation course could act as an 
equivalent to DATC/ASOC. 
Furthermore, the DoD should establish an additional skill identifier (ASI) 
for certified interrogators, regardless of military service or DoD civilian. This way, in 
times of conflict, there will be a large pool of DoD-wide interrogators to draw from, 
instead of relying solely on young Army interrogators. Being able to pull interrogators 
from all services would alleviate the problem with shortage of personnel. 
Creating an exclusive and demanding interrogation course could be a path 
toward removing the blemish of Abu Ghraib. Current military operations require fewer 
interrogators; these interrogators need to be of the highest caliber. 
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4. Including Experienced Collectors into National Agencies 
Implementing the recommendations of this thesis will improve Army HUMINT 
collector’s skills. But nevertheless, the Army ought to capitalize on employing the 
numerous quality collectors developed during GWOT. The Army already possesses a 
wealth of knowledge from experienced collectors. These experienced, strong collectors 
are valuable assets to the National HUMINT collection effort and should be put in a 
position of increased responsibility. By placing knowledgeable and qualified 
HUMINTers within agencies like the Defense Clandestine Service, the Army can 
maintain quality collectors and “Grow Army HUMINT” as the 2012 Posture statement 
suggests. 
This thesis highlights recommended changes to the current training and 
operational doctrine of human intelligence soldiers. It lays out clear guidance on 
professionalizing the corps. Utilizing the acquired skills of collectors and allowing for 
further development of those talents, creating regional experts, with language 
proficiency, who are able to conduct HUMINT operations at the tactical and national 
level. Human intelligence is essential to the security and defense of this nation. These 
adjustments to the current HUMINT corps are paramount in resolving the issues 
identified during GWOT. With the recommendations offered here, the US Army 
HUMINTers will have the experience and knowledge to remain active in fighting global 




A. HAVE “INTERROGATORS” AND “SOURCE HANDLER” EVER BEEN 




When I was a lieutenant many many years ago “interrogators” (MOS 96C actually) focused 
exclusively on POW type interrogations. That was before the unification of Defense HUMINT 
and the Army still had HUMINT. There was a separate MOS (definitely for officers, 36B, 
maybe for warrants also) called “Area Intelligence” or something like that which included 
some of the skills we associate with source handling today. This was a very small community 
and most people who went into these fields stayed in them without rotating back to “regular” 
Army assignments. 
These assets were strictly strategic; it was not until the Balkans conflicts that the Army (and 






… you’ve really dated yourself with bringing up 96C. We’ll start discussing training at 
Holabird next... 
“These assets were strictly strategic; it was not until the Balkans conflicts that the Army (and 
DoD in general) began to see the value of applying these types of resources to tactical level 
operations.” 
I would qualify that as “Big Army” began to see the light at that time. The SF groups, and 
SOF in general, recognized the value of low level source ops long before the Balkans, and 
HUMINT enlisted soldiers within the Group MIDs were often trained and sometimes 





Source handling used to be a primary function for CI. The large transition came after 
Interrogators los[t] the language requirement and became HUMINT, circa 2005. This was a 
result of requirement from OEF/OIF. As a result we have a large population of Interrogators, 
low population of CI, and continually pull CI out of our formations making us that much 
more vulnerable to the ever increasing trends of insider threat. 
We probably won’t see a dramatic shift back until 35M has a language requirement again; 
then 35M personnel will likely reclass to 35L to fill those shortages (which should happen) or 




…the transition actually came after operations in Bosnia. 97Es were doing MSO before 9/11 
ever happened. This transition had nothing to do with having/not having a language. 97Es had 
a skill set and a language and therefore it made sense for them to conduct MSO. The biggest 




Good answer... The biggest reason for the creation of the “big Army” HUMINT Soldier was 
to create a tactical HUMINT capability that was offensive in nature. Since the Balkans Crisis, 
the CI MOS has been a more defensive discipline when working tactically and could not 





Concur, the transition did begin after/during Bosnia/Balkans as I witnessed first-hand in 
1998, but did not sky rocket in transition until later when the school house just pumped out 
quantity not quality of HUMINT over CI circa 2005. [omitted]  
Overall the Army has missed the mark, especially as this discussion clearly demonstrates the 
bias and division of CI vs. HUMINT. Although several of the comments later on paint a 
better light, the Marine Corps has it right with having experienced folks capable of doing both 
jobs. 
Furthermore, it’s not enough to say someone is trained in MSO can effectively perform the 




It isn’t possible to have a detailed discussion of this topic on an unclassified forum. The short 
answer to whether Interrogator and source handler have been separate MOSs is yes. In fact, 
“source handler” is presently an ASI for the MOS 35M. Elements of the source handling 
trade were first taught at the 10-level in 1999, if memory serves. 
As to whether they ought to be separate MOSs, that depends on what Army leaders expect 
35Ms to do. My personal opinion; leaders want interrogators, and THINK they want source 
handlers, but don’t really understand what being a source handler means or what the 
operations entail to be done correctly. So, I think they should be separate, and that source 




It is slightly misleading to say that source handling is merely an ASI for 35M. So, for 
clarification, the Army considers SOC to be an advanced course in source handling thus there 
is an ASI for enlisted Soldiers who attend the training. Source handling as a function of 
HUMINT is currently integrated into the MOS and forms part of the critical task list for all 




Not my intention to be misleading. I did focus on 35M vs. 351M, but you are of course 
correct that there is no ASI for the 351Ms, as a MSO CAT II certifying course is required for 
technical certification as a 351M. 
For clarification, when I refer to source handling I assume we mean CAT II. I think that’s 
what most other folks mean as well. In any case, I will reference the message pertaining to the 
ASIs to make sure that I have my facts straight. 
[See footnote 146]164 
Since the title of the ASI S1 is “Source Handler” I infer that one is not considered a source 
handler without the ASI, and that source handling is therefore directly associated with MSO 
CAT II. The Army appears to not consider MSO CAT III source handling for the purposes of 
this discussion. I know we include aspects of source handling as critical tasks, but we don’t 
certify the collectors as source handlers without attendance at the courses above [courses 
listed in footnotes], at which point they are granted an ASI. 
The requirement to have a MSO CAT II certification prior to attendance at WOCS and 
WOBC has only recently been implemented and enforced. We still have a number of 351Ms 
who do not have such a certification, and a few (four that I am aware of) have attended a 
MSO CAT II certifying course and failed. What will happen to these Soldiers? Forced re-
class? One last chance to pass? 
 
 
                                                 
164 1. ASI S1: soldiers must successfully complete one of DA G2 approved category II MSO 
certifying courses to be awarded ASI S1: A. Source operations course (SOC) B. Military 
counterintelligence collections course (MCC) C. Counterintelligence force protection source operations 
(CFSO) D. Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) CI/HUMINT course. 2. ASI V4: soldiers must 
successfully complete one of the category 1 MSO certifying courses: A. Advanced source operations 





You bring up an interesting issue in regard to MSO Cat 2 and MOS Cat 3. There is currently 
no jointly agreed upon task list for MSO Cat 3 therefore there can be no certification for MSO 
Cat 3. That does not mean that those 35Ms who are trained to conduct MSO Cat 3 cannot be 
source handlers. It merely means that the community has yet to agree upon and publish a list 




Actually, I have a question based on the way you phrased this... If there is no agreed upon 
CAT III task list and no CAT III certification then how can anyone be trained to conduct 
CAT III MSO? 
CW4 
351M 
There is no Joint standard but there is an Army MOS that requires training in MSO Cat 3. 
Therefore, lacking any other benchmarks against which to assess training success, the closest 
we can come to a codified standard for the Army is whatever standard the CTSSB decides 
comprises the basic requirements for the 35M 10 level Soldier. Is this the very best answer? 
Absolutely not, but the subject matter experts in the field convene every two or three years to 





I was at the last CTSSB with you, and discussing the reasons why certain tasks were, were 
not, or couldn’t be included in the 10-level [critical task list] CTL is too big a can of worms to 
get into here. I observe, in addition to the lack of a task list for CAT III, a lack of uniform 
agreement as to what CAT III really is, operationally speaking. I think it would be super if we 
could have that discussion at the joint level. 
I also observe confusion/conflation between operational categories and source categories 
(levels). Again, ‘twould be great to have something that definitively laid it all out. (Actually, I 
think it is spelled out pretty well in existing policy and doctrine, but since there is still 




[CW3/351M and CW2 351M] have provided answers closest to my knowledge on the 
subject. Interrogators were once a separate MOS, but the HUMINT collector/source handler 
is a recent MOS to the “big Army.” Army CI was the tactical source handler for the Army 
until the Balkans. The mission was too big for CI to man and maintain CI operations. The 
solution was to bring interrogators into the fold, which eventually lead to two HUMINT 
based MOSs with two different focuses; 35L being defensive in nature and 35M being more 
offensive. 
The reasons that brought the MOSs to this point have all been good in theory, but I agree with 
[CW3 / 351M]. Execution has proved it to be less than efficient. Source handling and 
interrogations would be better employed and more productive if they were separate, and in 
general support under the control of commands specifically trained and designed to use them. 
You should look into getting a copy of the book titled “In the Shadow of the Sphinx.” 
Although it is a history of Army CI, it provides extensive details on how Army HUMINT 
evolved since WWII; HUMINT started as a function of CI. Kind of backwards since CI is 
based on HUMINT methods...you would think the Army started with HUMINT then moved 
to CI. However, CI was created first in 1917 to battle the German saboteurs of WWI who 





I believe that much of the reason that CI personnel were pressed into being the “tactical 
source handler” for Big Army was that they had the skills, but what the Army really needed 
was MSO/LLSO HUMINT assets. Of course they had none, so they used CI assets somewhat 
out of their field. 
Good point about CI being the original discipline, at least for the Army. Back in the day (and 
I’ve already dated myself by referring to MOS 96C), the Army largely got interrogators by 
reclassing soldiers who washed out of 97B school. Now it is a discipline of its own, which 





As far as a history of the MOS I’m not too sure, but once upon a time there were 97Cs. The 
97C’s job was basically MSO. Their 10-level course was about a yearlong at Fort Holabird 
(closed back in the early 70s). Their 10 course consisted everything done at SOC now and 
then some. Upon graduation they were able perform level 2 MSO. The MOS was shut down 
as an indirect and belated result of the Church and Pike Commissions by Stansfield Turner, 
the DCI under Carter, giving the MSO mission to the DIA which, as we now know, left the 





A. WHAT WOULD BE THE ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF 
MAKING THE 35M MOS A 20 LEVEL AND ABOVE ONLY MOS? 
• Tue, Jun 21, 2011 4:54 PM—Plain and simple there needs to be a screening process. As a 20 level 
MOS you are producing more army savvy personnel but you may still be lacking those that are 
able to conduct the MOS. I’ve seen E-6’s come out of the school that couldn’t write a report to 
save their life and 10 level soldiers who could collect far better than reclass counterparts of the 
same 35M experience. This has been a hot topic in the office and while making 35M a 20 level 
MOS would assist with having more responsible/military savvy collectors it wouldn’t help with 
those that can barely pass the 10 level course. Another interesting idea I’ve heard is instead of a 
20 level MOS either making it to where a soldier can’t become a 35M until they are in their 
second term or having an initial screening at MEPS for those interested in becoming a 35M. All 
the ideas could help but in reality the school should be what it was before I even got there. Some 
people just weren’t built to do this MOS.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 8:49 PM  I think we have plenty of 10 level soldiers that have a lot of maturity, 
some are even college graduates with masters degrees and life experience. As long as we NCO’s 
take the time to coach, mentor, and train our 10 level soldiers, they will gain the necessary army 
experience to be successful 35M’s. Their failures rest on our shoulders as NCO’s. Now there are 
the exceptions, if we do our job and identify them, do the necessary paperwork, we can get the 
sub-standard soldiers either re-classed or chaptered.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 8:43 PM—I feel the disadvantage to making the 35M MOS a 20 level and above 
MOS would be the shrinking of the work force. Sure, some 10 level soldiers lack the discipline 
and life experience, but it is our job as NCO’s to coach, mentor, and train them to be proficient. I 
have had some great 10 level soldiers, and they have accepted the responsibilities placed on 
them, and been very successful Doing MSO overseas. I say keep the 10 level soldiers.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 8:10 PM—I have worked with many soldiers who are strong HUMINT collectors 
and many who weak HUMINT collectors, 10 level, 20 level and 30 level. There are many issues 
that effect this. While I believe there is a lack of maturity and inter-personnel skills, I believe 
discipline is the larger problem with the 10 level students. I believe there needs to be an 
accession process for 10 level students. One, Drill Sergeants must be reinstated into AIT, where 
they must instill discipline and basic military bearing. Second, the language requirement must 
reinstated with a standard of 2+/2+, this will weed out many who lack the discipline this MOS 
requires.  
 
Also, another main issue comes from the lack of understanding on the part of the command/units 
of the HUMINT soldiers. Many units do not realize the amount of time for training that is 
required for HUMINT collectors. Many HUMINT collectors are given time consuming 
details. Sergeants Time training should be mandatory 2 to 3 times a week and a standard 
HUMINT round robin training established, IOT improve/maintain basic HUMINT skills. 
However, this acquiring this time will not happen if the S2X and OMT are not strong advocates 
of HUMINT training to the command. Overall with the amount of individuals who have 
reclassified, the overall experience level of our MOS in general is low to moderate. I concur that 
changes should be made at the 10 level, but also starting from the top down. 
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 10:10 AM—I agree with your opinion on the disadvantages. Though in order to 
prevent that the MOS would have to implent a means of interveiwing and weeding out those who 
are not capable of performning at this MOS even with the added maturity.  
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• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 10:06 AM—The main advantage of having the MOS become a 20 level only is that 
it would provide a better base of maturity for the MOS. Those individuals who have not yet 
grown out of the high school mindset have no place in this job field. Our job depends on a 
person’s ability to interact and connect with people. Maturity is key to that job.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:57 AM—A good advantage to making the 35M MOS a 20 level and above MOS 
would be that fact that we would have a more mature workforce of NCOs with army experience. 
The problem, though, is that you’ll have a workforce of reclasses (I’m a reclass) that come into 
the MOS with no experience in it.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:50 AM—Quite simply, there just has to be a better screening process, or any 
screening process in place to determine that the 10 level soldier is ready to be a M. Not all 10 
level Soldiers are 18-21, thus you could be cutting some serious talent from a mature 25 year old 
SPC just now coming into the military. Additionally, I just returned from a deployment with a 22 
year old SPC that was 21 when he joined right in as a M, he was writing CONOPS for LTs and 
CPTs mid way through the deployment and wrecking shop as a source operator. I think closing 
the MOS totally to 10 level is just mirroring that Army all-round knee-jerk decision making 
process. HOOOOOOO-AH!  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:48 AM—There are both disadvantages and advantages to making 35M as 20 level 
MOS. The level of maturity and military experience is a large part of training effective HUMINT 
collectors. By taking experienced NCOs from other areas of the Army, the MI corps would 
become a more professional organization. A disadvantage would be having soldiers coming into 
the MOS with bad habits. While privates have their own bad habits, they are easier to break than 
prior service soldiers. 
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:45 AM—There is no doubt that we need to find a better way to screen Soldiers 
becoming 35Ms. Although I believe that limiting access to only 20 level soldiers is a step in the 
right direction, it is not the complete answer. We need to have a high set standard that is not open 
to interpretation. I think a more stringent screening process in general is necessary.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:20 AM—I agree with this statement and I disagree with the statement. I believe it 
would be a good idea if they only let 20 levels into the MOS, however they should let anyone 
higher. I just got back from an deployment where were had a bunch of E-7 that were in control 
that didn’t know the job. Now I understand we needed people but at the same time, we need 
people in this field who understand and care for the job, not someone who just came over 
because it was away to make E-7 easy.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:16 AM—I totally agree. Retaining these new 35Ms will be a huge problem. Other 
MOS require a re-enlistment of up to 6 years to be in there field. Of course, this is mostly 
because the training is up to a year long for these MOSs but that would ensure that the Army gets 
the most out of these new 35Ms.I’m pretty sure though that if we improve the quality of 35MS in 
the Army we won’t be losing as much as we are now.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:12 AM—I believe that there both advantages and disadvantages to making 35M a 
20 level or higher MOS. There has been a lot of discussion about the maturity level of entry-level 
soldiers in this MOS. While I think it’s fair to say, we have a new generation of Soldiers entering 
the service. Many of them are not socially capable of carrying on an acceptable conversation 
with someone senior to them, let alone being able to conduct themselves with an air of 
confidence that shows they have maturity and experience. There are some, but those are 
outnumbered by the ones who need to be and are capable of being groomed in this field. It also 
wouldn’t be fair to those who get a later start on their military career, who have the experience 
and maturity that this field needs, but are only afforded the rank of being a new Soldier. Another 
thing that needs to be taken into consideration is how this would affect promotions. As NCO’s 
advance, there has got to be a qualified group of individuals to fill those lower skill level 
positions. It’s hard to tell right now if the pros outweigh the con’s, but I think there’s legitimate 
argument for both the advantages and disadvantages.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:08 AM—I think the main advantage of making the 35M MOS a 20 level MOS 
would be the maturity level of soldiers who are in the MOS. Many 10 level soldiers lack the 
social/life skills needed to interact with people, or they enter the MOS not knowing what this 
MOS entails. I believe an assessment and selection process is needed, similar to the 35L 
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process. However, if making the 35M MOS a 20 level MOS only is not possible, the army could 
reinstate the language requirement. I believe this would filter out 10 level students who do not 
have the required dedication or willingness to learn about another culture and interact with 
foreign nationals.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:03 AM—There are multiple advantages to making the MOS 20 level and above 
but I believe it’s only a step in the right direction. Soldiers looking to become a 35M should go 
through a screening process at all levels. This is directly inline with the Marines selection process 
as well as the selection process of other countries. Brand new soldiers lack the discipline, 
experience and skill sets to effectively do the job. Soldiers who reclassify into the job are not 
prepared for what the job entails. HUMINT is a different beast than most jobs have to deal with. 
Using other effective 35Ms to train and accept new 35Ms will improve the quality of 35Ms 
tremendously.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 7:50 AM—For the 35M MOS to progress and not become just another over-filled 
MOS, we do need an appropriate screening system which assesses the potential HUMINTer’s 
intelligence, common sense, social skills, and maturity. As…stated, our MOS should focus on 
quality. I would rather have a team of two or three solid performers than six bodies who lack the 
requisite skills to perform as a 35M. At the 35M10 course, there is a recent upshift in quality and 
maturity (overall) of students, from what I have seen during my tenure instructing. This could be 
a sign of things to come, or it could just be a rare occasion. Either way, I agree we need to 
maintain a high standard for this job, and I encourage an appropriate screening for individuals 
wanting to enter this MOS.  
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 7:39 AM—It is true that the 35M MOS requires a skill not common among the 
“Millenial Generation.” This skill is interpersonal communication, and if a 35M Soldier does not 
possess this skill, they will suffer and create a negative reflection on our MOS. On the contrary, I 
have seen MOS-T reclass NCO’s who were not capable of succeeding in this job either, so 
mandating a 20-level or higher Soldier to join may not address the issue. An interview assessing 
the individual’s ability to communicate and think on their feet would be the best method of 
identifying those who show the traits necessary to succeed in this job. From my experience, a 
reclass NCO performs better as a HUMINTer because they understand rank structure and the ins 
and outs of the military. They also recognize what is of value, information-wise-- more so than 
10-level Soldiers.  
• Sun, Jun 19, 2011 11:11 PM—”I agree that society is creating worse people that are entering the Army. 
It seems and though Mommy and Daddy are disciplining their kids anymore and it is starting to 
reflect on the Army. However, the Army is beginning to create an environment that mirrors this 
lack of discipline as well. Standards in Basic Training, IET, and Permanent Party are constantly 
being lowered to accommodate these “new world” Soldiers. By raising the entrance level of the 
35M MOS to 20, it will reduce the chances that low quality Soldiers will make it into the MOS 
and raise the standards/quality of the 35M Profession.”  
 
Despite the cultural shift from older generations’ personal contact to online interaction in today’s 
younger generation the basic human creature has not changed. A self-motivated Soldier will 
always be the shiny pebble so to speak. We can bemoan the younger Soldiers’ lack of experience, 
ability, charisma or anything else we want, but in doing so we forget that once we ourselves were 
a previous leader’s a** pain.  
 
It is our job to mold the incoming generation. Part of our job is to identify their short comings. 
Our main focus needs to remain on training and mentoring young Soldiers until they become the 
asset we all consider ourselves to be.  
Naturally I wish our MOS were more selective, or it were easier to flush out the dead weight.  
 
Lacking that mechanism today I try to focus on rigidly enforcing standards of excellence so the 
strong prevail and weak refuse to re-enlist. It may not be a perfect solution, but it is the best I 
have. 
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• Sun, Jun 19, 2011 11:06 PM—I agree that expertise, maturity and responsibility are all inherent traits 
required for success in the 35M MOS, and any other meaningful job in life. Where does that 
experience come from? I find many of my peers complaining about the lack of experience among 
10 level soldiers, but that is what they equate to, inexperienced soldiers requiring NCO guidance. 
I think we should focus more on training the force prior to totally removing privates from our 
ranks, because some of us find them to be an “inconvenience”. We all started as inexperienced in 
this MOS, the difference our leadership, for better or worse, trained us to what they thought right 
was. Based on the comments I have been reading I have to assume that several of the posters on 
this forum wouldn’t have been in this MOS either. I repeatedly hear complaints about MOS 
transfers into our MOS and their lack of experience, but then read numerous posts advocating the 
very thing that many here despise. I think it is just a little too hypocritical. I am not trying to 
single anyone out in particular, but I feel these views are shared by many in this forum who 
refuse to do a self-audit of themselves and their experience (or lack of) prior to placing the brunt 
of the blame on the lower-enlisted.  
• Sun, Jun 19, 2011 10:45 PM—I agree … on this one. Although the idea is promising to have an MOS 
that consists of only 20 level and above, I believe that it would bring more harm than good. The 
majority of 35M’s that I have worked with have been at the 10 level. I have seen them face trials 
and tribulations, but in the end the majority adapt and overcome to do things well beyond their 
skill level. Now these same 10 levels are bringing their unique experiences to the NCO ranks and 
are continually contributing at the higher echelons in superb fashion. Maybe my experience is 
unique, but it is exactly that, my experience. I have seen outstanding NCO HUMINTers too. 
Primarily though I have seen ten level 35M’s consistently achieve and excel ahead of 20 and 30 
level 35M’s that I have worked with outside of our unit, as well as many contractors. I think the 
idea brings a maturity factor to the mix, but that same factor can be found in and IET soldier as 
well. It’s like anything else, you just have to pick the right one. I think a selection process would 
be more applicable, but at the same time it would greatly depend on the leadership sitting on the 
selection board. I also think with the proper motivation to perform that more often than not 
soldiers will surprise you. I work in an environment where standards aren’t lowered for all to 
meet, rather those who fail to meet the standards are released. I believe a similar process should 




A. DO YOU BELIEVE SEPARATING THE 35M MOS INTO TWO 
SEPARATE TRACKS, ONE FOR MSO AND ONE FOR 
INTERROGATIONS, WOULD IMPROVE THE OVERALL QUALITY OF 
ALL 35M’S? 
I don’t think splitting the MOS would do any good, for two reasons. One is that it would be easy for the 
MOS to become lopsided -- not enough MSO or not enough interrogators. Given our current manning, 
this might not be an immediate problem, but I could see it being a problem down the road. 
The second reason is that there’s very little training out there specifically for interrogators. At least, I can’t 
think of much. The Reid course, I suppose. Kinesics and LSI-SCAN are useful HUMINT classes. But 
what do we have that is really advanced training for interrogators? Another way of saying this is, if 
someone wanted to be highly trained and proficient, why would they choose to be an Army interrogator? 
What would your training path look like? The 10 course and then... what? Senior interrogator -- which is a 
management course, not an advanced interrogation course. DSDC/Strat D? Not an interrogation course -- 
closer to MSO, I would think. The British course? I don’t know anyone who has actually gone to it, but 
that could be a start. 
If we’re going to separate the MOS, we need to have a comparable training path for the people who go to 
each path. Right now we don’t. 
Correct me if I am wrong here, but my understanding of previous discussions in our circle of colleagues 
has not been to physically split the 35M MOS. The way it has been discussed before is to establish two 
tracks within the 35M and 351M MOS’s for interrogations and MSO. Whether we agree or disagree with 
the concept it has unofficially been happening over the last 8-10 years. Many of my colleagues already 
pursue positions specifically focused on their preferred area within the MOS. The intent is to decide 
whether or not to formally establish career paths within the MOS in order to better support both areas 
within HUMINT. The area of training emphasis brought up by SSG Rushing is a valid one that has and is 
being discussed. What having formal career tracks should allow for is the establishment of more advanced 
training with regard to interrogations for those HUMINT collectors who prefer to follow an interrogation 
track and hopefully mirror the training pillars offered for MSO. 
While there are not different categories of interrogation operations such as MSO I-III there should be 
advancing levels of interrogation training. Just as SSG Rushing mentioned, the Senior Interrogator course 
is more of a management course. From discussions I have had with my peers there is a desire to establish 
and incorporate advanced interrogation training into the interrogator track should one be established. 
Overall, having HUMINT collectors tracked as MSO or interrogator will help the career managers better 
determine future assignments and ensure that these soldiers, NCO’s, and Warrants hit the appropriate 
educational and assignment “wickets” for advancement and proper utilization. 
I thought the intent was to have an ASI for folks who complete additional training. 
Good point about advanced interrogation training, I believe DIA has developed something; possibly 
currently done by a contractor. 
I agree to an extent, but how are we to know where their talents lie when they enlist into the MOS? 
I believe that the army should separate the track at the 30 level based on experience within the MOS. The 
main reason I believe the army should separate at the 30 level is because the fact is, we need experienced 
people doing their job. What happens when you have a SSG with 2 deployments experience as 35M doing 
only MSO and he gets moved to a JIDC. You have now seriously degraded the capability and disregarded 
an experienced NCO that could do more damage to the enemy by staying in the MSO side. its same way 
the army spends an ungodly amount to send a soldier to DLI for Arabic and then stations them in Korea. 
There is supposed to be concurrent training to keep individuals trained on both subjects but it does not 
happen enough and why would a unit train on interrogations when there is an upcoming deployment 
where they will be conducting MSO. 
This solution does present many problems in itself and many issues that would have to be worked out. 
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I agree, also if you split the MOS you have the potential for not having the right piece for the mission. 
When the MOS is combined as it is now you have a Soldier who can perform two different missions. 
Unfortunately the Army had to lower standards and we have sub-par people coming into the MOS from a 
GT/ST score point of view, but it is our job as NCOs to make sure those Soldiers who need that extra help 
get the training the deserve to succeed at the mission. 
While I agree with [the] point of training issues, I think the issue has to deal more with the question of 
“what are we going to do with the Interrogation-tracked collectors who are stuck in BfSBs and BCTs that 
don’t have access to a DHA, BIF, or JIDC?” They would have to resort to conducting MSO anyways as 
an operational requirement. To effectively run this strategy, we would have to ensure that there were 
plenty of positions out there to interrogate. If we look at the Field Interrogation aspect of it, they would 
still be out conducting MSO until the opportunity to do a FI presented itself. 
Training is simple. A POI for an ASI/SQI course is developed, manned and taught. However, finding 
enough interrogation jobs for 35M Interrogation-tracked soldiers is far more difficult. Besides, when 
would the track take place? In Aviation Warrant MOSs - let’s take 153D (UH-60 Blackhawk Pilot), once 
you are a CW2, you have a few choices: Track Safety, Standards, TACOPS, or stay untracked and risk 
falling behind your peers. 
Where would tracking fall into the 35M scheme. It shouldn’t happen at the 10-level course. It should 
happen after soldiers have had enough time to conduct both operations and become proficient and 
evaluated at one or the other. That is the point, correct? To ensure we have the best qualified collectors 
conducting MSO, and the best qualified Interrogators conducting Interrogations? 
There are too many variables that have to line up just right to pull off tracking the 35M MOS. None of 
which I can see as feasible right now except for MSO. I made a post in HUMINT TRAINING that 
[alludes] to the fact that we need more training opportunities in microexpressions, etc. While the Reid 
Course is a good course, it focuses on the law enforcement aspect of a forced confession. What about a 
tactical application of both Interrogation and MSO using microexpressions and kinesics? I believe, like 
SSG Rushing said, Advanced Interrogation training and heavy psych training would be needed for an 
Interrogation track. I just don’t see any of it happening fast. 
As for the quality of 35Ms as a result of tracking, I don’t think it will make a bit of difference. I would 
assume, knowing the Army, they would try to track soldiers in the initial stages in the 10-level course, 
meaning that there isn’t a judge of the correct track a soldier should take. With current manning needs for 
10-level 35Ms and TRADOCs willingness to already put unqualified and unfit 35Ms into the field, it 
would be a recipe for disaster. If tracking were to happen at the 20-level, then additional courseware 
would fit the bill and it could be feasible. 
I wouldn’t look for this to become a reality in this decade. We are too kinetic right now to be able to sit 
back and evaluate what is going on. We have been in Iraq and Afghanistan too long to try to jostle the 
foundation we sit on. If this idea became more than a conception, then it may work in a future conflict 
where units could hit the ground running at the “Y” and make an impact. Right now, though, we need to 
work with what we have and keep pushing for stricter adhesion to the standards to ensure we get the right 
people to fill the right slots 
I agree with you about having to work with what we have right now, but are we ever going to be stable 
again where we can just sit back and figure things out. I don’t see that in the future of this country. We 
have to constantly improve everything and grow from experiences and lessons learned. It is a very 
complicated decision that would require monumental work to make it right.  
You do raise a good point with the BfSB structure. That would be one of the most difficult things to 
change if a change were to occur. Do you send a HCT team out there with an “Interrogator” who may 
only conduct 3 to 4 field interrogations in a year? Or do you leave an HCT with None and have no 
capability of a field interrogation. There are so many factors to consider. 
We need quality soldiers and quality over quantity. If this track would become a reality then we would 
only be shooting ourselves in the foot. I like your outlook on the situation; it is a waste of limited 
resources and way too many variables. As it is in our field “It Depends”. 
I agree that perhaps the MOS should, not necessarily split, but close attention should to paid to the 
experience of the soldiers at the 10 and 20 level and ensure that soldiers are placed in opposing roles. If a 
soldier deploys in support of a MSO mission all attempts must be made to ensure the soldier is placed in 
an interrogation position on the next rotation. Providing this rotation at lower levels will eliminate your 
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stated concern. 
Unfortunately, as with everything else, mission dictates. So this opposing roles, although in my opinion 
ideal, is far from realized or in some cases even possible. 
[HUMINTers] should be slotted for opposite positions to be a well-rounded HUMINTER. But as we all 
know, the Army will pick the best and most experienced soldier for the job each time. Meaning, you end 
up stuck working the same position multiple deployments. If we concentrated on pre-deployment training 
for those soldiers without the experience we wouldn’t have to rely on the same people doing the same job 
each time they deploy. 
I disagree at some level we all become managers of soldiers. The SSG that gets transferred to a JIDC is 
expected to be a more manager of soldiers than an integration expert. He/She should know integration but 
it is not necessary for him/her to be the SME. That is why we have warrant officers. 
 
That is a great idea. Allowing a track split at the 30 level would allow the Army to focus its higher trained 
(and hopefully retained) assets on specific mission sets. God knows we have plenty of 30 level personnel, 
why not use this “dwell” time to ensure that these personnel are able to take the courses needed to become 
true experts in their track, whether MSO or Interrogations? I’d love to see the CTSSB approve split tracks 
based in choice/experience that allows us to expertify (ya I made that up, you’re welcome) our collectors. 
 
I feel that splitting the MOS would hinder more than help. In this profession there is no way of knowing 
who we will be called on to support or what our supported unit may run into while on mission. If the 
MOS were split how could we possibly ensure those individuals assigned for interrogations would end up 
in a DHA, or JIDC and even if those were hard slots, there isn’t enough for an even split of the MOS. In 
order to maintain an even spread of the MOS some people slated for interrogation would still have to 
conduct MSO eventually and vice versa. The major problem being that MSO and interrogation are 
perishable skills. I believe the entire MOS needs to continue to work in and train on all facets of the job to 
mitigate this degradation of skill sets. 
 
Agreed. I’ve never had a problem with a well-rounded soldier. It’s the ones who are only good at one 
thing that have the most problems. 
 
I completely agree. Keeping us all under the same MOS and providing the entire MOS the training to 
become proficient in all roles that are required is the most logical track. 
 
The simple fact of the matter is that specialization is productive; it is the reason the entire Warrant Officer 
Corps exists. 
I would actually take it a step further, though. Once an MSO-specific MOS was created, structure it 
similar to 35L, requiring an application and screening process. 
No, I believe the responsibility for improving the overall quality of all 35M’s rests on the shoulders of the 
senior 35M’s in each unit. I have worked at a platoon level as a team leader, OMT NCOIC, and a 
HUMINT platoon sergeant and it was my job to give that ground Commander a detailed capabilities brief 
and ensure that Commander had the best idea of how to best utilize all of his/her 35M’s for the given 
mission. Some missions require an interrogation team and some require MSO. I say this because, in my 
experiences as a 35M, the main issue at hand has always been whether to use the 35M’s as interrogators 
or for MSO or both. If the Commanders on the ground are educated and well informed of the capabilities 
of their Soldiers (35M’s) then it eliminates the confusion. Besides, in order to be a well-rounded 
HUMINT collector you must have a background in both interrogations and MSO. So, once again, I think 
it would be a waste of time and resources to split the MOS into two separate tracks. I feel it would be like 
splitting up an infantry squad to make two separate squads. Neither would be as effective as the original... 
 
I do not believe that separating 35M into two different tracks would be beneficial to HUMINT 
Operations. This can cause multi problems and not alleviate the problem which already exists. One of the 
problems that could be caused by this course of action would be a lack of personnel available for future 
missions. The problem which exists now is the level of maturity and competence of the HUMINT 
Collector that we are finding in the Army.  
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With this approach to HUMINT Operations, you would have separate tracks for soldiers to follow 
allowing the individual soldier to focus on one aspect of collection allowing them to better hone their 
skills. The underlying problem that HUMINT as a whole would face after this would be manning. As it 
stands now there is a tremendous manning issue in the Army for the 35M field. This is part of the reason 
so many new collectors have been pushed out of the school house. After talking with 10 level instructors’ 
students standards for operating in the field have dropped due to the Army needing numbers. We will run 
into the same problem, maybe not now; but, later down the road it is inevitable. With two tracks we will 
have over manning in one and not enough in the other. 
The major problem that is in the 35M field which makes me assume the reason for the question being 
posed in the first place is some soldiers are good at interrogations and some soldiers are good at MOS. 
Why can’t a soldier just be a good collector? I believe that soldiers can be good collectors but with 
interrogations and with MOS the soldier has to have a personality and characteristic traits that are not 
taught but gained through life experience. How can we as Non Commissioned Officers expect an 18 year 
old soldier straight out of high school to have the opportunity to gain these traits? There needs to be 35M 
recruiting teams. We need to “identify” collectors. That is what MSOH’s do in the first place, identify 
people. Separating the field is only forming an excuse to be substandard.  
Now to play devil’s advocate; I do think that we should make a carrier path once you reach senior Non 
Commissioned Officer by separating into fields of expertise. This would be a beneficial alternative to 
creating an entirely separate track for the 10 level soldiers. This will allow collectors that have focused on 
certain aspects of HUMINT throughout their carriers to be better managers in the realm that they have 
operated in. 
 
A developing soldier needs to have well rounded experiences to fully realize their capability. If you never 
get the chance to work in one field or the other then you will have no idea what your true potential is. 
Also, brining someone over to the other operation gives a new perspective on the operation. Interrogations 
and MSO have very different perspectives. Changing out personnel from one side to the other will give a 
fresh view on the operations and will help develop new techniques that would have otherwise been 
missed.  
At a senior position, there is an obvious benefit to having someone with a great experience in the type of 
operation they are managing. However, if you do end up on a track at the 30 or 40 level, then what? When 
the mission changes, you end up having shortages when you should be able to draw from the whole pool. 
Separating the two disciplines will create more problems than it solves in the long run.  
The real issue is that some people have a preference for one “track” or the other. What many people forget 
is that the qualities of a good collector are the same no matter what the mission. 
 
There are a lot of arguments predicated on the concept that splitting the MOS into interrogation ops and 
MSO degrades HUMINT because it denies a Soldier the ability to reach their full potential. I pose this 
question: where besides the -10 level course are the two disciplines integrated? No where! True, some 
principles and methodologies apply across the spectrum, but these are two distinct skill sets. Likely, many 
of us have seen the 35M with only interrogation experience enter his/her first source meet and attempt to 
interrogate the source. Inversely, many of us have likely seen the 35M with only MSO experience enter 
his/her first interrogation and be run into the ground by the detainee “trying to establish rapport.” 
I concede that a well-rounded collector CAN and SHOULD be able to do both. But artificially imposing 
this diversification in the quest for a well-rounded Soldier is what actually degrades capability. If the 
Soldier is capable and demonstrates talent or exceptional performance in one skill set, but is forced to 
divide his/her attention and effort in maintaining proficiency in both compels that Soldier to do so at 
expense of the one in which they truly excel. 
Splitting the MOS contains many implied tasks, not least of which is differentiating missions. While this 
is not a simple task, it begs the question, is it worth the effort? Again, many arguments here have been 
presented founded on the concept of quality over quantity. Allowing a Soldier to dedicate their training 
life-cycle to one of the two skill-sets (vice both), and giving them experience in one (vice both) results in 
a net gain in quality 
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Maybe we should have more focus on MSO for the HUMINT collector. I think there’s still a widespread 
perception that 35M is an interrogator -- maybe we should get away from that. 35M should be a collector 
first, and interrogation being one small skillset in a broader array of capabilities. 
I think our primary focus should be MSO anyway. Maybe we should make 35M primarily MSO and make 
advanced interrogation training an ASI. Provided we can GET advanced interrogation training, which as 
we’ve discussed may not be available. 
Great comments! Definitely spot on. I know that here in Afghanistan, the majority of our HUMINT 
personnel working in the DFIP in Bagram are perfectly content to be conducting interrogations in that 
brand-new, massive facility. The vast majority of them have little to no desire to head out and conduct 
source meets in support of MSO. Fortunately for them many of my peers and colleagues are the ones 
conducting the MSO which makes them perfectly happy on a professional level. I say, show me the 
individual who is an ideal interrogator and master MSOH all in one package. I daresay a very, very few 
people are qualified enough and comfortable enough to claim mastery of and expertise in both 
interrogations and MSO. This is all personality driven and lets face the facts folks...most talented 
MSOH’s aren’t all that fond of spending much time, if any, in a facility. The same is true conversely as 
well where that magical interrogator who can mentally crush a detainees willpower doesn’t usually care 
too much for running around planning and executing an SDR on the way to a VPU at a site they have 
been casing for the last couple of weeks to conduct a 90 minute meeting. Just because someone is 
breaking detainees left and right to find OBL doesn’t mean that same individual has the same personality 
or even desire to work as a friend and colleague with a LN, develop, recruit, train, and run him or her. 
Everyone keeps talking about quality over quantity which is all well and good since it provides a venue to 
complain about how TRADOC is screwing the FORSCOM units. If you truly want to affect change then 
help make decisions that will have a lasting impact upon our chosen profession. Look at it this way, if the 
entire MOS is mapped out WRT educational and assignment milestones what better way to work toward 
improving the quality of our personnel. If that SNCO position at BDE/DIV/Corps is coded for an ASI 
assigned through ASOC or a Master Interrogator Course how much easier is it then to get the training? 
Personally, I would like to see the vast majority of our 20 Level and higher positions coded for specific 
ASI’s just for that reason.  
That being said, you cannot reasonably expect me to believe that any NCO/SNCO assigned as an NCOIC 
at an FDS, DHA, or higher would be overly thrilled at having a soldier, NCO, WO who can run sources 
up and down the Hindu Kush mountains but has very little real-world interrogation experience. In fact, I 
don’t recall once in this forum any MSOH’s complaining that their numbers or quality of personnel would 
suffer or afraid that an interrogator might show up as their new MSOH soldier. As far as I can tell, we are 
primarily hearing from interrogation-focused leaders here. I agree that every M needs to have the baseline 
of training in both areas as well as the OJT at the units, by the time that soldier is promoted to SSG they 
will very likely have a very good idea which type of operations they feel stronger at and more qualified in. 
It is human nature and we should utilize a person’s strengths and motivation. Maybe NCO’s need to 
motivate their soldiers about interrogations more heavily than MSO. I will tell you that very shortly, the 
interrogations here in Afghanistan will be primarily conducted by Afghans in the facilities just as it 
transitioned in Iraq. The funny thing is that MSO’s will continue and likely increase significantly due to 
Op-Tempo. 
The bottom line is that TRADOC and HT-JCOE need to listen to the requests from the field for more 
advanced interrogation specific training so that our interrogators will have that same level of academic 
training available as the MSOH’s have. 
I disagree with splitting the MOS. I think you would lose some cohesion between the interrogators and the 
MSO teams. Small example- It would become territorial when it comes to field interrogations. If the MSO 
team can’t conduct them, then what are we supposed to do? Bring an interrogator along with us? It’s 
better to just improve the training and possibly create an ASI like…stated. 
I agree with [the] point that splitting the MOS would result in a duplication of effort. If HCT’s were 
unable to conduct interrogation, time and resources would be wasted getting an interrogator out of the 
DHA to do a field interrogation on a raid. Not to mention the fact that then the DHA would be short an 
interrogator. Keep one MOS!!! 
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I believe courses should be developed to compliment the interrogation side of the house before separation 
can occur. We have courses that focus on MSO certifying collectors to conduct MSO operations in the 
current theaters but none that really focus on interrogations. I know the 10 level course focuses on 
interrogations and commanders seem to think that this is enough. There is a little known advanced 
interrogation school but this course focuses on collectors who have already conducted interrogation 
operations whereas SOC is a practical necessity to conduct effective operations in the current conflicts. I 
believe that before a “Split” of the 35M MOS is undertaken we should at least develop a certifying 
program for interrogations, much like the MSO side of the house. 
I believe the MOS should have two separate tracks. One track focusing on MSO and one interrogation. I 
believe for the MSO side of the track there should be certain requirements.  
Rank and age should be just some of the requirements for conducting MSO operations. It should not be an 
entry-level position. I believe by emplacing this requirement alone, the overall quality of the MOS will 
increase.  
I have no issues with an interrogator being an entry level position. I also believe that at after a certain 
amount of experience and meeting the requirements for the MSO track, you should be afforded the 
opportunity to make a decision to stay as an interrogator or move on to being a collector. This will allow 
for individuals to grow in the MOS (improving the quality) and have control of your own career path. 
I agree... As a SGT/SSG or 20/30 level, you should be afforded the opportunity to make a decision to stay 
as an interrogator or move on to being a collector. 
Giving the individual the opportunity to branch out how they want is a great idea- but given operational 
needs, not everyone gets what they want, and how do we decide who those people are? Just food for 
thought. 
I agree wholeheartedly that entry-level troops are not usually a good fit for MSO- but neither do I feel that 
they’re right for interrogations either. Both require a high level of maturity, and some of the attitudes I 
have seen some of the young kids bring to interrogation operations are ridiculous and require a lot of 
fixing before they’re useful interrogators. That is time that we have, but that could be put to much better 
use if we didn’t have to deal with it as much/at all. 
Maybe if we did what the Marines do, and have troops be analysts or something first? That would 
hopefully give them a better understanding of how intelligence works as a whole, and that could only help 
them in the long run. The things my analysts taught me when I was the new guy are invaluable to me now, 
and it would have been nice to know them from the start. 
I agree with you the rank and age should be a requirement for MSO. That would help out on a lot of the 
issues we are having today. Too many younger inexperienced people are there are out trying to do MSO 
and just not being in the right mindset. 
I do not think it would be helpful to split 35M into two separate MOS’s. Source and detainee operations 
go hand in hand. There really is not enough significant differences between the two to warrant separation. 
The procedures for assessing, questioning, analyzing information, and report writing are all basically the 
same... whether or not the individual is physically controlled by U.S. forces. If our interrogations were 
more law enforcement-oriented, and our reason for interrogating detainees was to pressure them to 
confess, then it might be useful to separate the two. But the end goal of MI interrogation/ MSO is the 
same... to exploit information of intelligence value, and to use a series or approaches in order to make that 
happen. 
In every job, I believe it is necessary to have at least two separate job tracks in order to avoid stagnation. 
After working interrogations for six months straight, I know I was personally exhausted... physically and 
mentally. I needed a break to stay fresh and avoid getting into a rut. For me, that break was MSO. After 
doing that for six months, in turn, I was eager to get back to interrogations, and I found myself a better 
interrogator, not just because I was rested, but also because developing my MSO skillset actually 
improved my ability to “break” sources. 
No, I believe that a soldier is capable to conduct both skills. There are units where soldiers are conducting 
both duties and have no problems doing it. If the goal is to get better quality, we have to start training our 
soldiers with that same mentality. 
I don’t believe that separating the MOS in two would improve the soldier. I believe that soldier should 
take the time to improve themselves. Units need to set aside money and time for them to attend MOS 
schools. Just like they do for a 35N/P or those with languages. Instead of sending a 35M to the field as 
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soon as they get out of the 10 level course. For example, when I graduated AIT in June of 04, my first 
duty assignment was 4ID. I went to an FTX in July, where I set up and broke down tents. Then we went to 
NTC in Oct and deployed in Nov. In the six months, of wasted time for me as a then 97E, I had no MOS 
training other than the schoolhouse.  
So, in response to this question. Don’t separate the MOS, train soldiers sufficiently in the MOS. Send the 
soldier to SOC, Reid course, Kinesics, G2X, ASOC, etc. 
Speaking of training, I think, there needs to be a renewed focus on language for 35M. Language capability 
for a 35M is a huge bonus, both for interrogators and collectors, and I think it was a mistake for our MOS 
to get away from it. Though I guess that’s a different discussion. 
I agree, to a degree. There’s a lot of self-improvement and self-direction that needs to go on, but units 
really need to take an interest in the professional development of their HUMINTers. 
I am a firm believer in re-instating the language requirement for 35M. If anything, it will assist entry-level 
soldiers in building maturity while they are learning their language at DLI or within an immersion 
course... 
While they may not come out great linguists, they will grasp a better understanding of the language, the 
Army, and themselves. We can all agree that competency and maturity are all great traits in a collector. 
These will be bred from the additional training entry level 35Ms receive prior to arriving at their unit and 
to school. 
It should be a must for 30 level soldiers in the interim. Since we deal with interpreter management, etc. at 
the team level, the understanding of the language would go a long way to assisting in determining 
deceptive or otherwise counterproductive interpreters. Spot on guys. 
I don’t think that the MOS should be split, however I feel that units need to focus on getting everyone into 
the MOS schools that they need while in garrison, instead of simply wasting our time with random CTT 
training and weapons cleaning. Our MOS schools will help the new AIT soldiers as well as your seasoned 
35M. I agree… need quality of soldiers over quantity. The Soldiers I see coming out of the schoolhouse, 
are not ready for MSO or interrogations. If anything I think there should be a set age limit for this MOS. 
Say 21 perhaps. 
I agree. Since units do not take place in a draft to get the soldiers they want, the only thing the NCOs in 
that unit can do is effectively train the soldiers. Sending soldiers TDY when available, and having a 
developed training plan is key. The responsibility for us as NCOs is to develop the soldiers to be the best 
they can through effective training. 
This is already happening- and it kind of works. What happens though, when someone gets ‘typecast’ into 
a particular role (as I think it happens now) and doesn’t care for which side they’ve been pushed to? 
That’s one argument I have against the idea overall, that it’s one more thing that might dissuade troops 
from sticking around. 
Overall quality is not only a function of how specialized people are in this field. Quality has a lot to do 
with standards. Speaking with instructors and senior intel officers that I know personally has left me with 
a bad taste in my mouth about the rapid expansion of the MOS over the years. Standards were relaxed to 
an unacceptable level, in their opinions, and now they are having a hard time getting new troops to step up 
and take ownership of their work- I am not sure whether this is a maturity issue or what, but it seems 
fairly consistent from what I’ve been hearing. 
Only training and mentorship will improve the quality of 35M’s, and this could be accomplished via 
specialization. On the other hand, why can’t we train 35M’s to maintain a flexible skillset like we have 
now, and train it to standard? 
Separating the two (by MSO and interrogations) would permit/ focus the training for those specific skill 
sets ie? source handling and detainee/ interrogation operations. Also, the SH/ interrogator role would be 
clearly defined (for the collector’s respective unit) so that a CDR would better understand his/ her 35M 
asset capabilities. 
I cannot see how it would help to separate the 35M MOS. if we separate the MOS, MSO soldiers could 
not conduct field integrations. That would seriously hamper the efforts of the battlefield commander. In 
addition, the skill of the integrator and MSO are similar when it comes to dealing with people. Finally, 
area specialization is naturally achieved. Soldiers are separated into teams at their first unit and generally 
stay in that team’s area of specialization. 
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The quality is driven by the needs of the Army. The Army will lower standards to fill those needs and 
separating the MOS will not accomplish anything except have two MOSs with lower standards and now 
you make the Soldier less dynamic for the battlefield. Eventually quality will go up once the downsizing 
begins, until then we have to train these lower quality Soldiers to the best of our ability to prepare them 
for their missions. The advantage of having two skills sets for the MOS gives commanders a Soldier that 
can adapt to the mission at hand. If you separate the MOS you have to plan for switching out Soldiers if 
you mission changes for example. I am sure that can be a pain if a commander needs a field interrogation 
but his Soldier can only do MSO. 
A) I believe eventually we should split it, as for now though we should wait some time and continue to let 
the MOS settle we are going through this Roller Coaster constantly with everyone getting out and 
becoming contractors. My main reason for the split is while you have descent amount of 35M’s that can 
do all aspects of the job, you also have way to many that are only good at one or the other.  
B) I also agree with the training we would need to lay out more advanced courses for Interrogators. 
Just spent the past 30 minutes catching up on this issue. Here are a couple issues to consider. First, until 
the late 90’s, the interrogator course was an 8-week long Order of Battle interrogation course with no 
MSO component. CI did all the source ops. Second, as you all know, a -10 AIT graduate is unqualified by 
the DOD and ARMY MSO policies to operate anything but CAT 3 MSO without the special O-5 waiver. 
Basically, he’s unqualified to do MSO by the basic course. I believe ours is the only MOS where the basic 
course does NOT qualify you do your job. SOC/ASOC/FTC’s required to do any MSO of value in the 
DOD’s eyes. The O-5 waiver is a stop gap measure intended to keep the MSO collectors engaged until 
they can get the required and expected advanced MSO training. I fully expect that waiver option to go 
away once DA assesses there are enough SOC/ASOC grads to sustain the mission. Keeping the training 
combined provides greater flexibility to the unit to swap collectors around between HCTs and 
interrogation jobs, depending on the situation day by day. I completely agree that there needs to be an 
interrogation career track with additional formal training in interrogation besides Reid, LSI/SCAN, and 
the British course, which I’ve only heard of and don’t know any actual graduates of. There is an initiative 
at DCHC/DIA to develop a follow-on interrogation course. I would recommend that someone at 
USAIC/HT-JCOE set up a tiger team to draft a proposed POI for a journeyman/advanced interrogation 
series of courses. They’ll have to be short, no more than 4 to 5 weeks, though, if they intend to attract 
collectors from the divisions. Alternately, they could be tied to NCOES/WOES, but that would involve 
buy-in from DA G1. All those PME schools are detached from promotion now, so there’s really no 
incentive to go to WLC/PLDC/BNCOC as they’ve all devolved into administrative block checks versus 
real leadership training--but that’s a different topic altogether. In the meanwhile, I’d recommend that the 
units look for individual augmentee assignment options in response to RFFs to get their interrogators 
pushed out to units that are doing effective interrogations, that is, places other than the DFIP/JIDC-type 
places 
I think that recruiting people actually qualified to be a 35M would improve the quality of 35Ms. Since the 
recruiting surge and lowering of standards for entry, the overall quality of 35Ms has been substandard. 
Reducing the amount of responsibility is only encouraging soldiers that they can do less and still succeed. 
Yes, if it is done properly. For example, if first two years of the enlistment is MSO and strictly just that. 
Next two just interrogation. Once that is accomplished, maybe have a unit that can combine both of the 
experiences. 
I think it would be a good idea. It gives the collector a specific duty. Instead of going downrange and 
doing six months of interrogations and six months of source operations. Reason being is because it takes 
so much time to develop a source. When they take you off of one mission on to an interrogation and have 
no time to plan and prep it creates piss poor collection on both sides. 
No. How would we choose who would do what? I’m imagining that the responses below that say yes are 
from people who hate doing interrogations. The real problem is that for a job as important and sensitive as 
interrogations or MSO, there should be a selection process. But as long as the Army just plans to throw 
people at the problem, what’s the point? If mediocrity is the end result, it might as well be a fair one. 
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I believe that it should be broken up to two different tracks. When a new soldier enters into the MOS they 
should be given the Interrogation portion of the mission until they have reached the rank of E-5. Then 
they will be given the option to continue with the Interrogation aspect of the MOS or go to school to learn 
how to conduct MSO ops. This will help weed out the individuals who do not have the maturity or the 
ability to conduct source operations. 
No! All separating the MOS would do is create problems. Within HUMINT there are already 
specializations, interrogations and MSO. Specifically assigning individuals to those task by MOS and not 
by ability would destroy both operations. There are several HUMINTers that are exceptional at 
conducting MSO, but are completely lacking at interrogations and vice versa. Though this is an issue for 
HUMINT, it is manageable because HUMINTers can be moved from position to position depending on 
their strengths, however it is practically impossible to determine where a HUMINTers talents lie before 
they are engaged in operations. By separating the MOS, you would limit HUMINTers to their MOS 
instead of their talents drastically reducing the effectiveness of both operations. 
During my last deployment, I saw HCT’s who were overwhelmed due to the collapsing/combining of the 
battle space. Most HCT’s were picking up 12 to 15 extra sources from outgoing HCT’s. I am not saying 
this to show that collectors cannot do their mission. As an OMT I saw HCT’s conducting two to three 
source meets a day plus going on supporting mission of their perspective Battalions. In addition conduct 
liaison meets during KLE engagements, support screenings, debriefings, and walk-ins due to loss to 
civilian contracting teams. As everyone on this platform knows that after all the aforementioned MSO 
activities collector has to conduct future operational analysis and not to mention all the previous operation 
reports. 
I think that it should be separated into two separate tracks, because not every interrogator is source 
operator. 
I think it’s a mistake. The division would make manning much more difficult and TRADOC isn’t ready 
for the restructuring that would be necessary.  
Not to mention that while there are many courses for furthering MSO skills, there are virtually none for 
interrogation operations. 
It’s actually a fairly simple process as far as manning and assignments go. A soldier cannot be assigned to 
the 75th without an ASI of V for airborne ranger. A soldier is not assigned to an airborne unit with jump 
status without an ASI of P for basic parachutist. Debriefing billets require the ASI from DSDC etc. etc. 
Therefore, it is actually a simple process that HRC has used for decades in assigning the correct personnel 
to the appropriate billets. 
I feel the need to reiterate that my conversations with my colleagues have centered around the creation of 
two INTERNAL tracks for the “M” MOS and has not focused on the creation of a completely separate 
MOS. This would allow NCO’s at a certain level whether that’s at the 10, 20, or 30 level and WO’s to 
choose a specific career path to follow - Interrogator or MSO. All of the concerns regarding interrogation 
training are very valid and have been a topic of significant discussion at upper levels. 
As far as the individual who mentioned switching to MSO to “take a break” from interrogations - I don’t 
know what to say other than I find that a sad statement because when conducted properly, MSO is a very 
labor intensive and stressful line of work just like interrogations. 
I think the best statement on here is that not every interrogator is an MSOH - I would also add that is true 
in reverse as well. 
The bottom line is that this concept has the potential to significantly improve military education and 
career management for a great number of Soldiers if planned and implemented correctly. Junior Soldiers 
and NCO’s may not see the potential there because your input into personal assignments is fairly limited 
whereas SNCO’s, WO’s, and O’s have a lot more influence in their own personal assignments. So 
essentially many of us can, to a great extent, determine what type of billet we are going to fill whether it’s 
for interrogations, MSO, or management and oversight of both. 
I think we can all agree that the most significant take-away from this discussion would be to increase the 
availability of advanced interrogation training. I think we would see those course fill up rather quickly and 
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